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ABSTRACT 
In educational and organisational settings it has become common practice to 
use computer-based complex problems that represent dynamic systems for 
assessment and training purposes. In the interpretation of performance scores and the 
design of training programs, it is often assumed that the capacity to effectively 
control the outcomes of a dynamic system depends on the acquisition of structural 
knowledge. Control performance scores are generally interpreted as evidence of 
individual differences in the capacity to acquire and utilise structural knowledge and 
training programs typically try to improve learners‘ mental models of the system of 
interest. However, a causal relationship between the acquisition of structural 
knowledge and successful system control has not been established, and some 
findings suggest that it may be possible to control dynamic systems in the absence of 
structural knowledge. 
Therefore, the goals of this project were to determine the conditions that are 
required to learn how to control dynamic systems and the psychological processes 
that separate successful from less successful problem solvers in the performance of 
this task. The main emphasis of this investigation was to clarify the role of structural 
knowledge in the control of dynamic systems and to identify sources of individual 
differences in problem solvers‘ capacity to acquire such knowledge and apply it in a 
goal-orientated application.  
In a series of studies, a combined experimental and differential approach was 
adopted to address these goals. This consisted of the experimental manipulation of 
the task and structural characteristics of complex problems combined with the use of 
process indicators and external psychometric tests. Study 1 examined whether 
problem solvers need to directly interact with a dynamic system in order to acquire 
structural knowledge that is useful for system control. Study 2 examined whether 
increments in structural knowledge lead to improvements in control performance and 
whether dynamic systems can be successfully controlled without structural 
knowledge. Study 3 examined whether the relationship between structural 
knowledge and control performance is moderated by system complexity. Each of 
these studies also investigated the role of fluid intelligence in the acquisition and 
application of knowledge. Additional methodological contributions include the 
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application of Cognitive Load Theory to the design of the instructions used to 
manipulate structural knowledge, the use of randomly generated control performance 
scores to evaluate the success of performance and the development of a theoretically 
driven operationalisation of system complexity. 
Across the studies, it was found that structural knowledge was a necessary 
condition of better than random performance and that there was a causal relationship 
between structural knowledge and control performance. However, the likelihood that 
structural knowledge would be acquired and utilised was found to be dependent on 
the complexity of the system. Small increments in system complexity resulted in 
floor effects on performance. Fluid intelligence was found to play a crucial role in 
the acquisition and subsequent application of knowledge. Overall, the results indicate 
that the complexity of the system determines the amount of knowledge that is 
acquired by the problem solver, which in turn, combined with their intelligence, 
determines the quality of their control performance. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AIMS AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
Many situations require us (as human problem solvers) to interact with, and 
learn how to control, dynamic systems of causally connected variables. Learning 
how to heat food in a microwave, respond to emails and buy train tickets are just a 
few of the many examples that might be encountered in everyday life. On a more 
complex scale, the successful management of stock levels in a factory, hospital 
admissions, military operations and inflation in economies, requires problem solvers 
to manipulate and control the outcomes of highly inter-connected systems of 
variables. This thesis will examine the conditions that are required to learn how to 
effectively control the outcomes of dynamic systems and the cognitive processes that 
separate successful from less successful problem solvers in the performance of this 
task. 
Since the 1970s a myriad of computer-based problems that represent dynamic 
systems have been constructed to investigate how people behave in complex 
environments. They are referred to as dynamic decision-making tasks (e.g. Brehmer 
& Allard, 1991; Gary & Wood, 2007), micro-worlds (e.g. Brehmer & Dörner, 1993; 
Kluge, 2008; Cañas & Waern, 2005, Funke & Frensch, 2007), simulations (Bühner, 
Kröner, Ziegler, 2008; Wood, Beckmann & Birney, 2009), computer-simulated 
scenarios (e.g. Funke, 2001), process-control tasks (e.g. Broadbent, 1977), complex 
dynamic control tasks (e.g. Osman, 2010), finite state automata (e.g. Buchner & 
Funke, 1993; Buchner, Funke & Berry, 1995) and complex problems (e.g. Beckmann 
& Guthke, 1995). In this thesis, for the sake of simplicity they will all be referred to 
as complex problems.   
Complex problems consist of a number of inputs (variables that the problem 
solver can change) and outputs (outcomes that are generated by the system). The 
problem solver can change the values of the inputs, which affects the values of the 
outputs via causal structures that can be described algorithmically. The systems are 
considered to be ―dynamic‖ because the values of the outputs change in response to 
the problem solvers‘ actions, as well as independently over time (Edwards, 1962; 
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Brehmer, 1992; Funke, 1992). Typically, problem solvers are required to discover 
the relationships between the variables in the system; this is referred to as their 
structural knowledge. Concurrently or subsequently, they are also required to 
manipulate the inputs to reach certain goal values for the outputs; this is referred to 
as the quality of their system control, or control performance.  
In educational and organisational settings, it has become common practice to 
use complex problems for assessment and selection purposes (Funke, 1998; U. 
Funke, 1998; Hornke & Kersting, 2005; Kluge, 2008). For example, in 1999 the 
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) used the complex problem 
RAUMFAHRT (a virtual space shuttle) to assess the capacities to acquire knowledge 
and learn to control dynamic systems (Wirth & Funke, 2005). A set of similar 
complex problems will be included in PISA 2012 (The MicroDYN Approach; Greiff 
& Funke, 2008; 2009). The results of PISA are used to compare the knowledge and 
skills of students from different educational systems to inform the educational policy 
of the 60 participating countries (OECD Program for International Student 
Assessment). In organisational settings, complex problems are frequently used to aid 
the selection of personnel for roles in management, complex machinery operation 
and industrial research (Funke, 1998; U. Funke, 1998). For instance, in Germany, 
they are often preferred for the purpose of selection over traditional measures of 
intelligence (U. Funke, 1998; Kluge, 2008). The widespread adoption of complex 
problems in assessment and selection settings indicates that the capacity to control 
dynamic systems is seen as a key factor in job and educational success.  
A large number of complex problems have also been developed for the 
purposes of education and training. Over the last ten years, the use of complex 
problems that represent scientific principles has become prevalent in primary and 
secondary education, although they are not typically considered to be a replacement 
for mainstream teaching and learning practices (de Freitas & Oliver, 2006; de Jong & 
Van Joolingen, 1998; Hulshof & De Jong, 2006; Goldstone & Sakamoto, 2003). 
Similarly, complex problems that represent systems in business are used pervasively 
in MBA programs and for personnel training (Wolfe & Rogé, 1997; U. Funke, 1998; 
Wood, Beckmann & Birney, 2009; Stainton, Johnson & Borodzicz, 2010). 
Proponents of this approach to teaching argue that complex problems are 
advantageous for training and education because they: a) have high face validity, b) 
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provide a new way of communicating with the ―net generation‖, c) are more 
engaging than traditional methods of teaching, d) allow for experimentation in a 
―low-risk‖ environment, e) reduce the time needed to expose learners to a wide-
variety of situations and f) are adaptable to different training objectives (Wolfe & 
Rogé, 1997; U. Funke, 1998; Goldstone & Sakamoto, 2003; Hornke & Kersting, 
2005; de Freitas & Oliver, 2006; Wood, Beckmann & Birney, 2009; Stainton, 
Johnson & Borodzicz, 2010). Nevertheless, these assertions are usually tempered by 
the acknowledgement that there is dearth of empirical evidence to support the claim 
that the use of complex problems benefits traditional learning outcomes (e.g. the 
transfer of skills and knowledge to real world settings).  
In assessment and training contexts, there is a long held assumption that the 
problem solvers‘ capacity to effectively control the outcomes of dynamic systems 
depends on their knowledge of the underlying structure of the system. Consequently, 
differences in control performance scores are interpreted as evidence of individual 
differences in the capacity to acquire and utilise structural knowledge in dynamic 
environments (Hornke & Kersting, 2005; Kluge, 2008; Greiff & Funke, 2008; 2009). 
Similarly, interventions designed to improve the control of dynamic systems often 
encourage learners to map their mental models, challenge their mental models or 
improve their mental models of the underlying structure of the system in question 
(Sterman, 1994; Wolfe & Rogé, 1997; U. Funke, 1998; Gonzalez, 1999; de Freitas & 
Oliver, 2006). In both contexts poor control performance is typically interpreted as 
evidence that test takers or learners do not possess sufficient knowledge of the 
underlying structure of the system. 
Such an assumption might seem sensible, considering the well-established link 
between expertise and domain knowledge in naturalistic settings, such as chess and 
physics. In comparison to novices, experts are characterised by a high level of 
successful performance in a particular domain. Concomitantly, they possess a large 
amount of highly structured domain knowledge and tend to focus on the deep 
structure of problems rather than on their surface features (de Groot, 1978; Chase & 
Simon, 1973; Chi, Glaser & Rees, 1982; Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Ericsson, 
Prietula & Cokely, 2007). This suggests that the superior performance of experts is 
crucially dependent on their abstract domain knowledge (Holyoak, 1991; Ericsson, 
2003). 
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However, the results of studies that have investigated how people learn to 
control dynamic systems do not clearly support a causal relationship between the 
acquisition of structural knowledge and successful system control. On the one hand, 
a number of studies have shown strong associations between the amount of structural 
knowledge acquired by problem solvers and their capacity to control the outcomes of 
dynamic systems (Funke & Müller, 1988; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; Vollmeyer, 
Burns & Holyoak, 1996; Kröner, Plass & Leutner, 2005; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; 
Osman, 2008). On the other hand, a number of studies have demonstrated that 
problem solvers can learn to control the outcomes of dynamic system seemingly in 
the absence of structural knowledge (Broadbent, 1977; Broadbent, Fitzgerald & 
Broadbent, 1986; Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Berry, 1984; Berry, 1991; Stanley, 
Matthews, Buss & Kotler-Cope, 1989; Marescaux, Luc & Karnas, 1989; Dienes & 
Fahey, 1995). Most importantly, the provision of structural information appears to 
have no significant effect of the quality of system control (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 
1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993; Preußler, 1996). This suggests that the efficient control of 
dynamic systems may not depend on the acquisition of structural knowledge (these 
findings are discussed in detail in Chapter 3).  
This possibility has been widely discussed, and a number of alternative views 
on how people learn to control dynamic systems have been put forward. One 
perspective is that dynamic systems can be controlled through trial-and-error (Putz-
Osterloh, 1993). Another is that problem solvers require a period of practice at 
controlling the system before they can effectively utilise structural knowledge 
(Preußler, 1998; Schoppek, 1998; 2002; 2004). Still others put forward the case that 
problem solvers must acquire knowledge of specific actions and their outcomes 
through practice, and that the acquisition of structural knowledge has no bearing on 
the success of this endeavour (Broadbent, Fitzgerald & Broadbent, 1986; Marescaux, 
Luc & Karnas, 1989; Dienes & Fahey, 1993; Kluwe, Haider & Misiak, 1990; Kluwe, 
1993, 1995; Berry & Broadbent, 1995; Gonzalez, Lerch & Lebiere, 2003). 
Obviously, these arguments are inconsistent with each other and at the present time 
there is no clear evidence that favours any particular argument. 
Clearly, an accurate model of how people learn to control dynamic systems is 
critical for the valid use of complex problems in applied settings. Currently, the 
cognitive processes that differentiate successful from less successful problem solvers 
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in the control of dynamic systems remain unspecified (Kluwe, Misiak & Haider, 
1991; Funke, 1992; U. Funke, 1998). Hence, complex problem solving can only be 
defined as whatever the complex problem solving tests measure (to appropriate 
Boring‘s (1923) famous answer to the question of ―what is intelligence?‖). As a 
result, we do not know how best to train people to control dynamic systems. 
Consequently, the development of training programs can only progress through trial-
and-error (Gonzalez, 1999). This state of affairs is clearly incongruent with an 
evidence-based approach to assessment and training. 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the conditions that are 
required to learn how to effectively control the outcomes of dynamic systems, with a 
particular focus on the role of structural knowledge. The following questions will be 
addressed: 
 Do problem solvers need structural knowledge in order to control 
dynamic systems effectively? 
If so, 
 How must this knowledge be acquired? 
 Is there is a systematic relationship between the amount of structural 
knowledge that is acquired and the quality of system control?  
 Are there systematic sources of individual differences that might explain 
the capacity to acquire and utilise knowledge?  
 Does the complexity of the underlying structure of the system influence 
the relationship between structural knowledge and the quality of system 
control?  
The aim of the following sections is to provide a guide for the reader of this 
thesis. The first section will define the key terms that are used throughout this thesis. 
The second section will outline the importance of a combined experimental and 
differential approach to the study of system control, which is the basic 
methodological approach adopted in the empirical work reported in this thesis. The 
final section will give an overview of the subsequent chapters. 
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1.2 Key terms 
1.2.1 Tasks and Problems 
Firstly, in order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to define what is meant by 
the terms ―task‖ and ―problem‖. The use of cognitive tasks is central to the study of 
human behaviour in psychology in general, and problem solving in particular 
(Hackman, 1969; Wood, 1986).  A task has a recognisable beginning and an end, and 
contains a certain set of stimuli and guidelines concerning the goals to be achieved 
(Hackman, 1969). Clearly, problems have these characteristics too; yet problems are 
usually seen as distinct from cognitive tasks more generally. 
A commonly used distinction between a ―task‖ and a ―problem‖ is whether the 
solution to the desired goal state is known from the outset of performance. For 
example, Frensch and Funke (1995) review a number of alternative definitions of the 
term ―problem‖, and conclude that a problem can be said to exist when an individual 
does not immediately know how to address the difference between the current state 
of affairs and the desired state of affairs (the goal state). This definition can be traced 
as far back to Duncker (1945), who writes: ―A problem arises when a living creature 
has a goal but does not know how this goal is to be reached‖ (p.1). Thus, in line with 
this definition, whether a situation constitutes a ―task‖ or a ―problem‖ can only be 
determined with reference to the knowledge of the particular individual who is 
required to achieve the desired goal state. 
This definition is problematic as it implies that individual and situational 
characteristics determine whether a situation is to be defined as a ―task‖ or a 
―problem‖. A problem for one person may be a task for another, depending on their 
level of prior experience. Conversely, a problem may be transformed into a task by 
providing the individual with the relevant solution to apply. In turn, this suggests that 
a problem might become a task once an individual has identified the correct solution. 
In effect, this excludes solution application from the collection of processes that can 
be considered as part of problem solving. As such, this distinction between ―task‖ 
and ―problem‖ is insufficient for the purposes of this thesis. 
In order to overcome these issues, the terms ―problem‖ and ―task‖ are used 
more concretely in this thesis. The term ―problem‖ is used to encompass the entire 
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situation that the individual encounters within the experimental setting.  The term 
―task‖ is used to refer to an overarching goal that is imposed by the instructions 
given in the situation. For example, in the context of complex problems, most often 
the tasks to be performed by the problem solver are ―acquire knowledge about the 
relationships between the variables in the system‖ and ―control the outcomes of the 
system‖. Thus, the task to be performed constitutes one aspect of the overall problem 
encountered by the individual. 
1.2.2 Complex problems 
Three major research approaches have been developed that use complex 
problems to investigate how people learn to control dynamic systems: Dynamic 
Decision Making (e.g. Dörner, 1975, Brehmer, 1987; Sterman, 1994; Busemeyer, 
2002; Omodei & Wearing, 1995), Implicit Learning (e.g. Broadbent, 1977; Berry & 
Broadbent, 1984) and the Linear Structural Equation approach (e.g. Funke, 1985; 
1993; 2001; Beckmann, 1994). Each approach entails the use of complex problems 
that have specific structural, surface and task characteristics. As Chapter 2 presents a 
comprehensive comparison of the approaches in these terms, the following sections 
will broadly describe each of these characteristics. This will also serve to highlight 
the heterogeneous nature of complex problems more generally. 
1.2.2.1 Structural characteristics 
Structural characteristics describe the properties of the system that is 
represented in the complex problem. The design of the structure of a system may be 
guided by a formal framework which specifies the characteristics that the system 
must contain (e.g. Funke, 1985; 1993; 2001) or informed by data and assumptions 
about a particular system in the real world (Goosen, Jensen & Wells, 2001; Stainton 
et al., 2010). Quesada, Kintsch and Gomez (2005) have suggested that the structural 
characteristics of complex problems can be further described in terms of time-
related, variable-related and system-behaviour-related elements: 
Time-related elements include whether the system is event-driven or clock-
driven, and the degree of time pressure. Event-driven systems change in discrete 
steps triggered by problem solvers‘ actions, while clock driven systems change in 
response to an internal clock. The degree of time pressure that problem solvers may 
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be exposed to varies considerably across different systems (Quesada et al., 2005). In 
some systems, the problem solver may take as much time as they need to make a 
decision within the reasonable constraints of the experimental session (e.g. CHERRY 
TREE; Beckmann, 1994). In other systems, such as FIRECHIEF (Omodei & 
Wearing, 1995), the time pressure is intense and the problem solver must make quick 
decisions.  
Variable-related elements include the type and number of variables, the 
number of relationships between the variables and whether these relationships are 
linear or non-linear (Quesada et al., 2005). All systems include input and output 
variables, but mediating and moderating variables may also be present which cannot 
be directly observed (Wood, Beckmann & Birney, 2009). The number of variables 
present in different structures varies considerably; at the lower end of the spectrum 
CITY TRANSPORTATION (Broadbent, 1977) consists of a single input and a 
single output variable, while at the extreme upper end of the spectrum 
LOHHAUSEN (Dörner, Kreuzig, Reither & Stäudel, 1983) consists of over 2000 
variables. The number of variables is not indicative of the number of relations in a 
system, as some structures contain many variables with few connections, while 
others contain few variables with highly inter-connected structures (Blech & Funke, 
2005). While many systems contain purely linear relationships between the variables, 
DURESS (Christoffersen, Hunter & Vicente, 1996), FIRECHIEF (Omodei & 
Wearing 1995), LOHHAUSEN (Dörner et al., 1983) and MORO (Dörner, Stäudel & 
Strohschneider, 1986) contain quadratic and exponential relationships. The effect of 
the number of variables and relations on system control, and their relationship to the 
complexity of the system, is discussed in Chapter 7. 
System-behaviour-related elements include whether the system is opaque or 
transparent, stochastic or deterministic, and whether the feedback is immediate or 
delayed (Quesada et al., 2005). In opaque systems, the underlying structure of the 
system cannot be fully determined by the problem solver as the system contains 
layers of hidden variables. In transparent systems, all the variables are displayed in 
the user interface (Funke, 1991; Quesada et al., 2005). In the literature, transparency 
also sometimes means that problem solvers are informed as to the underlying 
structure of the system prior to the instruction to control the system (Putz-Osterloh & 
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Luer, 1981; Funke, 1991; Putz-Osterloh, 1993; Latzina, 1990). However, in this 
thesis the term transparency is used strictly in the former sense.  
Stochastic systems contain random components in their underlying structures 
(Quesada et al., 2005). For example, in Broadbent and Berry‘s (1984) SUGAR 
FACTORY problem, which consists of a single input and output variable, ±1000 is 
added on a psudo-random basis to the value of the output variable on two-thirds of 
the trials. This means that no unique output value is associated with any one starting 
state and input value. In comparison, in deterministic systems, the same starting state 
and action will always produce the same outcome.  
Problem solvers receive feedback about the effect of their actions on the 
system via the value of the output variables. In systems where the feedback is 
immediate, the effect of the problem solvers‘ actions on the outputs is evident as 
soon as the action is executed. In systems where the feedback is delayed, the effect 
of the problem solvers‘ actions may only become apparent after a certain number of 
trials have passed or a set period of time has elapsed. The presence of feedback 
delays makes it more difficult to connect specific actions to their outcomes, and 
distinguish between autonomous changes in the output variables and changes that are 
the result of direct interventions on the system variables (Brehmer & Allard, 1991; 
Brehmer, 1995).  
1.2.2.2 Surface characteristics 
The surface of a complex problem is the user interface that the problem solver 
interacts with (Wood, Beckmann & Birney, 2009). The most widely discussed 
surface characteristic is the type of cover story and labels given to the system 
variables. A distinction is often made between ―domain-independent‖ or ―abstract‖, 
and ―semantically meaningful‖ or ―concrete‖ cover stories and variable labels (e.g. 
Hesse, 1982; Beckmann, 1994; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; Goldstone & Sakamoto, 
2003; Lazonder, Wilhelm & Hagemans, 2008; Bühner, Kröner & Ziegler, 2008, 
Lazonder, Wilhelm & Van Lieburg, 2009). Semantically meaningful or concrete 
cover stories and variable labels refer to familiar systems in the real world. For 
example, in LOHHAUSEN the problem solver is instructed to act as the mayor of a 
virtual small town dealing with variables labelled ―living standard of the workforce‖ 
and ―energy consumption‖ (Dörner, 1987), while in FIRECHIEF individuals are 
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required to control variables labelled as ―helicopters‖ or ―trucks‖ to stop simulated 
forest fires spreading (Omodei & Wearing, 1995). Domain-independent or abstract 
cover stories and variable labels do not refer to any known or previously experienced 
system (e.g. COLORSIM, Kluge, 2008; MULTIFLUX, Kröner, 2001). For example, 
in MULTIFLUX problem solvers are instructed to work out how to control a 
fictitious machine that consists of four control devices labelled ―A‖, ―B‖, ―C‖ and 
―D‖ and four instruments labelled ―1‖, ―2‖, ―3‖ and ―4‖.  
It could be argued that the important difference between problems such as 
LOHHAUSEN and MULTIFLUX is not in their ―concreteness‖ or ―abstractness‖. 
Rather, the important difference is whether the cover story and variable labels seem 
familiar or novel to the problem solver, and thus whether prior experience may be 
useful (Goode & Beckmann, under revision). Therefore, in this thesis, rather than 
classifying the surface features of complex problems in terms of whether they are 
―abstract‖ or ―concrete‖, the terms ―familiar‖ and ―novel‖ will be used.  
The surface of complex problems can also be described in terms of whether the 
user interface is graphical or numerical, or a combination of the two. In graphical 
user interfaces, the values of the system variables are represented as lines or bars on 
graphs. On each trial, problem solvers are able to set the input variables at positive, 
negative or constant values. The graphs that display the value of the output variables 
are then updated to show whether each variable has increased, decreased or remains 
unchanged (e.g. MACHINE, Beckmann, 1994; MULTIFLUX, Kröner, 2001). In 
contrast, numerical user interfaces display the exact values of the variables in a series 
of tables. On each trial, problem solvers are able to enter a number for each input 
variable that is typically constrained within a certain range. The table that displays 
the output variables is then updated to show the resulting numerical values (e.g. 
MICRODYN, Greiff & Funke, 2009). In some complex problems, such as 
COLORSIM (Kluge, 2008), the values of the input and output variables are 
represented in both graphs and tables.  
1.2.2.3 Task characteristics 
Task characteristics describe the goals that are imposed by the instructions 
given in the experimental setting. Knowledge-related goals direct the problem solver 
to acquire knowledge about the underlying structure of the system. Control-related 
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goals direct the problem solver to bring the system into a certain state. Each of these 
goals defines a task to be performed in relation to the system.  
With regard to control-related goals, a further distinction is often made 
between well- and ill-defined goals. Well-defined goals instruct the problem solver 
to achieve specific values for the output variables. For example, in MACHINE 
(Beckmann 1994) problem solvers are instructed to match the value of the outputs 
with lines indicated on the output graphs over a series of seven trials. In contrast, ill-
defined goals require the problem solver to interpret the instructions in order to 
formulate their own specific goals. For example, in MORO (Dörner, Stäudel & 
Strohschneider, 1986) problem solvers are instructed to improve the living 
conditions of a fictitious African tribe by manipulating variables such as pastures, 
cattle, fertiliser and housing. Problem solvers have to decide which of these variables 
are relevant to the living conditions of the fictitious tribe and how they should be 
altered. The consequences of well- and ill-defined goals for the interpretation of 
control performance scores are discussed in Chapter 2.   
Another particularly critical task characteristic is whether problem solvers are 
instructed to simultaneously acquire knowledge and control the system, or whether 
these tasks are separated experimentally. In many studies, problem solvers are 
instructed to perform both tasks simultaneously (e.g. Berry & Broadbent, 1984; 
1989; Sanderson, 1989; Rigas, 2000; Rigas, Carling & Brehmer, 2002; Süß, 1999; 
Wittmann & Süß, 1999; Wittmann & Hattrup, 2004). However, there is much debate 
over whether it is actually possible for problem solvers to perform both of these tasks 
concurrently because the optimal strategy required to discover the relationships 
between variables in a system often differs from the one that is required to control its  
outcomes (Vollmeyer, Burns & Holyoak, 1996; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002). This 
issue is discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3.  
1.3 A combined experimental and differential approach 
Complex problems have been studied from two different research traditions: 
The differential and the experimental. Differential research in this area has largely 
been occupied with the question of whether (or not) individual differences in system 
control can be explained by traditional measures of intelligence (e.g. Dörner, 
Kreuzig, Reither & Stäudel, 1983; Gediga, Schottke & Tuck-Bressler, 1984; Putz-
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Osterloh , 1981; Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Reichert & Dörner, 1988; Joslyn & 
Hunt, 1998; Kröner, 2001; Kröner & Leutner, 2002; Kröner, Plass & Leutner, 2005; 
Bühner, Kröner & Ziegler, 2008). As yet, findings are rather inconsistent, and this is 
likely because these studies have to a certain extent ignored the effect of structural, 
surface and task characteristics on performance.  In contrast, while experimental 
research in this area has made significant progress towards documenting the 
structural, surface and task characteristics that influence the acquisition of structural 
knowledge and control performance on average, this research has treated individual 
differences between subjects as error variance (e.g. Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Funke, 
1992; Kluge, 2008). As a result, our ability to explain and predict the performance of 
individuals on complex problems that have specific characteristics is severely 
limited.   
In this thesis we will attempt to address these limitations through the adoption 
of a combined experimental and differential approach, as advocated by Cronbach 
(1957; 1975). In particular, the amount of structural information available to problem 
solvers and the complexity of the underlying structure of systems will be 
manipulated experimentally. Process indicators and traditional measures of 
intelligence will be used to account for individual differences in the effect of these 
experimental manipulations on the acquisition of structural knowledge and control 
performance. This approach should allow us to identify whether the control of 
dynamic systems is causally dependent on the acquisition of structural knowledge, 
and explain why individuals differ in their capacity to acquire and utilise such 
knowledge. 
1.4 Overview of the thesis 
The initial literature review is presented in three short chapters. Overall, the 
purpose of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 is to identify inconsistencies and gaps in our 
knowledge of how people control dynamic systems, which then provides the basis 
for the experimental studies reported in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
Chapter 2 describes and critically examines the three major approaches that 
have investigated how people learn to control dynamic systems using complex 
problems (i.e. Dynamic Decision Making, Implicit Learning and Linear Structural 
Equations). The purpose of this chapter is to establish a context for the current 
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research and provide a justification for the selection of the methodological approach 
adopted in this thesis. 
Based on this analysis, Chapter 3 reviews and integrates the experimental 
findings from the different approaches with regard to the role of structural 
knowledge in the control of dynamic systems. The purpose of this section is to 
identify the structural, surface and task characteristics that might influence whether 
structural knowledge can be effectively acquired and utilised to control dynamic 
systems, and how this process may take place. 
Chapter 4 explicates a model of successful system control based on the 
findings presented in Chapter 3, and discusses possible sources of individual 
differences in the tasks of acquiring structural knowledge and controlling the 
outcomes of dynamic systems.  
Chapter 5 reports the data from a study (N = 91) that investigated the role of 
structural information and fluid intelligence in controlling a dynamic system.  The 
aim of this study was to determine whether problem solvers need to directly interact 
with a dynamic system in order to acquire structural knowledge that can be 
effectively utilised to control its outcomes, and to identify sources of individual 
differences in the acquisition and application of knowledge.  
Chapter 6 consists of a paper that was published in the journal Intelligence 
(Goode & Beckmann, 2010). This study (N = 75) investigated whether there is a 
causal relationship between the acquisition of structural knowledge and the 
efficiency of system control. The aim of this study was to establish whether 
structural knowledge is a necessary component of successful performance, and the 
extent to which the utilisation of knowledge depends on the problem solvers‘ level of 
fluid intelligence.  
Chapter 7 reports the data from a study (N = 293) that represents a synthesis 
and expansion of the work reported in Chapters 5 and 6. The aim of this study was to 
determine whether the results reported in Chapters 5 and 6 generalise to systems of 
differing complexity. 
Chapter 8 integrates the findings presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, in order to 
propose a model of successful system control. We consider the implications of the 
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current work for the use of complex problems for the purposes of assessment and 
training. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
COMPLEX PROBLEM SOLVING RESEARCH APPROACHES: A CRITICAL 
EVALUATION 
2.1 Introduction 
A recurrent tension exists in psychological research between a desire to 
maintain both experimental control and ecological validity (Neisser, 1976; Brehmer, 
1992; Brehmer & Dörner, 1993; DiFonzo, Hantula & Bordia, 1998; Gray, 2002). For 
example, Brehmer and Dörner (1993) express their concern that ―in field research 
there is often too much [complexity] to allow for any more definite conclusions, and 
in laboratory research, there is usually too little complexity to allow for any 
interesting conclusions‖ (p.172). On the one hand, this reflects an on-going concern 
as to whether laboratory tasks adequately represent the complex demands of real-life 
situations, and thus whether it is appropriate to generalise the theoretical concepts 
derived from such tasks to real life performances. On the other hand, there is also a 
concern that real life situations are far too complex to allow conclusive insights to be 
drawn about the cognitive processes that underlie performance. 
With this dilemma in mind, in the late 1970s researchers criticised traditional 
problem solving tasks, such as the Tower of Hanoi, for being far too simple, too 
transparent and static (Dörner, 1975; Broadbent, 1977). It was argued that in 
comparison, real-life tasks such as flying an aircraft, driving a car or managing an 
economy, were complex, opaque and dynamic (Buchner, 1995; Wenke, Frensch & 
Funke, 2004). In response, three major experimental approaches developed to 
examine how people behave in, and learn to control, complex and dynamic 
environments: Dynamic Decision Making (e.g. Dörner, 1975, Brehmer, 1987; 
Sterman, 1994; Busemeyer, 2002), Implicit Learning (e.g. Broadbent, 1977; Berry & 
Broadbent, 1984) and the Linear Structural Equation approach (e.g. Funke, 1985; 
1993; 2001; Beckmann, 1994; Vollmeyer, Burns & Holyoak, 1996).
1
  
Broadly, all researchers working within the constraints of these approaches are 
concerned with how people learn to control dynamic systems of variables. However, 
                                                        
1
 Computer-based simulations of complex and dynamic systems are also used to investigate discovery 
learning in conceptual domains. The approach adopted in these studies is similar to the dynamic 
decision making approach.  
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researchers from different approaches have addressed markedly different aspects of 
this question. Researchers who have used the Dynamic Decision Making (DDM) 
approach have largely been concerned with why people perform poorly in complex 
and dynamic environments, and whether or not traditional measures of intelligence 
reflect the same demands as those required to control dynamic systems (e.g. Dörner, 
1975, Brehmer, 1987; Sterman, 1994; Busemeyer, 2002). In this research, the effects 
of structural, surface and task characteristics on performance have largely been 
ignored. In comparison, researchers who have utilised the Linear Structural Equation 
approach have typically examined the effect of various problem characteristics on 
acquiring knowledge about, and controlling, dynamic systems (see Funke, 1991; 
1993; 2001). A limited number of researchers have used this approach to examine 
the role of individual differences in performance. Finally, researchers who have used 
the Implicit Learning approach have drawn distinctions between different modes of 
learning that are possible in dynamic environments (e.g. Broadbent, 1977; Berry & 
Broadbent, 1984; 1987). However, an integrated theory of how people learn to 
control dynamic systems needs to encompass all of these different perspectives: The 
cognitive mechanisms that operate during performance, individual differences, as 
well as structural, surface and task characteristics. 
Therefore, the aims of this chapter are to a) determine whether the research 
findings from the Dynamic Decision making (DDM), Implicit Learning and Linear 
Structural Equation approaches can be integrated into a holistic model of how people 
control dynamic systems and b) determine which approach provides the most 
methodologically sound framework for the study of the processes that underlie 
system control. Firstly, common elements across the approaches will be discussed. 
Secondly, each approach will be described and critically evaluated in terms of the 
type of systems they employ, whether they present complex problems in a familiar or 
novel context, the tasks set for the problem solver, the operationalisation of 
dependent variables and the ecological validity of the approach. 
2.2 Common features across the approaches 
Each approach uses computer-based problems that represent dynamic systems 
of inter-connected variables. At a mere descriptive level, these problems consist of a 
number of inputs (variables that the problem solver intervenes on) and outputs 
 17 
(outcomes that are generated by the system) that are represented in a computer 
program. The values of inputs can be changed, which affects the values of the 
outputs via more or less complex causal structures that relate the inputs to the 
outputs, and which can be described algorithmically. This is referred to as the 
underlying structure of the system. Systems are considered to be ―dynamic‖ when 
the values of the outputs change in response to problem solvers‘ actions and 
independently over time (Edwards, 1962; Brehmer, 1992; Funke, 1992). Typically, 
problem solvers are allowed to interact with the system over a set period of time or 
for a set number of trials, where a trial consists of setting the value of the input 
variables and viewing the subsequent effect on the output variables. 
In order to ―solve‖ the problem, problem solvers must learn how to manipulate 
the values of the input variables in order to control the values of the output variables 
to reach and maintain desired goal states. This is referred to as control performance. 
Efficient control performance is analogous to identifying the ―correct‖ solution in a 
traditional laboratory problem-solving task, such as an intelligence test item. 
However, unlike traditional problems, the application of a solution requires the 
problem solver to constantly intervene ime on the system variables to maintain the 
goal output variable states over a period of time. Therefore, the efficiency of control 
performance is typically evaluated over a set period of time during which the 
problem solver continuously interacts with the system to reach and maintain the 
desired goal states.  
In some studies, performance is also evaluated in terms of the amount of 
structural knowledge that problem solvers acquire while they interact with the 
system. Structural knowledge refers to verbalisable knowledge about the underlying 
structure of the system. This knowledge may be represented at different levels of 
precision. At the broadest level, only the existence of a relationship between two 
variables is known; this is referred to as qualitative structural knowledge. At a more 
specific level, the direction of the relationship is known, and optimally, the strength 
or numerical weight of the relationship can also be specified; this is referred to as 
quantitative structural knowledge (Funke, 1992; van Joolingen & de Jong, 1997; 
Kluge, 2008; Kröner, Leutner & Plass, 2005).  
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The distinction between structural knowledge and control performance is 
similar to that found in the cognitive skill acquisition literature between declarative 
and procedural knowledge, respectively. Declarative knowledge is general factual 
knowledge about a task, while procedural knowledge is how to perform a particular 
task (Anderson, 1983; 1993). In the case of complex problems, declarative 
knowledge entails knowing that one variable influences another (e.g. that variable X 
has a strong negative impact on variable Y) whilst procedural knowledge entails 
knowing how to achieve a particular result (e.g. knowing how to increase variable X 
by 3 points to decrease variable Y by 8 points).  
2.3 The Dynamic Decision Making approach 
2.3.1 Structural characteristics 
In this approach, complex problems are referred to as dynamic decision-
making tasks, micro-worlds or simulations. The systems that they represent share a 
number of key characteristics. In particular, they contain a large number of highly 
interconnected variables (between 10 and 2000), many of the relationships between 
the variables cannot be directly observed, and may be non-linear, and decisions must 
be made in real time. It is often argued that these characteristics mirror those of 
complex, dynamic and uncertain environments in the real world (Brehmer, 1992; 
Brehmer & Dörner, 1993; Kerstholt & Raaijmakers, 1997; DiFonzo, Hantula, & 
Bordia, 1998, Gray, 2002; Waern & Cañas, 2003; Cañas  & Waern, 2005; Brehmer, 
2005). 
Two frequently used complex problems in this approach are ―MORO‖ and 
―TAILORSHOP‖. In ―MORO‖ problem solvers must advise a tribe in Africa on how 
to improve their living conditions (Dörner, Stäudel & Strohschneider, 1986). The 
system contains 49 highly inter-connected variables, such as pastures, cattle, 
fertiliser, population and housing. ―TAILORSHOP‖ requires problem solvers to 
manage the supply chain of a virtual shirt-making factory. The system contains 24 
variables, such as raw materials, number of machines and workers. The goal is to 
maximise the profits of the company over a 12-month period (Putz-Osterloh, 1981). 
What makes these problems particularly challenging to solve is that the systems are 
opaque. That is, many of the effects cannot be directly observed because the 
variables change as a result of complex causal sequences of effects.  
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Although the complex problems used in this approach share some common 
structural characteristics, they are far from homogenous. This is problematic because 
a range of system properties, such as the number of variables (Preußler, 1997), the 
number of relations (Kluge, 2008; Funke, 1992), the type of relations (Funke, 1992), 
feedback delays (Sterman, 1989; Brehmer & Allard, 1991), the consistency of the 
relationships between the inputs and the outputs (Ackerman & Cianciolo, 2002), the 
type of connectivity pattern (Howie & Vicente, 1998) and whether the relationships 
in the system are linear or non-linear (Dörner, 1989; Dörner & Scholkopf, 1991) 
have been shown to have significant impacts on the difficulty of knowledge 
acquisition and control performance. This state of affairs has led many to argue that a 
comparison of the experimental findings from studies that use different complex 
problems is almost impossible (Buchner, 1995; Funke, 1992; Brehmer, 2005; 
Kerstholt & Raaijmakers, 1997; Buchner & Funke, 1993; Diehl & Sterman, 1995; 
Mackinnon & Wearing, 1985). 
In order to compare the experimental results from different complex problems, 
Quesada et al. (2005) suggest that system structures should be formally described. In 
an effort towards the construction of a taxonomy of system characteristics they 
describe ten different dimensions on which problems used in the DDM literature 
differ, including the number of variables, the type of variables (continuous or 
discrete), whether there are feedback delays and whether the system is stochastic or 
deterministic (see also Gonzalez, Vanyukov & Martin, 2005 for a similar taxonomy). 
However, it could be argued that this does not resolve the problem, as Quesada et al. 
(2005) provide no guidelines as to how similar systems should be to yield 
comparable experimental results.  
2.3.2 Type of cover story 
As the explicitly stated aim of the DDM approach is to ―bring the field into the 
laboratory‖ (Brehmer, 2005, p.75) researchers use cover stories that refer to familiar 
situations in the real world. Many cover stories have been used, including managing 
an economy (Sterman, 1989), acting as the mayor of a town (Dörner, 1987), 
directing a fire fighting unit (Brehmer, 1990; 1992) and diagnosing medical 
problems (Kleinmuntz & Thomas, 1987). The use of familiar cover stories is 
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designed to encourage problem solvers to bring their prior experience to bear in 
laboratory tasks, as they would in real life (Brehmer & Dörner, 1993). 
This approach has been frequently criticised precisely because it encourages 
subjects to form assumptions about the underlying structure of the system, and often 
no attempt is made to ensure that the underlying structure of the system reflects the 
structure of the real life situation that it is supposed to represent (Buchner, 1995; 
Funke, 1992; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995). This is problematic because some 
findings suggest that the acquisition of structural knowledge is facilitated if prior 
experience is in concordance with the actual underlying structure of the system, but 
is hindered if it is in conflict (Reither, 1981; Hesse, 1982; Lazonder, Wilhelm, & 
Hagemans, 2008; Lazonder, Wilhelm & Van Lieburg, 2009). These results suggest 
that assumptions evoked by the cover story of a problem may confound the 
interpretation of other experimental manipulations. 
Even if experimenters do try to explicitly replicate the structure of real world 
situations, there is no reason to assume that it is aligned with a particular individual‘s 
prior experience. This is clearly demonstrated in the results of Lazonder et al.‘s 
(2008) study, in which the underlying structure of the system was explicitly designed 
to reflect commonly known relationships in everyday life. The task required subjects 
to investigate how training frequency, smoking and nutrition affected the time it took 
an athlete to run 10km. Increased training frequency, eating ―sport food‖ and not 
smoking decreased the athlete‘s time, while eating ―junk food‖ increased their time. 
These relations might seem rather obvious; however, a knowledge test revealed that 
two subjects (out of forty) had incorrect assumptions about these relationships. These 
findings suggest that even in carefully designed problems, individual differences in 
prior knowledge are likely to be a source of potential error variance. It is perhaps 
surprising then, that prior knowledge is rarely controlled for in experimental studies 
within the DDM approach (with the notable exceptions of Leutner, 2002; Wittmann 
& Hattrup, 2004).  
2.3.3 Task characteristics 
The key task characteristics utilised in the DDM approach are that: a) subjects 
must simultaneously try to acquire knowledge about the underlying structure of the 
system while they try to control it and b) the goal states are usually ill-defined. It has 
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been argued that these demands reflect reality because we (as human problem 
solvers) rarely have the opportunity to acquire knowledge about a system 
independently from our attempts to manipulate it and we are often required to decide 
which goals are relevant to a particular context (Dörner & Wearing, 1995; Rigas, 
Carling & Brehmer, 2002). However, these characteristics place a serious limit on 
the validity and reliability of the dependent variables that can be derived as 
performance measures, and make it difficult to determine which behaviours lead to 
successful performance. 
The requirement that subjects simultaneously control and acquire knowledge 
about a system presents two main challenges to the assessment of performance. 
Firstly, the strategy that is necessary to acquire knowledge about a system may be 
incompatible with the one that is needed to control it. Thus, the problem solver who 
first undertakes the task to systematically discover the underlying structure of a 
system before they attempt to control it may appear to have worse control 
performance than the problem solver who attempts to incrementally manipulate the 
output variables towards the goal state using a trial-and-error strategy (Kerstholt & 
Raaijmakers, 1997). Secondly, if we assume that problem solvers do not initially 
know how to control the outcomes, then this implies that control performance should 
improve over the course of the task. This will limit the reliability of aggregated 
measures of control performance because performance at different points in time will 
reflect different levels of expertise. This is one possible reason as to why the 
reliability of control performance measures is often low (Funke, 1983; 1984; Kluwe, 
Misiak & Haider, 1991; Wenke & Frensch, 2003; Wenke, Frensch & Funke, 2004). 
This is problematic because any researcher using correlations must demonstrate that 
the variables of interest show sufficient reliability. Thus, the requirement to 
simultaneously acquire knowledge and control a system poses a significant threat to 
the validity and reliability of performance measures. 
The use of ill-defined goals is also likely to pose a threat to the validity of 
control performance measures because problem solvers must formulate their own 
goals and these self-set goals may differ across individuals. For example, in 
LOUHHAUSEN (Dörner, Kreuzig, Reither & Stäudel, 1983), in which subjects act 
as the mayor of a virtual small town, the goal is to ensure that the residents are 
―satisfied with both the town and their own lives‖ (Dörner & Wearing, 1995, p.67). 
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Given such instructions, it is clear that different subjects may prioritise different sub-
goals, according to their personal values. This makes it difficult to compare the 
performance of different subjects (Funke, 1993) and any operationalization of 
solution quality is somewhat arbitrary. 
Self-set goals are also problematic because findings from verbal protocols 
suggest that subjects may not adhere to consistent goals for performance over the 
course of interacting with the system. Dörner (1980) reports that subjects often jump 
from one goal to the next, relatively quickly, without achieving any goal, and treating 
all goals superficially. In the most extreme situation, problem solvers may fail to set 
any concrete goals at all. Dörner (1980) sees this as a general problem that people 
confront when dealing with real-world tasks. Alternatively, however, it could be 
argued that it may reflect the fact that subjects are not sure what they are actually 
supposed to be doing. 
More recently, the proponents of the DDM approach have recognised the 
problems with ill-defined goals, and have advocated in favour of the use of specific 
goals (e.g. Rigas, Carling & Brehmer, 2002). However, the complex nature of most 
of the systems utilised in the DDM approach means that there are multiple ways in 
which any particular goal might be achieved. For example, in TAILORSHOP (Putz-
Osterloh, 1981) subjects are told to maximise the profits of a clothing factory. 
Subjects who invest heavily in equipment and supplies will produce greater profits in 
the later half of simulation than subjects who makes no investment in the company. 
On average, however, there will be no difference in their 12-month profit. Therefore, 
successful performance cannot be clearly specified on a behavioural level, as no 
optimal solution exists to the problem (Kluwe et al., 1991). This makes it difficult to 
distinguish the processes that differentiate successful from less successful problem 
solvers. 
2.3.4 Operationalisation of dependent variables 
Within the DDM approach, there is little consensus as how control 
performance should be operationalised, even within studies that use the same 
complex problem. For example, using the complex problem TAILORSHOP, Putz-
Osterloh (1981) operationalised control performance in terms of the number of 
months with increased capital assets, while Barth and Funke (2010) calculated the 
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profits at the end of every month. Most significantly, findings show that when 
different dependent measures of performance are derived from the same task, 
different results are obtained with regard to the correlation between traditional 
measures of intelligence and control performance (i.e. TAILORSHOP e.g. Funke, 
1983; Putz-Osterloh, 1981; Süß, Kersting & Oberauer, 1991 and MORO, e.g. Elg, 
2005). This may suggest that different performance measures reflect different facets 
of control performance (Elg, 2005) or it may simply indicate that the measures differ 
in their reliability (Kluwe et al., 1991; Wenke & Frensch, 2003; Wenke et al., 2004). 
Similarly, no general method has been developed to assess what problem 
solvers have learnt about the underlying structure of such systems. Typically, 
subjects are given a series of questions designed to assess their knowledge of how 
the system works (e.g. Wittmann & Hattrup, 2004; Elg, 2005). However, the format 
and content of these assessments (i.e. whether they assess quantitative, qualitative or 
both types of structural knowledge) is inconsistent. Obviously, this makes 
comparisons across studies problematic. 
The majority of studies do not directly measure structural knowledge (e.g. 
Reither, 1981; Diehl & Sterman, 1995; Rigas, Carling & Brehmer, 2002; Jobidon, 
Rousseau & Breton, 2005; Barth & Funke, 2010). In these studies, it is assumed, 
either explicitly or implicitly, that successful control performance indicates that 
problem solvers have acquired an accurate mental representation of the underlying 
structure. Hence, control performance is used as an indirect indicator of structural 
knowledge. The problem is that a causal relationship between structural knowledge 
and control performance has not yet been established, and indeed, the results of some 
studies suggest that structural knowledge and control performance may be unrelated 
(e.g. Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993). These findings suggest that 
structural knowledge needs to be assessed independently from control performance. 
2.3.5 Ecological validity 
Regardless of these problems, proponents of the DDM approach argue that the 
advantage of studying decision-making in ecologically valid environments far 
outweighs the disadvantages (Brehmer, 1992; Brehmer & Dörner, 1993; DiFonzo, 
Hantula, & Bordia, 1998, Gray, 2002; Waern & Cañas, 2003; Cañas  & Waern, 
2005; Brehmer, 2005). While this may be true, it is questionable whether the 
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complex problems used in many of the studies within the DDM approach are 
actually ecologically valid. Complex problems tend to be dramatic 
oversimplifications of the complex environments that they purport to represent. This 
is partly because the real world is far too complex to be represented via computer 
models and also because many of the relationships that govern real world situations 
are unknown or change over time (Keys & Biggs, 1990; Goosen, Jensen, & Wells, 
2001; Gold, 2003). Given such constraints, designers of complex problems within 
the DDM approach are encouraged to aim for the perception of reality by the 
problem solver, rather than true fidelity to the real world (Norris, 1986; Brehmer & 
Dörner, 1993; Gold, 2003; Stainton, Johnson & Borodzicz, 2010). 
Thus, the claim that any particular complex problem is ecological valid is 
usually based exclusively on surface characteristics (i.e. ―face validity‖). That is, the 
problem has the appearance of reflecting some situation in reality due to the cover 
story, and so it is assumed that the psychological demands of the task mirror reality 
(Beckmann & Guthke, 1995). One way of testing this assumption would be to 
compare the performance of experts from the relevant domain and novices on a 
particular task. We would expect that experts should perform better than novices in 
the real situation, and therefore should show better performance in the simulated 
situation. The results of two studies illustrate that there is no reason to assume that 
this is the case, based on the surface features of the complex problem.  
Reither (1981) compared the performance of a group of ―experts‖ and 
―novices‖ in a computer simulation of a fictitious tribal village in Africa. The experts 
had 6-8 years experience as aid workers in developing countries, while the novices 
were preparing for their first assignment. Against expectations, the novices were 
more successful in promoting the long-term growth of the village. Reither (1981) 
attributed the experts‘ comparatively poor performance to the fact that they believed 
that they knew what was to be done before they fully understood the system. On the 
other hand, this also suggests that the task is not ecologically valid, as the behaviours 
that are successful in the real world situation do not apply to the simulated situation.  
In a more recent study, Rolo and Diaz-Caberera (2005) designed a complex 
problem based on an analysis of a petrol refinery. They then compared performance 
in the field and experimental settings. In the field study verbal protocol analysis was 
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used to investigate expert performance in a petrol refinery. In the experimental study, 
it was found that similar decision sequences were observed in experts in the field and 
―good‖ performers in the laboratory. For example, when subjects have to cope with 
the systems instability, good performers and experts seek information about the 
variable states in order to diagnose the cause of the problem. The results of these 
studies illustrate that the surface characteristics of a complex problem provide no 
indication of its ecological validity, and that ecological validity needs to be 
demonstrated on a problem-by-problem basis. 
2.3.6 Summary of the DDM approach 
In summary, the DDM approach utilises problems that claim to simulate a 
particular situation in reality. They are embedded in a rich semantic network, have 
highly complex structures, and problems solvers are typically required to formulate, 
or at least further specify, their own goals, as well as acquire knowledge about the 
system while they control it. While the proponents of this approach argue that these 
demands reflect those of real life situations, these demands also result in a reduction 
of experimental control. The extent to which the complex problems used in this 
approach actually do mirror real world situations is also questionable. In addition, no 
standard method has been developed to assess problem solvers‘ knowledge about the 
underlying structure of the system or control performance. These factors make it 
difficult to compare the results of studies even within this approach. 
2.4 The Implicit Learning approach 
2.4.1 Structural characteristics 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, proponents of the Implicit Learning 
approach advocate the use of relatively simple and mathematically well-defined 
systems in order to isolate the underlying psychological processes involved in system 
control (Broadbent, 1977; Berry & Broadbent, 1984; 1988). The problems used are 
referred to as process-control (e.g. Broadbent, 1977), complex dynamic control tasks 
(e.g. Osman, 2008; 2010) or finite state automata (e.g. Buchner & Funke, 1993; 
Buchner, Funke & Berry, 1995). The problems contain between 2 and 4 variables 
that are governed by a set of linear equations, which typically include a random error 
factor. The tasks are usually, but not always, dynamic, so that the current output 
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value depends on the value of the input selected by the subject and the previous 
value of the output.  
One of the earliest examples is the CITY TRANSPORTATION problem 
(Broadbent, 1977), in which subjects can control the number of free parking spaces 
and passenger load on a virtual bus system. This system consists of a two output 
variables that can be manipulated by changing the value of two input variables. The 
relationship between the variables is described by two simultaneous linear equations. 
The system is not dynamic, as the outputs depend only on the current values of the 
inputs.  
Another example is the SUGAR PRODUCTION problem, (Berry & 
Broadbent, 1984), which contains only one input (the number of workers) and one 
output (sugar production). Subjects are told that they can control the rate of sugar 
production by manipulating the number of workers in a factory. The linear equation 
that describes the relationship between the variables is dynamic and includes a 
random error factor.  
Most of the studies in this approach use the SUGAR FACTORY problem or 
structurally isomorphic problems with different cover stories (e.g. PERSON 
INTERACTION, PERSON CONTROL). On the one hand, this makes it easy to 
synthesize the research findings from this approach with regard to how people learn 
to control dynamic systems. The results are rather consistent across different studies, 
as they are not confounded by differences in system properties. On the other hand, 
the consistent use of the same system begs the question of whether these results are 
generalisable to different systems, or whether the results obtained are to some degree 
an artefact of the SUGAR FACTORY system. These issues are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3 when we present the main findings from this approach. 
2.4.2 Type of cover story 
As in the DDM approach, one criticism is that the problems are typically 
presented with familiar labels given to the system variables (with the notable 
exceptions of Buchner & Funke, 1993; Buchner, Funke & Berry, 1995). As 
previously discussed, this may have an impact on the acquisition of structural 
knowledge. Indeed, Sanderson and Vicente (1986) found that subjects confronted 
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with the CITY TRANSPORTATION problem typically started with a number of 
beliefs about how the system should work and that these beliefs incongruent with the 
actual underlying structure of the system. This problem has largely been overcome, 
however, as key findings have been replicated with structurally isomorphic versions 
of the SUGAR FACTORY problem with different cover stories (Berry & Broadbent, 
1984; Berry & Broadbent, 1988). 
2.4.3 Task characteristics 
In comparison to the DDM approach, the Implicit Learning approach 
emphasises the use of well-defined goals. For example, in the SUGAR FACTORY 
problem subjects are instructed to ―…reach and maintain a target output of 9,000 
tons‖ (Berry & Broadbent, 1984, p. 212). As the system is mathematically tractable, 
it is possible to specify an optimal intervention given an arbitrary system state. 
Therefore, in comparison to the DDM approach, it is possible to validly compare 
different subjects‘ performance. 
The main similarity to the DDM approach is, however, that subjects are 
typically required to learn about the underlying structure of the system while they 
control it. As previously discussed, this makes it difficult to separate the process of 
acquiring knowledge from controlling the system, and may limit the reliability of 
measures of control performance. Indeed, Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) report 
that if participants are explicitly instructed to infer the rules underlying the SUGAR 
FACTORY task before they receive specific goals for system control, the reliability 
of control performance measures is somewhat higher than if they are instructed to 
infer the rules while they control the task (Spearman-Brown Split-half reliability .87 
and .69, respectively).  
2.4.4 Operationalisation of dependent variables 
No standardised methods have been developed to assess either structural 
knowledge or control performance. With regard to control performance, multiple 
methods are often utilised even within the same study. For example, Berry and 
Broadbent (1987) use both the number of attempts that it takes to reach the goal state 
and the number of times that the subject moves away from, rather than towards, the 
goal, as measures of performance. Berry and Broadbent (1984) use the number of 
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trials on which the goal state is reached. Although the criterion for performance is 
similar, the use of different measures makes it difficult to directly compare the effect 
of different task characteristics and experimental manipulations on performance.  
The number of trials on which the goal state is reached is the most commonly 
used indicator of control performance. However, this is particularly problematic as 
the number of times that any particular goal state can be reached is highly dependent 
on the characteristics of the underlying system structure. For example, Buchner and 
Funke (1993) constructed a ―small‖ and a ―large‖ version of a complex problem that 
were identical in their surface features but the underlying structure of the small 
problem was designed to be less complex than the large problem. In the small 
complex problem, given the actions that must be performed to achieve the goal state, 
the goal state can be achieved on 12 out of 50 trials. In the large complex problem 
the goal state can only be achieved on 5 trials. Given these limitations, it is 
impossible to conclude whether the large complex problem is actually more difficult 
to control than the small complex problem, or whether this is an artefact of the 
system. 
Similarly, a number of different methods have been used to assess structural 
knowledge. Knowledge is sometimes assessed quantitatively, for example subjects 
are required to predict an output, given a specific input (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; 
Berry & Broadbent, 1987), or qualitatively, for example, they must indicate the 
direction of a change, given a general input direction (e.g. ―If the size of the 
workforce is increased…would you expect the sugar output level to 
increase/decrease/stay the same/don‘t know?‖, Berry & Broadbent, 1987, p. 9). 
However, the measurement of structural knowledge at least allows researchers to test 
the assumption that control performance and knowledge acquisition are dependent 
processes.  
2.4.5 Ecological validity  
Although these tasks have been criticised as overly simple (Quesada, Kintsch 
& Gomez, 2005), Buchner (1995; Buchner & Funke, 1993) argues that many 
technical systems, such as ―video recorders, computer programs, TV sets, digital 
wrist watches and banking machines‖ (p.53) can be adequately described in the same 
way. All of these systems have a finite number of possible input and output states, 
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and functions that map the relationships between them. This suggests that although 
these tasks have the appearance of being highly artificial, they may well be 
ecologically valid.   
2.4.6 Summary of the Implicit Learning approach 
In summary, the Implicit Learning approach utilises complex problems that 
represent only the abstract features of dynamic environments. That is, they have a 
limited number of input and output variables that are causally connected by a set of 
linear equations. Subjects are given a specific learning goal and the underlying 
structures of the systems are mathematically well defined. As a consequence, it is 
possible to precisely specify the interventions that produce optimal performance. 
Although the complex problems tend to be embedded in a familiar cover story, this 
problem is overcome by the replication of experimental findings with complex 
problems that have isomorphic structures but different cover stories. The main 
criticisms of this approach are that only a limited number of system structures have 
been utilised, standardised methods have not been developed to assess control 
performance and structural knowledge, and that the reliability of such measures are 
likely to be limited as subjects are required to simultaneously acquire knowledge and 
control the system. 
2.5 The Linear Structural Equation approach 
Funke (1985; 1986; 1992; 2001) introduced Linear Structural Equation systems 
as a formal framework in which to study complex problem solving. This framework 
entails a formal description of the task environment, assumptions about how 
knowledge is represented and systems are controlled, and a set of diagnostic 
procedures for assessing what has been learnt.  
2.5.1 Structural characteristics 
In this approach, the problems are referred to as complex problem solving 
(CPS) tasks or micro-worlds. Overall, the problems used in the this approach are 
similar to those used in the Implicit Learning approach, as they have a limited 
number of input and output variables that are governed by a set of linear equations. 
The systems are dynamic, so that the current output value depends on the value of 
the input selected by the subject, and the previous value of the output. Some systems 
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also include autonomic changes, so that the values of particular output variables 
change independently on each trial. In terms of structural characteristics, the main 
difference between the Implicit Learning and Linear Structural Equation approaches 
is that the systems used in the latter approach contain more variables (typically 
between 6 and 8). 
The underlying structures of the systems used in this approach typically differ 
on only a few dimensions: The number of variables, the number of relations and the 
kind of relations between the variables. One example is ―MACHINE‖ (Beckmann, 
1994). In this problem, subjects are initially instructed to work out how three 
controls, ―A‖, ―B‖ and ―C‖ (the input variables) affect three displays, ―1‖, ―2‖ and 
―3‖ (the output variables). The underlying structure of the system is described by a 
set of three linear equations. Each of the outputs change in response to the decisions 
made by the problem solver and two outputs change independently on each trial. An 
example of a larger system is ―LINAS‖ (Putz-Osterloh, 1993). LINAS contains four 
inputs and seven outputs interconnected by fifteen linear relations. The labels given 
to the system variables do not refer to objects in the real world (e.g. ―Bulmin‖, 
―Ordal‖, ―Trimol‖) to control for the influence of prior knowledge. As the systems 
differ on only a few dimensions and are described by linear equations, these factors 
make it possible to compare the results obtained using different systems, and 
systematically manipulate system properties to determine whether results generalise 
to different systems. 
2.5.2 Type cover story 
The complex problems used in this approach can be broadly split into two 
categories with respect to whether they are presented in a novel or familiar context. 
Novel problems such as ‗SINUS‘ (Funke, 1992) and ‗MACHINE‘ (Beckmann, 1994; 
Beckmann & Guthke, 1995) have novel labels of the system variables. For example, 
in ‗SINUS‘, participants are told that they must discover how creatures, called 
‗OLSCHEN‘, ‗MURKERN‘ and ‗RASKELN‘ affect other creatures called 
‗GASELN‘, ‗SCHMORKEN‘ and ‗SISEN‘. In contrast, other problems contain 
labels that refer to familiar systems in the real world. For example, in Beckmann‘s 
(1994) CHERRY TREE problem subjects are instructed to work out how ―HEAT‖, 
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―LIGHT‖ and ―WATER‖ affect the production of ―CHERRIES‖, ―LEAVES‖ and 
―BEETLES‖.  
Unlike in the other approaches, the familiarity of the variables and context is 
seen as a factor that is open to experimental manipulation. The effect of familiarity 
on performance is somewhat disputed, however, as some studies have found that it 
hinders the acquisition of structural knowledge (Beckmann, 1994; Beckmann & 
Guthke, 1995; Funke, 1992), and others have found that it makes no difference 
(Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002). For this reason, the majority researchers now emphasise 
the use of novel systems, in order to control for the influence of prior knowledge or 
assumptions (e.g. Funke, 2001; Blech & Funke, 2005; Kröner, Leutner & Plass, 
2005; Kluge, 2008). 
2.5.3 Task characteristics 
As in the Implicit Learning approach, the goal states are well defined and as 
the systems are mathematically tractable it is possible to specify an optimal 
intervention. However, the processes of acquiring knowledge about the system, and 
controlling the system are separated experimentally. A typical experimental 
procedure consists of an initial exploration phase in which problem solvers are first 
required to determine how the inputs affect the outputs in the absence of specific 
goals. In a subsequent control phase they are instructed to control the system by 
manipulating the input variables to reach and maintain defined goal states of the 
output variables. This means that separate measures of structural knowledge and 
control performance can be derived. From a methodological perspective, this 
represents a major advantage over the DDM and Implicit Learning approaches. 
2.5.4 Operationalisation of dependent variables 
Standardised methods have been developed to assess structural knowledge and 
control performance. Almost all studies utilise causal or structure diagrams to assess 
problem solvers‘ knowledge of the underlying structure of the system (Blech & 
Funke, 2005). In this procedure, subjects are given a diagram that depicts all the 
possible relations in the system and they must indicate which relations exist, as well 
as the direction and strength of each effect. This diagram is usually presented on 
paper (e.g. Funke, 1985; Vollmeyer, Burns & Holyoak, 1996; Burns & Vollmeyer, 
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2002), however, computer-based versions have also been realised (e.g. Beckmann, 
1994; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; Osman, 2008). Subjects are typically required to 
complete multiple causal diagrams over the course of the exploration phase, and they 
are later used to compare subjects‘ structural knowledge to the actual underlying 
structure of the system. This makes it possible to construct learning curves and to 
determine how problem solvers‘ mental models of the system change as they 
intervene on the system variables. 
The major problem with the causal diagram method is that subjects tend to 
differ in the degree to which they are willing to guess about the structure of the 
system (Funke, 1992). This problem can be overcome by analysing subjects‘ causal 
diagrams using an adaptation of the discrimination index from the two-high 
threshold model for recognition memory (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). In this index, 
structural knowledge scores are corrected for guessing by subtracting the false alarm 
rate from the hit rate. The hit rate is the number of correctly identified relations 
divided by the actual number of relations in the system. The false alarm rate is the 
number of incorrectly identified relations divided by the number relations that are not 
present in the system, but that could possibly exist given the number of variables. 
Thus, as in conventional recognition tasks, the discrimination index corrects for 
subjects‘ individual response tendency. This method can be used to generate 
sensitivity indexes for the detection of the existence of relations in the system, as 
well as the detection of the strengths and directions, and has been shown to be highly 
reliable (Müller, 1993; Beckmann, 1994). 
A more minor problem with the use of causal diagrams is that there is evidence 
that their use improves the acquisition of structural knowledge (Blech & Funke, 
2006). The negative implication of this finding is that causal diagrams may force 
problem solvers to represent the system in an artificial manner that is more aligned 
with the method of assessment than real life processes. The positive implication is 
that causal diagrams may to some extent homogenise problem solvers‘ initial models 
of the system, which Vollmeyer et al. (1996) have found can vary radically from 
subject to subject. These differences may confound assessments of knowledge 
acquisition because the problem solvers‘ initial mental model may partly determine 
how difficult it is to acquire knowledge about the underlying structure of the system. 
For example, if the initial mental model includes only direct effects between 
 33 
variables, then the search space is relatively small and the strategies for detection are 
fairly obvious. Alternatively, if the initial model includes interaction or random 
effects, the search space becomes much larger, and it is unclear what strategies might 
be employed to uncover such effects, or disconfirm their existence (Burns & 
Vollmeyer, 2000). The provision of a causal diagram informs subjects that only 
certain relations may be expected in the system, and that in addition, they should test 
for the direction and strength of the relationships between variables. So, whilst the 
use of causal diagrams may reduce the ecological validity of the process of 
knowledge acquisition, it also controls for differences in problem solvers‘ initial 
mental models of the system which may confound assessments of structural 
knowledge. 
Other methods have also been used to assess subjects‘ structural knowledge. In 
prediction tasks, subjects are asked to predict the values of the output variables, 
given certain values of the input variables (Funke & Müller, 1988; Beckmann, 1994; 
Vollmeyer, Burns & Holyoak, 1996; Kröner, Plass & Leutner, 2005; Bühner, Kröner 
& Ziegler, 2008).  Another approach is Preußler‘s (1996) ―pair-task‖, in which two 
variables names are presented to the subjects and they must decide whether a 
relationship exists or not. These measures provide less detailed information about the 
quality of subjects‘ structural knowledge than the causal diagram method, as they do 
not allow for a differentiated analysis of knowledge in terms of relations, directions 
and strengths. 
In early studies, control performance was operationalised by calculating the 
deviation of the current states of the output values from the goal states of the output 
values in terms of the root means squares criterion (RMS). In this method, deviations 
become higher the further away the actual states of the system variables are from the 
goals (e.g. Funke & Müller, 1988; Putz-Osterloh, 1993). Funke (1992; 1993) 
criticised this method as it assumes that control performance is on an interval scale, 
which implies that someone who has missed the goal by 100,000 points has 
performed 10 times are poorly as someone who misses it by 10,000 points. In order 
to overcome this problem, Funke (1992; 1993) argues that RMS scores should be 
logarithmically transformed so that larger distances from the goal states are not 
weighted more heavily. Most recent studies adopt this method (Funke, 1991; 1992; 
1993; Vollmeyer, Burns & Holyoak, 1996; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Schoppek, 
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2002; Kluge, 2008), and many studies report that is that such measures are highly 
reliable (Kluge, 2008; Körner, Plass & Leutner, 2005; Bühner, Kröner & Ziegler, 
2008).  
However, Beckmann (1994) argues that this method unduly focuses on the 
behaviour of the system rather than the behaviour of the problem solver. In 
particular, it does not take into account that the values of the input variables are 
usually constrained. Thus, if a poor decision is made on a given trial, a number of 
trials may be required to realign the output values with the goal states. Hence, the 
RMS criterion penalises subjects although they may be making an optimal 
intervention towards the goal state given the current state of the system. 
An alternative method, proposed by Beckmann (1994), is to calculate the 
Euclidean distance between the optimal input intervention (that would bring the 
system closest to the goal state) and the actual input intervention made by the 
subject. Using this method, a score closer to zero reflects a more ―optimal‖ 
intervention to bring the system in line with the desired goal states.  
In order to calculate the Euclidean distance between the actual and the optimal 
intervention for each trial, the values of the output variables on the previous trial and 
the goal state values are used to solve the set of linear equations underlying the 
system. This indicates the ideal values of the input variables for that particular trial.  
If the ideal values are within the possible limits of the input variables then the ideal 
values of the input variables are equal to the optimal values of the input variables. 
However, if an ideal value is outside the limits of the input variables, then the 
optimal value is set to the closest limit. For example, if the ideal value is 110, and the 
inputs are constrained to values between -100 and 100, then the optimal value would 
be set to 100. Once the optimal value for each input variable is determined, the 
Euclidean Distance (DEuclid) between the actual and the optimal values of the input 
variables can be calculated for the trial using the equation: 
DEuclid = √∑ (Xit
actual
 - Xit
optimal
)
 2
 
where Xit
actual
 represents the actual value of input variable i at trial t, and  
Xit
optimal 
represents the optimal value of input variable i at trial t.  
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For example, imagine a system that consists of three input variables (X, Y and 
Z) and three output variables (A, B and C). On the first trial, the optimal values of 
the input variables are calculated to be X = 13, Y = 5 and Z = 8. The subject enters 
the values 12, 8 and 6 for X, Y and Z, respectively. The Euclidean Distance would 
then be calculated as: 
DEuclid = √ (12 - 13)
 2
 + (8 - 5)
 2
 + (6 - 8)
 2
 
which gives a control performance score of 3.74 for the first trial. 
This method avoids the main limitations associated with the RMS criterion. 
Firstly, it focuses on the subjects‘ behaviour (i.e. input interventions) and not on the 
outcomes of the system. Secondly, it does not penalize the subject for poor decisions 
made on previous trials as it takes into account that their intervention strategy is 
limited by the constraints on the values of the output variables. In addition, this 
performance measure has been shown to have excellent reliability and to correlate 
with control performance scores based on the RMS criterion (Beckmann, 1994). 
One problem with all of the above methods is that they do not take into account 
the controllability of the system. Controllability reflects the extent to which a goal 
state can be achieved through random interventions (Strauß, 1993; Beckmann, 1994; 
Hornke & Kersting, 2006). The controllability of the system is significant because 
Hornke and Kersting (2006) have found that in some systems it may be possible to 
reach the desired goal state through random interventions. This suggests that if 
subjects‘ control performance scores are not compared to control performance scores 
generated by random interventions, then it is impossible to conclude whether 
experimental effects (or lack of them) are in fact psychologically meaningful or are 
an artefact of the system. Few studies have taken controllability into account (with 
the notable exceptions of Beckmann, 1994; Kluge, 2008), and obviously this 
criticism is also relevant to the assessment of control performance in the DDM and 
Implicit Learning approaches. 
2.5.5 Ecological validity 
Finally, there is some question over whether the complex problems used in this 
approach are ecologically valid. Buchner (1995) argues that few systems in the real 
world will have the ―exact properties‖ (p.48) of linear equations. However, in many 
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sciences, a general linear model is often used to represent the relationships between 
variables (Blech & Funke, 2005). So to some extent, these systems can be said to 
approximate reality. 
More importantly, parallels have been identified between hypothesis testing in 
science and the acquisition of knowledge in the complex problems used in this 
approach. Both situations involve finding out about the relationships between 
variables in an unknown environment through the systematic manipulation of 
variables (Funke, 1992; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2000). In this sense, the demands of 
complex problems can be said to approximate those required in the context of 
scientific discovery. 
2.5.6 Summary of the Linear Structural Equation approach 
In summary, the Linear Structural Equation approach overcomes a number of 
the problems that are associated with the DDM and Implicit Learning approaches.  In 
contrast to the DDM approach, an optimal solution can be specified for system 
control as the systems are mathematically well defined and a specific goal is given to 
problem solvers. This makes is possible to validly compare subjects‘ control 
performance scores. Secondly, the use of linear equations limits the number of 
dimensions on which problems may differ in terms of their system characteristics. 
This makes it possible to compare the experimental results obtained using problems 
with different underlying structures. In contrast to both the DDM and Implicit 
Learning approaches, the experimental separation of the tasks of knowledge 
acquisition and system control allows for an independent examination of the 
processes that underlie the performance of each of these tasks. In addition, reliable 
measures have been developed to assess structural knowledge and control 
performance which have been consistently used in a large body of prior research.  
2.6 Conclusions 
One aim of this chapter was to determine whether the research findings from 
the DDM, Implicit Learning and Linear Structural Equation approaches could be 
integrated into a holistic model of how people control dynamic systems. On the one 
hand, the critical evaluation of each approach suggests that a number of factors might 
preclude a complete integration of the experimental findings in this field, and that 
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findings from the DDM approach in particular need to be interpreted cautiously. On 
the other, as the Implicit Learning and Linear Structural Equation approaches share a 
number of key features their findings should be comparable. In this section, the key 
issues will be summarised to provide a guide for the subsequent literature reviews 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Firstly, in terms of structural characteristics, the approaches differ in terms of 
whether they advocate the use of systems that attempt to represent the complexity of 
real life or are limited to a number of abstract features. In the former camp, DDM 
complex problems have highly complex structures that differ on at least ten 
dimensions. A number of researchers have argued that this makes the comparison of 
experimental findings that use different complex problems highly problematic, and 
by extension, this suggests that it will be difficult to reconcile findings from this 
approach with those reported in the Implicit Learning and Linear Structural Equation 
approaches. In the latter camp, the dynamic systems utilised within the Implicit 
Learning and Linear Structural Equation approaches are highly similar: They consist 
of a small number of input and output variables that are governed by sets of linear 
equations. The main difference is that the systems used in the Linear Structural 
Equation approach tend to be larger than those used in the Implicit Learning 
approach, in that they have more variables and more relations between those 
variables. This suggests that differences in structural characteristics should not 
completely confound the comparison of experimental results from these two 
approaches, and that inconsistent findings might be attributable to differences in 
system size (the implications of system size for the interpretation of experimental 
results are discussed in detail in Chapter 3). 
Secondly, the use of familiar labels for the system variables may in some cases 
confound the interpretation of experimental results. The DDM and Implicit Learning 
approaches utilise familiar cover stories and labels for the system variables, which 
encourages problem solvers to form assumptions about the underlying structure of 
the system that may or may not be correct. This suggests that findings from the DDM 
and Implicit Learning literature with regard to the acquisition of structural 
knowledge may be confounded by differences in problem solvers‘ assumptions about 
the system. In the Implicit Learning literature, however, this issue can be discounted 
because experimental findings have been replicated with problems with isomorphic 
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structures but different cover stories. Alternatively, the Linear Structural Equation 
approach advocates the use of novel cover stories and labels for the system variables 
to control for the influence of prior experience. The subsequent literature reviews 
will take into account the possible influence of prior experience in the interpretation 
and integration of experimental results. 
Thirdly, the task(s) set for the problem solver may influence the reliability and 
validity of control performance scores. In the DDM approach subjects are typically 
required to formulate, or at least further specify, their own goals. This implies that 
different subjects may formulate different goals, and thus the comparison of control 
behaviour to any external criteria of success is somewhat arbitrary. In comparison, 
the Implicit Learning and Linear Structural Equation approaches advocate the use of 
well-defined goals. This allows valid comparisons of control performance to be made 
between subjects, and suggests that what is being measured is due to systematic 
sources of variability. Consequently, the literature review presented in Chapter 4, 
which concerns individual differences in knowledge acquisition and control 
performance, excludes studies in which non-specific goals were given to problem 
solvers.  
Another factor that may influence the interpretation of experimental results is 
whether the tasks of knowledge acquisition and system control are performed 
simultaneously or consecutively. In the DDM and Implicit Learning approaches 
subjects are required to acquire knowledge about the system while they control it. In 
comparison, in the Linear Structural Equation approach these tasks are separated into 
an exploration phase and a control phase. The question that remains is whether the 
tasks of acquiring knowledge and controlling the system involve the same processes 
when the problem solver is required to do both at the same time. This question is 
addressed in detail in the literature review presented in Chapter 3.  
Finally, only the Linear Structural Equation approach has standardised and 
reliable measures to assess structural knowledge and control performance. Although 
the methods of assessment do have some minor problems associated with them, their 
consistent use makes it possible to directly compare the results of different studies 
that use the Linear Structural Equation approach. In comparison, researchers within 
the Implicit Learning and DDM approaches have used a number of different methods 
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to assess structural knowledge and control performance. Another problem is that 
reliability coefficients are rarely reported. This suggests that correlational evidence 
from the Implicit Learning and DDM approaches needs to be interpreted cautiously 
due to a possible lack of reliability in performance scores. 
The issues discussed above also address the second aim of this chapter which 
was to determine which approach provides the most methodologically sound 
framework for the study of system control. The evaluation suggests that a 
methodologically sound approach should entail: Mathematically tractable systems 
that can be formally described, the use of novel cover stories and variable labels to 
control for the influence of prior knowledge, the experimental separation of the tasks 
of knowledge acquisition and system control, well-defined goals for system control 
and reliable measures of structural knowledge and control performance. In 
comparison to the DDM and Implicit Learning approaches, the Linear Structural 
Equation approach can be implemented to meet each of these requirements. 
Consequently, this is the approach adopted in the empirical work reported in this 
thesis. 
In conclusion, the DDM, Implicit Learning and Linear Structural Equation 
approaches differ in the extent to which they attempt to replicate the complexity of 
real world environments in the laboratory. The Implicit Learning and Linear 
Structural Equation approaches advocate the use of complex problems that represent 
only the abstract features of complex and dynamic environments. In comparison, the 
DDM approach attempts to simulate the complexity of the real world in the 
laboratory. However, although the complex problems utilised in the latter approach 
may seem to have a closer correspondence to real world situations, the lack of 
experimental control inherent in their design makes it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions from the results of studies that utilise them. In contrast, the Implicit 
Learning and Linear Structural Equation approaches strike a balance between the 
desire for complexity and experimental control that makes it possible to draw both 
interesting and valid conclusions from the results of their experimental studies. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE IN CONTROLLING A DYNAMIC SYSTEM 
3.1 Introduction 
Currently, there is little consensus regarding the role of that knowledge plays in 
learning how to control the outcomes of dynamic systems. There are two main points 
of contention that will be addressed in this chapter. Firstly, there is disagreement 
over the type of knowledge that has to be acquired in order to learn how to control a 
dynamic system. An argument will be put forward that given certain structural and 
task characteristics, problem solvers will acquire structural knowledge, and that the 
acquisition of structural knowledge is preferable if the goal is to develop a flexible 
skill base for the control of dynamic systems. Secondly, there is disagreement over 
whether structural knowledge alone is sufficient to produce successful control 
performance. It will be argued that as yet there is not enough evidence to resolve this 
debate. As the influence of prior knowledge was discussed in the preceding chapter, 
this chapter will primarily deal with complex problems that are designed to be novel. 
3.2 What type of knowledge is acquired? 
With regard to learning to control novel dynamic systems, two main types of 
knowledge are discussed in the literature: Instance-based knowledge and structural 
knowledge. Instance-based knowledge, which is also referred to as input-output 
knowledge (Schoppek, 2002), state transitions (Buchner, Funke & Berry, 1995) or 
exemplar knowledge (Stanley, Matthews, Buss & Kotler-Cope, 1989) represents 
particular states of a system. A state of a system consists of the initial value of the 
output variables, specific input values and the resulting values of the output 
variables. Structural knowledge represents abstractions of particular instances to 
rules that describe the relationships between the variables in the system, and may be 
more or less specific. At the broadest level, only the existence of a relationship 
between two variables is known. At a more specific level, the direction of the 
relationship is known, and optimally, the strength – represented in numerical weight 
values – of the relationship can also be specified (Funke, 1992). Although instance-
based and structural knowledge are conceptually distinct, they are also 
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interdependent because instances can be used to test or infer rules (i.e. acquire 
structural knowledge). 
The distinction between instance-based and structural knowledge is derived 
from models of rule-induction in problem solving and cognitive skill acquisition (e.g. 
Simon & Lea, 1974; Dunbar & Klahr, 1988; Anderson, 1983; 1993; Ackerman, 
1988; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Logan, 1988; 1990). Simon and Lea (1974) 
describe problem solving that requires rule-induction as a search in two distinct 
problem spaces: One of instances and one of rules. The instance space consists of all 
possible states of the problem, while the rule space consists of all possible rules 
underlying the problem. In complex problems, the instance space corresponds to all 
the possible states of the system, while the rule space corresponds to all the rules that 
the problem solver thinks might govern the relationships between the inputs and the 
outputs. Thus, the rule space is defined by the problem solvers‘ conceptualisation of 
the plausible rules within the system. For example, the rule space may or may not 
include exponential relationships or interactive effects (Burns & Vollmeyer, 2000). 
Thus, instance-based knowledge consists of information contained in the instance 
space, while structural knowledge consists of information contained in the rule 
space.  
Similarly, competing models of cognitive skill acquisition emphasise either 
top-down or bottom-up learning processes that correspond to the acquisition of either 
structural or instance-based knowledge prior to skilled performance (Taatgen & 
Wallach, 2002). Top-down models of skill acquisition generally assume that 
individuals first learn general, abstract rules that through practice turn into specific, 
usable procedural skills (Anderson, 1983; 1993; Ackerman, 1988; Anderson & 
Lebiere, 1998).   In bottom-up models of skill acquisition, the knowledge base is 
thought to develop concurrently with performance through practice.  Initially, 
general strategies are applied to reach a desired goal state and the results of each 
intervention are stored as an instance. After a certain period of practice, skilled 
action is the result of the storage and retrieval of specific instances that achieve the 
desired goal state (Logan, 1988; 1990).  
A central question then is what type of knowledge is necessary for successful 
control performance in dynamic systems tasks? Control performance requires 
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problem solvers to enter specific values of the input variables in order to achieve 
specific values of the output variables (i.e. generate specific instances). This means 
that the control behaviour of problem solvers who have acquired either relevant 
instance-based or structural knowledge is indistinguishable.  
However, the key difference in control performance that results from the 
application of structural knowledge as opposed to the retrieval of instances should be 
flexibility. Instance-based knowledge should only be useful in situations that are 
identical to those that have been previously experienced. In comparison, as structural 
knowledge takes the form of general rules about the inter-relationships between the 
system variables, it could, at least theoretically, be used to generate any desired 
system state. Hence, from a training perspective, the acquisition of structural 
knowledge would be preferable to instance-based knowledge if the goal of training is 
to develop a flexible skill base. Of course, this is dependent on whether problem 
solvers can actually acquire and effectively utilise structural knowledge. The 
following sections will review the evidence for the role of both types of knowledge 
in system control.  
3.2.1 Evidence for the role of instance-based knowledge in system control  
In a series of early articles, Berry and Broadbent (Broadbent, 1977; Berry & 
Broadbent, 1984) drew a comparison between the acquisition of manual skills and 
learning how to control dynamic systems. They argued that both tasks require a 
series of inter-related decisions which must be enacted over time. In the case of 
manual skills, they argued that it is generally accepted that people cannot completely 
describe how they perform a particular task, and that conversely, knowledge about a 
task is probably insufficient for successful performance. For example, knowledge of 
the relationships between the gears and the wheels of a bicycle is unlikely to result in 
being able to ride a bicycle. Similarly, they argued that knowledge about the 
relationships in a dynamic system, such as an economy or hospital, is unlikely to be 
sufficient for successfully controlling its outcomes. Rather, the knowledge base 
required for successful control performance must be developed as the problem solver 
attempts to perform the task (i.e. reach the desired goal states).  
This argument found support in a series of studies conducted by Broadbent and 
colleagues (Broadbent, 1977; Broadbent, Fitzgerald & Broadbent, 1986; Berry & 
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Broadbent, 1984; 1988) who found that problem solvers learnt to control dynamic 
systems seemingly in the absence of reportable structural knowledge. Berry and 
Broadbent (1984; 1988) gave subjects the task of learning to control the outcomes of 
either the SUGAR PRODUCTION or PERSON INTERACTION complex problems. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, these problems require subjects to learn how to 
manipulate the value of an output variable by changing the value of a single input 
variable while concurrently attempting to acquire structural knowledge. In these 
initial studies, after they interacted with the complex problem, subjects were required 
to complete questionnaires that assessed their knowledge of the relationship between 
the system variables by asking them to predict the value of the output variable, given 
certain values of the input variable. They found that practice increased the subjects‘ 
ability to control the value of the output variable but not their ability to answer the 
questionnaire. Using the CITY TRANSPORTATION task, this dissociation between 
structural knowledge and control performance was also observed by Broadbent 
(1977; Broadbent, Fitzgerald & Broadbent, 1986). These results were interpreted as 
evidence that the development of skilled control performance is independent of the 
acquisition of knowledge regarding the underlying structure of the system. 
One criticism of these studies is that subjects may have had knowledge about 
the underlying structure of the system that was not adequately assessed by the 
particular questionnaires used in Berry and Broadbent‘s studies (Sanderson, 1989; 
Shanks & St John, 1994; Berry & Broadbent, 1995). However, Berry (1984; 1991) 
used a number of different question types and still found evidence for the 
dissociation. Most strikingly, this dissociation was observed in Stanley et al.‘s (1989) 
study, even when subjects were asked to describe what they knew about the system 
in their own words. They asked subjects to practice either the SUGAR 
PRODUCTION or the PERSON INTERACTION complex problems and to 
subsequently explain to someone unfamiliar with the complex problem how to 
control it. They found that subjects‘ performance improved long before they could 
tell someone else how to control it.  
The dissociation between verbalisable knowledge and control performance, 
however, was not entirely supported by the results of Stanley et al.‘s (1989) study. 
They found that after 570 trials, subjects were able to express information that would 
be useful in helping others control the system. In comparison, subjects in Berry and 
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Broadbent‘s (1984; 1989) studies completed a maximum of 60 trials. Similarly, 
Sanderson (1989) found that structural knowledge was associated with control 
performance in the CITY TRANSPORTATION complex problem after a significant 
amount of practice. These results demonstrate that knowledge of the underlying 
structure of the system is acquired at a much slower rate than knowledge of how to 
control the system. This supports the claim that controlling the outcomes of a system 
is not dependent on the amount of knowledge acquired about its underlying structure 
(Sanderson, 1989; Stanley et al., 1989).  
Berry (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; 1988) initially interpreted these results as 
evidence of implicit learning, which has been characterised as ―… a process whereby 
a person learns about the structure of a fairly complex stimulus environment, without 
necessarily intending to do so, and in such a way that the resulting knowledge is 
difficult to express‖ (Berry & Broadbent, 1995, p.132). That is, the problem solver 
acquires structural knowledge but they are unable to verbalise it. This knowledge is, 
however, reflected in their ability to control the system. This explanation has found 
little support, however, as it has proved quite difficult to demonstrate that subjects 
acquire ―unconscious‖ structural knowledge.  
An alternative interpretation, first put forward by Broadbent et al. (1986), is 
that these results can be explained in terms of a look-up table, which stores the 
correct actions to be taken in certain situations. The concept of a look-up table 
corresponds closely to Logan‘s (1988; 1990) model of cognitive skill acquisition. In 
Broadbent et al.‘s model, the most appropriate action is determined by comparing the 
current situation to previously experienced situations. The same response is given to 
situations in which a previous response led to the goal state and a random response is 
given in new situations. If the random response leads to the goal state then this 
response is stored for future retrieval. This is a form of instance-based knowledge, as 
it implies that specific values of input and output variables are stored and retrieved to 
produce successful performance.  
This model of control performance has found considerable empirical support. 
Marescaux, Luc and Karnas (1989) found that in the SUGAR FACTORY subjects 
tended to perform better in situations that they had previously experienced and not so 
well in situations that they had not previously experienced. Subjects also tended to 
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give the same response in situations in which they had been correct rather than 
incorrect. Dienes and Fahey (1995) replicated these results using the SUGAR 
FACTORY and PERSON INTERACTION complex problems. These results suggest 
that subjects do not need to have any knowledge, either implicit or explicit, of the 
underlying structure of the system. Rather, performance can be explained by the 
memorisation and retrieval of specific instances that produce the goal state 
(Marescaux, Luc & Karnas, 1989; Dienes & Fahey, 1995). 
Computational models of system control also support this conclusion. Dienes 
and Fahey (1995) developed two models of how people learn to control the SUGAR 
FACTORY; one that stored instances of specific actions that achieve the goal state, 
and another that started off with a number of different rules to be tested. The former 
model produced the closest match to the actual data generated by subjects. Similar 
studies have been conducted which also show that computer models of system 
control that store instances, rather than rules, most closely fit the data generated by 
subjects as they learn to control the SUGAR FACTORY (Lebiere, Wallach & 
Taatgen, 1998; Gibson, Fichman & Plaut, 1997).  
More recently, Gonzalez, Lerch and Lebiere (2003) have argued that instance-
based knowledge might also account for performance in more complex dynamic 
systems. They investigated how subjects learnt to control a virtual water distribution 
system called the WATER PURIFICATION PLANT. The task requires subjects to 
schedule five water pumps to open and close over a period of time to meet a series of 
production deadlines. Subjects are only instructed to meet these specific goals and 
not to try to acquire knowledge about the relationships in the system. 
In their computer model of system control, general heuristic strategies are first 
used to determine the most appropriate action. With exposure to the task, instances 
that achieve the desired goal state are stored in long-term memory. Gradually, 
performance shifts from decisions based on the application of general heuristic 
strategies to the retrieval of appropriate actions from memory. Gonzalez et al. (2003) 
do not clearly define what is meant by a general heuristic strategy. However, in their 
computer model, if a situation has not been previously experienced then the water 
pump with the closest deadline is to be opened. A series of experiments showed that 
this computer model of task performance closely approximates the learning curves 
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and performance of human problem solvers. Gonzalez et al. (2003) argue that this 
indicates that human problem solver rely on a mix of heuristic strategies and 
instance-based knowledge to control dynamic systems. 
A number of other researchers have also proposed that successful control 
performance might be achieved through the application of heuristic rules, without 
necessitating the remembrance of instances or the acquisition of structural 
knowledge (Stanley et al., 1989; Buchner, Funke & Berry, 1995). Buchner et al. 
(1995) define a heuristic rule as a simple strategy that does not take into account the 
underlying structure of the system but nevertheless results in adequate performance 
when it is consistently applied. Like instance-based knowledge, the efficacy of such 
strategies is highly context specific. Buchner et al. (1995) ran a series of simulation 
studies that tested the adequacy of different heuristic rules on 30 intervention trials in 
the SUGAR FACTORY with 500 simulated subjects. In the first simulation study, 
for 30 trials a workforce of either 800, 900 or 1000 was randomly chosen. In a 
second simulation study, a workforce of 900 was consistently employed across 30 
trials. The success of these strategies was considerable, and in both cases the number 
of trials on target was close to or better than the number of trials on target of real 
subjects who interacted with the task for 30 trials. Buchner et al. (1995) argue that if 
subjects used heuristic strategies, they would not have to store instance-based 
knowledge and that knowledge of heuristic strategies would not be reflected in post-
task questionnaires that assessed structural knowledge. 
Similarly, Stanley et al. (1989, Experiment 3) instructed subjects dealing with 
the SUGAR FACTORY to ―Always select the response level half-way between the 
current production level and the target level, and you will get as close to the target 
level as possible‖ (p. 566). They found that such a strategy had an immediate 
positive impact upon control performance. Thus, it appears that control performance 
can be successfully achieved through the application of heuristics. This suggests that 
perhaps the dissociation between structural knowledge and control performance 
occurs because subjects develop and use heuristic strategies to reach the desired goal 
states. 
There are, however, a number of problems with this argument. Firstly, it seems 
implausible that subjects should be able to develop efficient heuristic strategies 
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without instruction or considerable experience with the system. Secondly, if subjects 
were to apply heuristic strategies, we would expect them to respond consistently to 
every situation that they encounter. Instead, findings show that subjects respond 
consistently to situations in which they have been correct, and randomly to new 
situations and situations in which they have been incorrect (Marescaux, Luc and 
Karnas, 1989; Dienes & Fahey, 1995). Thus, the dissociation observed between 
structural knowledge and control performance cannot be attributable to the use of 
heuristic strategies. 
3.2.2 Evidence for the role of structural knowledge in system control  
In consideration of the evidence presented above, it may perhaps come as a 
surprise that there are a significant number of studies that have found that problem 
solvers actually do acquire structural knowledge about dynamic systems. In these 
studies, a strong association is found between the quality of system control and the 
amount of structural knowledge that is acquired by problem solvers (e.g. Funke & 
Müller, 1988; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Kröner et al., 
2005; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Osman, 2008a; Kluge, 2008). These studies use 
Funke‘s Linear Structural Equation approach (1985; 1986; 1992, see Chapter 2 for 
more details). In this approach, the complex problems consist of input and output 
variables that are causally connected through a set of linear equations. A novel cover 
story and labels are given to the system variables in order to control for the influence 
of prior experience. As described in Chapter 2, the general experimental procedure 
consists of an initial exploration phase, during which problem solvers must first try 
to determine the underlying structure of the system. At certain points during the 
exploration phase, subjects are asked to create a diagram of the causal relationships 
that they have detected within the system, including the direction and estimated 
strength of each effect. A measure of structural knowledge is derived from a 
comparison of subjects‘ causal diagrams and the actual underlying structure of the 
system. This is then followed by a control phase in which problem solvers must try 
to control the outputs to reach specific goal values by manipulating the inputs. 
In direct conflict with the results reported by Broadbent and colleagues 
(Broadbent, 1977; Broadbent, Fitzgerald & Broadbent, 1986; Berry & Broadbent, 
1984; 1988), these studies suggest that the quality of problem solvers‘ control 
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performance is dependent on the amount of knowledge that they have acquired about 
the underlying structure of the system. For example, Funke and Müller (1988) report 
that control performance and knowledge of the underlying structure of the system are 
significantly negatively correlated (r = -.41), as did Beckmann and Guthke (r = -.51, 
1995), Vollmeyer and Burns (r = -.48 and r = -.61, 1995), Vollmeyer et al. (r = -.57 
and r = -.65, 1996), Kröner, Plass and Leutner (r = -.77 and r = -.61, 2005), Burns 
and Vollmeyer (r = -.28, r = -.40, 2002), Osman (r = -.48 and r = -.53, 2008a) and 
Kluge (r = -.68, r = -.66 and r = -.50, 2008). The correlation coefficients are negative, 
as a lower control score indicates better performance. 
How can these results be reconciled with those reported by Broadbent and 
colleagues? In the following sections, we will discuss structural and task 
characteristics that may influence whether problem solvers are more likely to acquire 
instance-based or structural knowledge.  
3.3 Explanations for conflicting results 
3.3.1 The size of the problem space 
Schoppek (2002) argues that the size of a systems‘ problem space determines 
whether problem solvers will use instance-based or structural knowledge to control 
the outcomes of the system. In systems where the input variables are independent of 
each other and there are no side effects, the size of the problem space can be 
calculated by multiplying the number of possible input values with the number of 
possible output values. The complex problem used by Broadbent and Berry (1984; 
1988) has one input variable and one output variable, each with twelve possible 
states. Therefore, the number of possible states is 12 x 12 = 144. In comparison, in 
studies that report a relationship between structural knowledge and control 
performance (e.g. Funke & Müller, 1988; Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Kröner et al., 2005; 
Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Osman, 2008a; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995), the 
problems have three inputs and three outputs, and as such the number of possible 
states is much larger. For example, Schoppek (2002) gives an example of a system 
with three input variables and three output variables, with integer ranges from -
10000 to 10000. This would result in 20000
3 
= 8 x 10
12 
possible states. He argues 
that in these larger systems it is implausible that problem solvers would be able to 
store the amount of instance-based knowledge necessary to successfully control the 
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system. Hence, they must reduce the amount of information to be stored by 
abstracting general rules from the data. 
The problem with this argument is that problem solvers do not need to store all 
possible states in the problem space; rather, they only need to store instances that 
achieve the desired goal state. In the SUGAR FACTORY complex problem, if the 
goal is to reach a target production of 9,000 tonnes there are only 6 possible input 
values that would realise this target state, given various starting values (this is the 
goal given in all the studies that use the SUGAR FACTORY e.g. Berry & 
Broadbent, 1984; 1988; Sanderson, 1989; Stanley et al., 1989; Marescaux et al., 
1989; Dienes & Fahey, 1995; Buchner et al., 1995). Similarly, in larger systems, the 
number of on-target instances will still only represent a small fraction of the entire 
problem space. Essentially, we would argue that the size of the problem space is not 
indicative of the number of instances that must be stored by problem solver and is 
therefore not informative as to whether problem solvers will acquire instance-based 
or structural knowledge. 
Moreover, it could be speculated that if a system contains a large number of 
highly inter-connected variables it may be more efficient to remember instances, 
rather than derive rules, which is directly the opposite of Schoppek‘s (2002) 
argument. For example, LOUHAUSEN (Dörner et al., 1983) contains over 2000 
highly inter-connected variables. In such systems, it may be impossible to derive an 
accurate model of the underlying structure of the system because of the information 
processing limits imposed by the human cognitive system. Given these limits, 
remembering and re-enacting particular actions that achieve the desired goal state 
may be the only way to perform successfully, unless one indeed has structural 
knowledge. Thus, we argue that it seems unlikely that there is any relationship 
between the size of the systems‘ problem space and whether problem solvers will use 
instance-based or structural knowledge. 
3.3.2 Random error factor 
 In the SUGAR FACTORY the random error factor makes it difficult to 
calculate the relationship between the variables from the data. The underlying 
structure of the system is given by the equation: 
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 Pt = 20 x Wt – Pt-1 
where Pt is the current sugar production, Wt is the number of workers and Pt-1 is 
the sugar production on the previous trial. On two thirds of the trials ± 1000 is added 
to the results derived from the above equation as a random error factor. This means 
that no one input state is associated with a particular output state. This makes it 
difficult to calculate the exact relationship between the variables from the data, 
unless the random error factor is known. 
3.3.3 Constraints on the values of the output variables 
In addition, constraints on the values of the output variables may also make it 
difficult to derive the underlying structure of the system. The values of W and P are 
constrained to values between 1000 and 12000. This means that many interventions 
do not lead to any change in the output value, and thus that there are only a limited 
number of system states that are informative as to the underlying structure. For 
example, if the current output value is 3000 and an input value of 300 is entered, this 
will lead to an output value of 3000 (assuming that the error factor is not active on 
that trial). This reflects the rule underlying the system, as (20 x 300) – 3000 = 3000. 
Alternatively, if an input value of 1000 is entered this will produce an output of 1000 
due to the constraints on the values of the outputs. Given the equation however, we 
would expect an output value of -2000.  Based on this system state, the underlying 
equation cannot be successfully derived. The problem solver, however, is naive to 
the constraints on the system variables and to which of the system states are 
informative. Hence, it could be speculated that if they were trying to derive a linear 
equation governing the behaviour of the system based on the generated system states 
they may come to believe that the relationship between the variables is random. In 
addition to the random error factor, the constraints on the system variables are likely 
to make inducing the underlying structure of the system difficult, if not impossible. 
In comparison, the complex problems used in studies that have found that 
problem solvers do acquire structural knowledge do not include random error factors 
or constraints on the output variable values (e.g. Funke & Müller, 1988; Vollmeyer 
et al., 1996; Kröner et al., 2005; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Osman, 2008a; 
Beckmann & Guthke, 1995). Consequently, any system state that is produced will 
reflect the equations that govern the behaviour of the system, and therefore problem 
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solvers will have more opportunities to correctly induce the rules underlying the 
system. This may explain why problem solvers are able to acquire structural 
knowledge about these systems.  
3.3.4 The type of learning goal given to problem solvers 
The third significant point of difference between studies that find an 
association between structural knowledge and control performance and those that do 
not is the type of learning goal that is given to subjects. Specifically, in the studies 
that report that structural knowledge and control performance are not associated, 
subjects received a specific learning goal from the beginning of the task. That is, they 
were instructed to learn to produce and maintain a specific output value (e.g. 
Broadbent, 1977; Broadbent et al., 1986; Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Berry, 1984; 
Berry, 1991; Stanley et al., 1989; Marescaux et al., 1989; Dienes & Fahey, 1995). In 
Berry and Broadbent‘s (1988) study, subjects were additionally told to look for the 
pattern underlying the system and to do this whilst reaching and maintaining the 
specific goal. The latter type of instruction means that subjects essentially have two 
goals to pursue at the same time; a goal to reach and maintain the target outcome and 
a goal to test the accuracy of their knowledge. Trying to pursue both goals might 
result in only a narrow search of the problem space in order to find the solution path 
to the specific goal, with the result that general structural knowledge is not acquired 
(Geddes & Stevenson, 1997; Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; 
Wirth, Künsting & Leutner 2009).  
In comparison, in studies that report an association between the amount of 
structural knowledge acquired and the quality of control performance, subjects 
initially received a non-specific learning goal (Funke & Müller, 1988; Beckmann & 
Guthke, 1995; Vollmeyer & Burns, 1995; Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Kröner et al., 
2005; Kluge, 2008; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Osman, 2008a). That is, subjects 
were first instructed to explore the system in order to look for relationships between 
variables. During the exploration phase, they were not informed of the goals that 
they later had to reach in the separate control phase. This type of instruction might 
result in a wider search of the problem space and so foster rule learning (Vollmeyer 
et al., 1996; Geddes & Stevenson, 1997; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Wirth et al., 
2009). 
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Findings from a number of studies support the claim that the type of 
knowledge that is acquired is dependent upon the learning goal given to subjects. 
Using Berry and Broadbent‘s (1984) PERSON INTERACTION complex problem, 
Geddes and Stevenson (1997) instructed subjects to explore and induce the rules 
underlying the system (non-specific goal), practice reaching a specific goal state 
(specific goal), or practice reaching a specific goal state while trying to induce the 
rules (dual goal). They found that subjects who were given a non-specific learning 
goal showed evidence of rule learning, as they performed well on familiar and 
unfamiliar prediction questions and could answer general questions about the 
underlying structure of the system. Subjects who received a specific goal or dual 
goals performed poorly on this task. In addition, subjects who received a non-
specific goal had better control performance than subjects in the other conditions in a 
later control phase in which new goals were set for performance. Most importantly, 
and in contrast to the results previously reported with this complex problem (e.g. 
Broadbent & Berry, 1984; 1989), structural knowledge was significantly positively 
correlated with control performance, but only in the non-specific goal group. This 
suggests that if the underlying structure of the system is induced, then it will be used 
to control the outcomes of the system.  
Burns and Vollmeyer (2002) tested the hypothesis that the presence of specific 
goals during the exploration phase hinders the acquisition of structural knowledge. 
The complex problem was based on the Funke‘s (1985; 1986; 1992) Linear 
Structural Equation approach and the system consisted of three inputs and three 
output variables. All subjects were instructed to learn about the relationships between 
the variables during an initial exploration phase. In addition, half the subjects were 
told the values of the output variables that they would have to reach during a later 
control phase. Consistent with the results of Geddes and Stevenson (1997), subjects 
who knew about the goals during the exploration phase acquired less structural 
knowledge than subjects who did not know about the goals. This suggests that 
problem solvers cannot acquire structural knowledge while they attempt to control 
the system. 
The results of this study also suggest that subjects who have specific goals 
during the exploration phase acquire instance-based, rather than structural 
knowledge. When the goals for performance were the same as those given during the 
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exploration phase, subjects who had received a specific goal performed similarly to 
those who had received a non-specific goal. However, when novel goals were set for 
performance then subjects who had been given a specific goal performed more 
poorly than those who had been given a non-specific goal. This shows that the 
method used to control the outcomes by subjects who had been given a specific goal 
did not transfer to new situations, and suggests that the knowledge they acquired was 
instance based. In a study utilising the same complex problem, Osman (2008a) 
replicated these results, as did Wirth et al., (2009), who found the same results using 
a complex problem that represented the principles of buoyancy in liquids.  
Some evidence also suggests that, in addition to having a non-specific goal 
(e.g. explore and induce the rules), direct instructions to test hypotheses also foster 
rule learning. In a series of experiments, Vollmeyer and Burns (1995) attempted to 
promote structural knowledge by giving subjects a specific hypothesis to test. The 
complex problem used in the experiments was based on the Funke‘s (1985; 1986; 
1992) Linear Structural Equation approach and the system consisted of three inputs 
and three output variables. The first experiment examined the effect of goal 
specificity and hypothesis instruction on the acquisition of structural knowledge and 
control performance. Subjects in a specific goal condition were informed as to the 
goals that they would have to reach from the outset of the exploration phase, while 
subjects in a non-specific goal condition were given the goals at the start of the 
control phase. In addition, half of all subjects were given a hypothesis and instructed 
to test it to determine whether it was correct. Unbeknownst to the subjects, the 
hypothesis was indeed correct. Overall, the results showed that subjects with a non-
specific goal acquired more structural knowledge, as did subjects who received a 
hypothesis to test. There was no interaction between these variables, and Burns and 
Vollmeyer argue that this suggests that a non-specific goal and hypothesis testing 
instructions have a similar effect; That is, they both encourage a search of the 
hypothesis space. Burns and Vollmeyer then conducted a follow-up experiment to 
test whether the positive effect of hypothesis instruction that was initially observed 
was actually because subjects were given a correct piece of information about the 
system. This time, subjects were either given a correct hypothesis to test, an incorrect 
hypothesis to test or just told there was a possible link between two variables. The 
results showed that the instruction to test any hypothesis (correct or incorrect) lead to 
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the acquisition of more knowledge than just information that a link might be present. 
Hence, these results suggest that problem solvers will acquire structural knowledge 
when the task characteristics are conducive to searching the hypothesis space. 
In summary, the type of knowledge that is acquired about complex problems 
appears to be dependent on certain structural and task characteristics. In particular, 
the random error factor and constraints on the values of the output variables in the 
complex problems used by Broadbent and colleagues (Broadbent, 1977; Broadbent 
et al., 1986; Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Berry, 1984; Berry, 1991; Stanley et al., 
1989; Marescaux et al., 1989; Dienes & Fahey, 1995) limit the number of instances 
that can be used to abstract general rules. This may explain why rule-induction is so 
difficult even though the equation that governs the behaviour of these systems 
appears to be very simple. This subsequently suggests that problem solvers may have 
no alternative but to remember instances that achieve the desired goal state. 
Secondly, Broadbent and colleagues gave subjects a specific goal from the outset of 
the task, and findings suggest that a specific goal inhibits the acquisition of structural 
knowledge. The evidence suggests that subjects must first explore the complex 
problem, in the absence of a specific goal, in order to acquire structural knowledge 
(Geddes & Stevenson, 1997; Vollmeyer & Burns, 1995; Vollmeyer et al., 1996; 
Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Osman, 2008a; Wirth et al., 2009). This suggests that 
structural knowledge must be acquired prior to the instruction to control the system. 
The question that now arises is whether structural knowledge alone is sufficient 
in order to effectively control the outcomes of dynamic systems.  Namely, is there a 
direct causal relationship between the amount of knowledge acquired by problem 
solvers and the quality of their system control? Or is an additional process required 
before knowledge can be translated into effective control actions? Studies that have 
found an association between structural knowledge and control performance do not 
adequately answer this question because subjects had the opportunity to interact with 
the system prior to controlling it. Successful control performance may then be 
attributable to a combination of structural knowledge and activity, rather than 
structural knowledge alone. Therefore, in the following section, we will examine 
whether there is evidence for a direct causal relationship between structural 
knowledge and control performance.  
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3.4 The acquisition of structural knowledge through direct instruction 
One way to address the question of whether the acquisition of structural 
knowledge is sufficient for successful system control is to attempt to promote 
structural knowledge through direct instruction and observe the effect on control 
performance. If structural knowledge is sufficient to control the outcomes of 
dynamic systems, then the provision of structural information should provide an 
immediate benefit to control performance (Blech & Funke, 2005).  
In a series of studies Putz-Osterloh (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-
Osterloh, 1993) attempted to promote structural knowledge through the provision of 
a causal diagram. Putz-Osterloh and Lüer (1981) gave an experimental group a 
diagram of the underlying structure of the complex problem TAILORSHOP, while a 
control group received no supporting information. The diagram was presented on a 
sheet of paper, as a system of arrows linking the input and the output variables.  It 
was found that the experimental group were no better at controlling the system than 
the control group. Although this suggests that structural knowledge cannot be 
directly translated into effective control actions, this interpretation is problematic as 
TAILORSHOP has a familiar cover story and labels for the system variables. This 
may obviate any beneficial effect that structural information has on control 
performance because problem solvers‘ assumptions about the system might make it 
difficult to incorporate new information into their existing mental model of the 
system. 
This problem was overcome in a later study conducted by Putz-Osterloh 
(1993). The design was the same as that used by Putz-Osterloh and Lüer (1981), 
however, this study used the complex problem LINAS which has a novel cover story 
and labels for the system variables. The results replicate those found by Putz-
Osterloh and Lüer (1981): Subjects who received the causal diagram did not perform 
significantly better than those who were required to control the system without such 
information. Putz-Osterloh (1993) argues that these results indicate that successful 
control performance can be accomplished without the aid of specific knowledge and 
that a simple strategy of trial-and-error may be as efficient in reaching the goal states 
as the application of the rules underlying the system.  
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However, this implies that all subjects were able to effectively control the 
system regardless of the amount of information that they received. This conclusion 
seems unjustified given that a criterion for successful performance was not used in 
either study. An equally plausible explanation is that those who were given structural 
information simply failed to apply it, and that all subjects performed poorly. This 
suggests that structural knowledge cannot be directly translated into effective control 
actions. 
This is the conclusion reached by Preußler (1996), who also found that 
structural information did not have the expected beneficial effect on control 
performance. Subjects in a control group explored the complex problem LINAS 
without assistance, while subjects in an experimental group were instructed using 
standardised examples as to how each input affected each output with text-based 
explanations. No differences in control performance were detected. This result is 
particularly surprising considering that findings show that most problem solvers are 
unable to acquire a complete or accurate representation of the underlying structure of 
a system through an unguided exploration of the system variables (Funke & Müller, 
1988, Müller 1993; Beckmann, 1994; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; Vollmeyer et al., 
1996; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Kröner, 2001; Schoppek, 2002; Kröner et al., 2005; 
Kluge, 2008; Osman, 2008a). These results suggest that structural knowledge, when 
it is acquired through direct instruction, does not provide an advantage to control 
performance over knowledge that is acquired through a free exploration of the 
system variables. 
In summary, the results suggest that the acquisition of structural knowledge 
through direct instruction may be insufficient to promote control performance. The 
results of Putz-Osterloh‘s (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993) and 
Preußler‘s (1996) studies show that subjects who acquire structural knowledge 
through direct instruction do not have better control performance than subjects who 
perform without knowledge or incomplete knowledge. In contrast, a number of 
studies have found that the amount of knowledge acquired by problem solvers 
through an exploration of the system variables is strongly associated with the quality 
of their control performance (Funke & Müller, 1988; Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Kröner 
et al., 2005; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Osman, 2008a; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; 
Kluge, 2008). This inconsistent pattern of results suggests that problem solvers may 
 57 
need to interact with the system variables before structural knowledge can be 
effectively utilised.  
One alternative explanation that should be considered is that the instructional 
methods used to inform subjects of the underlying structure of the system in these 
studies may not have been sufficient to promote structural knowledge. Firstly, in 
Putz-Osterloh‘s studies (1993; Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981), subjects may not have 
understood how the diagram presented on paper related to the input and output 
variables presented on screen. In order to understand the meaning of the diagram, 
subjects may require a direct demonstration of how the inputs affect the outputs. 
Secondly, although subjects in Preußler‘s (1996) study did receive an explanation as 
to how the inputs affect the outputs, they did not receive a structural diagram that 
they could refer to during the control task. Therefore, they may have been unable to 
recall this information during the control task. Findings show that information that is 
permanently available, or provided as it is needed, is much more effective in 
promoting the acquisition of knowledge than information that is given prior to the 
interaction with a task (Kotovsky, Hayes & Simon, 1985; Berry & Broadbent, 1987; 
Leutner, 1993; Hulshof & De Jong, 2006). If these conditions were met then 
structural information may well benefit control performance.  
These limitations indicate that as yet there is insufficient evidence to conclude 
whether there is a direct causal relationship between the acquisition of structural 
knowledge and control performance. We can conclude, however, that structural 
information in the form of a causal diagram or standardised examples does not 
benefit control performance. One reason for this may be that these instructional 
methods are inadequate to promote problem solvers‘ structural knowledge. Another 
reason for this may be that declarative knowledge must first be translated into 
procedural knowledge in order to be useful for system control. This in turn implies 
that the relationship between structural knowledge and control performance may be 
moderated by another factor. In the following sections we will examine the 
conditions that may allow problem solvers to translate structural knowledge into 
effective control actions.  
 
 
 58 
3.5 Practice 
A number of researchers argue that a period of goal-orientated practice may be 
required before problem solvers can effectively translate structural knowledge into 
control actions (Putz-Osterloh, 1993; Preußler, 1996; Preußler, 1998; Schoppek, 
2004). As discussed above, Putz-Osterloh (1993) found that subjects who were given 
structural information performed no better than those who did not receive such 
information. However, differences were observed in a follow-up study conducted six 
months later. This included only those subjects who had reached the highest level of 
control performance in the initial study. Subjects dealt with a complex problem that 
was identical to that used previously, except that one new relationship was added to 
the system. This time, subjects who had received the causal diagram had better 
system control, and were more likely to detect the difference between the initial 
system and the new system. Given that the advantage to control performance was 
only evident after subjects had considerable exposure to the system, Putz-Osterloh 
(1993) suggests that in order to benefit from structural information problem solvers 
may need to practice applying it.  
This claim seemingly finds further support in a study conducted by Preußler 
(1998), which used the complex problem LINAS to examine the effect of structural 
information and practice on control performance. An experimental group were given 
a causal diagram and completed practice tasks in which goal values had to be 
attained by manipulating the input variables. Each task was repeated until the subject 
reached the target values. The control group had to perform the same practice tasks, 
although without having the diagram available and without having the chance of 
retries until the correct response was found. In a subsequent control phase in which 
new goals were set for performance, subjects who received the diagram had better 
control performance than those who performed without such information. Again, it 
has been argued that these findings suggest that structural information does not 
directly benefit control performance, as it seems knowledge needs to be practiced in 
the context of application (Schoppek, 2004; Preußler, 1998).  
However, one significant limitation of Preußler‘s (1998) study is that the 
additional instructions given to the experimental group confounds the results. Both 
the experimental and control group completed the practice tasks. As the experimental 
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group had also to find the correct solutions to the practice tasks, this setting provided 
them with more opportunity to: a) interact with the system, b) evaluate the accuracy 
of their acquired knowledge and c) acquire more knowledge about the system. The 
observed advantage in control performance may be the result of any of these 
differences. Therefore, it is impossible to conclude from the results of this study that 
subjects benefit from structural information if they practice using it.  
In summary, although the aforementioned studies have some significant 
limitations, they do suggest that under some conditions structural information may 
benefit system control. More research is required to determine whether a period of 
goal-orientated practice is required before problem solvers can utilise knowledge, or 
whether problem solvers may simply need to interact with the system in order to 
better understand how to apply the information that they have been given. To the 
author‘s knowledge, no studies have tested the latter hypothesis. However, a number 
of studies have investigated whether problem solvers who interact with a system 
have better structural knowledge and system control than those who observe the 
same pattern of interventions. These studies will be reviewed in the following 
section. 
3.6 Intervention vs. observation 
Controlling the outcomes of a system requires declarative as well as procedural 
knowledge; declarative knowledge about the dependencies between the system 
variables and procedural knowledge about how to change input variables in order to 
achieve the desired effect on the output variables. There is an ongoing debate, 
however, as to whether subjects must directly interact with a system in order to 
acquire procedural as well as declarative knowledge.  
In order to address this debate, Funke and Müller (1988) allowed subjects in 
one condition to explore the complex problem SINUS. In a yoked-control design, 
subjects in a second condition observed the interventions made by their experimental 
twin in the first condition. Both groups had to complete causal diagrams and 
subsequently control the system to reach specific goals. The system consisted of 
three inputs and three outputs linked by a set of linear equations and had a novel 
cover story and labels for the system variables. Subjects who observed interventions 
acquired more knowledge of the underlying structure of the system, yet those who 
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interacted with the system variables had better system control. These findings 
demonstrate that advantages in terms of structural knowledge do not necessarily 
translate into advantages in controlling the system, and that problem solvers who 
interact with a system may acquire some additional sort of knowledge that benefits 
control performance in comparison to those who only observe the outcomes of a 
system. 
Beckmann (1994) found a similar pattern of results using a method that was 
designed to encourage subjects to acquire complete knowledge of the underlying 
structure of the system. Using the complex problem MACHINE, which is similar to 
SINUS, Beckmann (1994) instructed subjects in one condition to make the 
interventions that were considered optimal to diagnose the underlying structure of 
the system. That is, on the first trial the inputs were to be set at zero, so that any 
autonomic changes in the output variables could be detected. Subsequently, the 
inputs were to be changed one at a time, so that the effect of each input could be 
observed on each output. Subjects in another condition observed the same optimal 
interventions being made on the system variables. Although subjects in each 
condition did not differ in terms of the structural knowledge that they acquired, 
subjects who interacted with the system variables had significantly better control 
performance than those who observed interventions, as in Funke and Müller‘s (1988) 
study. Beckmann (1994) argues that this advantage is due to the acquisition of 
procedural knowledge, as well as declarative knowledge in relation to the system 
variables.  
In a series of studies, however, Osman (2008a; 2008b) has found that 
―observation can be effective as action‖ in learning to control dynamic systems. As 
in Funke and Müller‘s (1988) study, Osman (2008a) manipulated whether subjects 
explored the task or observed the exploration of another subject. In addition, subjects 
were either given a specific or non-specific learning goal. The system consisted of 
three inputs and three outputs linked by a set of linear equations and had a novel 
cover story and labels for the system variables. Whether or not subjects intervened 
on the system variables appeared to have no impact on either knowledge or control 
performance. The same result was observed in a second study with a slightly 
different manipulation of the type of learning goal that subjects received (Osman, 
2008b). In contrast to previous findings (Funke & Müller, 1988; Beckmann, 1994), 
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these results suggest that interacting with the system variables confers no additional 
advantage for system control over observing the same system states. 
One possible explanation for this inconsistency could lie in differences in the 
complexity of the systems used in these studies. The main difference between these 
studies is that the systems used by Funke and Müller (1988) and Beckmann (1994) 
appear to be much more complex than used by Osman (2008a; 2008b), in that they 
have more relationships between the variables (all the systems have three input and 
three output variables). It may be that intervening on the system variables provides 
an advantage over observing the same interventions only when the amount of 
information to be processed exceeds certain limits. In other words, activity may 
promote the processes of chunking and efficiently organising information in 
functional units that otherwise would overload the cognitive system. However, this 
explanation is purely speculative, and requires further investigation. 
3.7 Conclusions 
In conclusion, there is sufficient evidence to answer the question of whether 
structural knowledge is necessary to control the outcomes of dynamic systems. A 
number of studies suggest that dynamic systems can be controlled through the 
application of heuristic strategies or instance-based knowledge (Broadbent, 1977; 
Broadbent & Berry, 1984; 1987; Berry, 1984; 1991; Broadbent et al., 1986; Stanley 
et al., 1989; Buchner et al., 1995; Gonzalez et al., 2003). The success of heuristic 
strategies and instance-based knowledge is, however, highly context specific, as it 
does not generalise to new goals for system control (Marescaux et al., 1989; Dienes 
& Fahey, 1995). Flexible system control requires the acquisition of structural 
knowledge (Geddes & Stevenson, 1997; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002). Thus, the 
acquisition of structural knowledge is necessary to promote the development of 
transferrable control skills. 
The question that then arises is whether the acquisition of structural knowledge 
is sufficient for successful system control. Some findings suggest that structural 
knowledge either has to be acquired through an exploration of the system variables 
or practiced in the context of application in order to be useful for system control 
(Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Funke & Müller, 1988; Putz-Osterloh, 1993; 
Beckmann, 1994; Preußler, 1996; 1998). This would suggest that structural 
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knowledge must be translated into procedural knowledge through an additional 
process before it can be used to control the outcomes of a system. Alternatively, it 
may be that the methods used to inform subjects of the underlying structure of the 
system in previous studies (e.g. Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993; 
Preußler, 1996) may have been inadequate to effectively promote structural 
knowledge, and thus directly influence control performance. The empirical study 
reported in Chapter 5 addresses these issues. 
A second issue is that a causal relationship between the amount of structural 
knowledge that is acquired by the problem solver and the quality of their control 
performance has not been sufficiently established. While the findings of a number of 
studies show an association (correlation) between structural knowledge and control 
performance, these results do not imply causality (e.g. Funke & Müller, 1988; 
Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; Vollmeyer & Burns, 1995; Vollmeyer et al., 1996; 
Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Kröner et al., 2005; Osman, 2008a; Kluge, 2008). 
Systematic manipulations of the amount of knowledge that problem solvers are able 
to acquire are needed to examine the nature of this relationship. Thus far, previous 
studies have only evaluated whether different methods of control (e.g. trial-and-error 
as opposed to knowledge-based) or different methods of acquiring knowledge (e.g. 
structural information as opposed to exploration) result in differing levels of control 
performance (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1981; Preußler, 1996). As 
such, it is unclear whether increments in structural knowledge result in 
improvements in control performance. This issue is addressed in the empirical 
studies reported in Chapters 6 and 7.  
Finally, the evidence suggests that whether activity or practice is required to 
promote the application of knowledge may be dependent on the complexity of the 
system. In the literature, system complexity is often discussed as a potential 
moderator variable (Dörner, 1987; Brehmer & Dörner, 1993; Kerstholt & 
Raaijmaker, 1997; Kluge, 2008). However, experimental results are rarely replicated 
with different systems. This state of affairs makes it difficult to determine whether 
the experimental results obtained with complex problems are scalable to real world 
systems which are likely to be much more complex. Therefore, the empirical study 
reported in Chapter 7 attempts to replicate the results derived in Chapters 5 and 6 
with systems of differing complexities. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THE ACQUISITION OF STRUCTURAL 
KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL PERFORMANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
Thus far our discussion has focussed on how knowledge influences the control 
of complex problems at an aggregate level. Although a direct causal link is yet to be 
established, findings suggest that given certain structural and task characteristics, 
problem solvers who acquire more knowledge about the underlying structure of a 
system will have better control performance than problem solvers who acquire less 
knowledge. The outcome of performance can then be seen as a function of a) 
individual differences in the capacity to acquire knowledge and b) individual 
differences in the capacity to apply knowledge. This section will be concerned with 
possible sources of individual differences in performing these two tasks.  
A number of researchers have argued that the role of intelligence in system 
control remains unclear (Kluwe, Misiak & Haider, 1991; Wenke & Frensch, 2003; 
Wenke, Frensch & Funke, 2004). The nature of this debate will be described in more 
detail in Section 4.3, however, its resolution seems critical considering that 
traditional measures of intelligence have been shown to be the best predictors of job 
and academic performance (Neisser, Boodoo, Bouchard, Boykin, Brody, Ceci, 
Halpern, Loehlin, Perloff, Sternberg & Urbina, 1996; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) and 
that complex problems are now used as additional predictors of success in such 
settings (Funke, 1998; U. Funke, 1998; Hornke & Kersting, 2005; Kluge, 2008). 
Therefore, in order to contribute to this debate, our search for the sources of 
individual differences will be restricted to the cognitive or intellectual abilities that 
are likely to influence performance.
2
 
In this thesis, we adopt the cognitive approach to understanding intelligence, 
which regards intellectual ability as a set of general cognitive resources that are 
                                                        
2 We do, however, acknowledge that individual differences in the acquisition of structural knowledge 
and system control is likely to be the result of both cognitive and non-cognitive factors. A number of 
studies have found that non-cognitive factors such as motivation, metacognition and emotions have a 
significant impact on the cognitive processes involved in the acquisition of structural knowledge and 
system control (e.g. Vollmeyer, Rollett & Rheinberg, 1997, 1998; Vollmeyer & Rheinberg, 1999, 
2000; Spering, Wagener & Funke, 2005; Barth & Funke, 2009). 
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available to an individual (Snow & Lohman, 1989; Lohman, 2000)
3
. According to 
this view, performance on intelligence tests and experimental tasks can be 
understood in terms of the information processing demands that they impose on the 
cognitive system (e.g. Carroll, 1993; Sternberg, 1988). Obtained correlations 
between intelligence test scores and experimental tasks can then be explained on the 
basis of shared information processing demands (Carroll, 1993), and there is now a 
large body of research that has detailed the information processing demands of 
intelligence tests (for a review see Lohman, 2000). Therefore, the comparison of 
performance on intelligence tests and the acquisition of structural knowledge and 
control performance in complex problems should allow us to identify consistent 
sources of individual differences in the cognitive processes that discriminate between 
successful and less successful problem solvers.  
Few studies have separately considered the cognitive demands of acquiring 
knowledge and controlling the outcomes of dynamic systems at an individual 
differences level (with the exceptions of Beckmann, 1994; Beckmann & Guthke, 
1995; Kröner et al., 2005; Bühner, at al., 2008). This is in part because until recently 
few studies had experimentally separated these two tasks, and/or measured structural 
knowledge independently from control performance (see Chapter 2 for more details). 
The main limitation of this approach is that these two tasks are likely to impose 
different demands on the problem solver, and yet control performance also appears 
to be related to the acquisition of structural knowledge. Therefore, to understand 
what makes control performance difficult, some idea is needed of the distinctive 
processes that underlie the acquisition of structural knowledge and control 
performance.  
Thus, in the following sections firstly a framework will be introduced that 
describes at a process level how problem solvers might acquire knowledge about 
dynamic systems. This will be mapped onto what is known about the demands of 
traditional intelligence tests. This exercise will then be repeated for control 
performance. The empirical relationships between performance on intelligence tests 
and performance on complex problem solving tasks, demonstrated in previous 
                                                        
3
 This approach can be seen as complementary to the psychometric approach to the study of 
intelligence, which is primarily concerned with the organisation of abilities within a nomological 
network (e.g. Vernon, 1965; Cattell, 1971; Horn, 1968). 
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research, will then serve as a test of our hypotheses about possible sources of 
individual differences in the acquisition of structural knowledge and control 
performance. 
4.2 Individual differences in the acquisition of structural knowledge 
4.2.1 Understanding the knowledge acquisition process: Dual-space Search Model 
Klahr and Dunbar‘s (1988) model of Scientific Discovery as a Dual-space 
Search (SDDS) has frequently been used to describe the process of knowledge 
acquisition in dynamic systems (e.g. Shute, 1990; Vollmeyer et al., 1996; de Jong & 
van Joolingen, 1997; Geddes & Stevenson, 1997; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2000; 2002). 
This model is an extension of Simon and Lea‘s (1974) model of problem solving that 
requires rule-induction to the domain of scientific discovery. In scientific discovery 
the main task for the learner is to discover the properties of a given domain through 
hypothesis testing. Conceptually, this is identical to knowledge acquisition in 
complex problems as it also involves the exploration of a novel environment (Funke, 
1992). 
The main assumption in the SDDS model is that hypothesis testing involves a 
search in two distinct, but related, spaces: A hypothesis space and an experiment 
space. The hypothesis space consists of all the possible relationships between the 
variables in a task, while the experiment space consists of all the possible states 
within a task. In Simon and Lea‘s (1974) original model, these were referred to as 
the rule space and instance space, respectively. Three performance components are 
specified: Search hypothesis space, test hypothesis and evaluate evidence. In the 
context of acquiring knowledge about a dynamic system, a search in the hypothesis 
space involves generating a hypothesis about the underlying structure of the system, 
and making a prediction about the behaviour of the system based on this hypothesis. 
Testing hypotheses involves a search in the experiment space by designing and 
implementing experiments through the manipulation of the input variables. The 
resulting evidence is then evaluated with respect to the initial prediction, and 
hypotheses are confirmed or modified on the basis of the results. This is an iterative 
process that continues until the problem solver decides that he or she has correctly 
induced the underlying structure of the system. Extensions of this model have been 
proposed that deal with how knowledge about the system is represented, but they do 
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not propose any additional performance components (Burns & Vollmeyer, 2000; de 
Jong & van Joolingen, 1997).  
To test this model, Klahr and Dunbar (1988) examined subjects‘ verbal 
protocols as they learnt how to operate a computer controlled robot. They confirmed 
that the discovery process seemed to fit the model of a search in the two spaces. 
However, they noted that prior knowledge of computer programming was a key 
determinant of whether subjects began their search in the hypothesis space or in the 
experiment space. If prior knowledge was available, then subjects formed hypotheses 
immediately through ―analogical mapping, heuristic search, priming, remindings or 
conceptual combination‖ (Klahr, 2000, p. 33). Thus, a hypothesis was initially 
generated and tested in the experiment space. If hypotheses could not be evoked 
from memory, then a correct hypothesis was generalised based on the results of an 
experiment. The basic components of performance remained the same, however, 
regardless of whether the problem solver began their search in the hypothesis or the 
experiment space (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). This model has found further support in 
subsequent studies both within the domain of scientific discovery (Dunbar, 1993; 
Klahr, Fay, & Dunbar, 1993), and in relation to knowledge acquisition in complex 
problems (Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Vollmeyer & Burns, 2002; van Jooligen & de 
Jong, 1997; Schoppek, 2002).  
4.2.2 Implications of the SDDS model for individual differences in knowledge 
acquisition 
In the context of novel complex problems for which prior knowledge is not 
available, the SDDS model implies that effective knowledge acquisition involves a) 
the design of experiments that are appropriate for abstracting general rules from the 
data or testing hypotheses, b) making predictions based on abstracted rules about the 
values of the outputs given certain inputs and c) the abstraction of general rules from 
the data. The latter two demands can be categorised as types of reasoning, and thus it 
can be inferred that reasoning ability represents one possible source of individual 
differences in the acquisition of structural knowledge. A number of other researchers 
have proposed that reasoning ability is the most important criterion for detecting 
systematic patterns among variables and to develop hypotheses about the causal 
structure of systems (Süß, Kersting, & Oberauer, 1991; Wittmann & Süß, 1999). 
 67 
The SDDS model, in addition, predicts that the successful execution of these 
components is dependent on the problem solvers capacity to conduct appropriate 
experiments. In the context of scientific discovery learning, an appropriate 
experiment consists of a test that will control the influence of other variables in order 
to determine whether there is a causal relationship between two variables (Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988). Similarly, in complex problem solving, the underlying structure of 
the system cannot be determined unless the input variables are changed 
systematically. Firstly, all variables should be held constant, in order to determine 
whether the outputs change independently. Then, each input should be varied 
individually, while the others are held constant, in order to determine how each input 
affects each output. This is referred to as the ―Vary One Thing at a Time‖ (VOTAT) 
strategy (Tschirigi, 1980; Putz-Osterloh, 1993; Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Kröner et al., 
2005).  The empirical evidence supports the assumption that the abstraction of 
general rules with regard to the relationships between the variables in complex 
problems is causally dependent on the identification and use of the VOTAT strategy. 
Findings show that subjects who use the VOTAT strategy more frequently tend to 
acquire more structural knowledge than subjects who use it less frequently or 
consistently change all variables at the same time (Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Putz-
Osterloh, 1993; Kröner et al., 2005). Most importantly, if subjects are instructed to 
use this strategy then they acquire more structural knowledge than subjects who do 
not receive this instruction (Vollmeyer et al., 1996).  Thus, the SDDS model and 
empirical evidence converge on the hypothesis that a second significant source of 
individual differences in the acquisition of structural knowledge is likely to be the 
identification and use of the VOTAT strategy.  
4.2.3 Conceptual and empirical overlap with traditional measures of intellectual 
ability 
Kröner (Kröner, 2001; Kröner & Leutner, 2002; Kröner et al., 2005) argues 
that both reasoning ability and strategy identification are required in traditional 
measures of intellectual ability, and in particular, those that measure fluid 
intelligence such as the Raven‘s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM; Raven, 
1958). However, while there is broad consensus that reasoning ability is central to 
performance on intelligence tests (Sternberg, 1986; Lohman, 2000), there seems to 
be little grounds for the claim that intelligence tests should also reflect individual 
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differences in strategy identification. Carpenter, Just and Shell‘s (1990) analysis of 
the requirements of the APM incorporated an extensive set of data derived from 
verbal protocols, eye-tracking and simulation models of performance. They found 
that ―the processes that distinguish among individuals are primarily the ability to 
induce abstract relations and the ability to dynamically manage a large set of 
problem solving goals in working memory.‖ (p. 404). Other studies have found 
further support for Carpenter et al.‘s (1990) analysis of the processing requirements 
of the APM (e.g. DeShon, Chan & Weissbein, 1995; Embretson, 1998). These 
findings do not support a link between performance on traditional intelligence tests 
and strategy identification. 
From a theoretical perspective, such a relation is not to be expected either. 
Klahr and Dunbar (1988) argue that the process that primarily distinguishes 
traditional rule induction tasks from scientific discovery is the need to perform 
experiments to generate data that can be used to test hypotheses. In traditional rule 
induction tasks, the entire set of instances that can be used to test hypotheses are 
given in the problem.  In comparison, in scientific reasoning tasks, experiments must 
be designed and enacted by the problem solver. Similarly, in complex problems, the 
set of system states that are generated will be determined by how the user interacts 
with the system. This was the main motivation behind Klahr and Dunbar‘s (1988) 
extension of Simon and Lea‘s (1974) initial model of problem solving, as the original 
model did not specify a need to generate experiments to test hypotheses. These 
analyses suggest that while structural knowledge and performance on traditional tests 
of intelligence are likely to be strongly related due to the shared requirement to 
induce abstract relations, strategy identification may constitute an independent 
source of individual differences in knowledge acquisition.  
Few studies, however, have examined the inter-relationships between strategy 
identification, structural knowledge and tests of fluid intelligence, and the results that 
are available are somewhat inconsistent. In two studies, Kröner (Kröner & Leutner, 
2002; Kröner et al., 2005) found that structural knowledge was moderately correlated 
with tests of fluid intelligence, as assessed by the APM (r = .43) and the inductive 
reasoning scale of the Berlin Structure of Intellect Test (r = .47; BIS; Jäger, Süß & 
Beauducel, 1997). In contrast, Beckmann and Guthke (1995) found that structural 
knowledge and performance on the reasoning sub-tests of the Intelligence Structure 
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Test (IST; Amthauer, 1973) were only weakly related (r = .11). This is surprising 
considering that both studies operate within the linear structural equation framework, 
and presented the system with a novel cover story, in order to control for the 
influence of prior knowledge.  
Similarly, the results regarding the relationship between strategy identification 
and performance on tests of fluid intelligence are also rather inconsistent. Kröner 
(2001) found no significant relationship between strategy identification and the APM 
(r = .17), while Kröner et al. (2005) found that strategy identification and the 
inductive reasoning scale of the BIS were moderately correlated (r = .41). Clearly, 
the inter-relationships between these constructs are in need of further investigation.  
4.3 Individual differences in control performance 
The situation with regard to identifying possible sources of individual 
differences in control performance is somewhat more complicated. Most theoretical 
analyses of the requirements of system control focus exclusively on the structural 
characteristics of complex problems (e.g. Dörner, Kreuzig, Reither & Stäudel, 1983; 
Putz-Osterloh, 1993b; Brehmer & Dörner, 1993; Rigas, Carling & Brehmer, 2002; 
Gonzalez, Thomas, & Vanyukov, 2005; Elg, 2005). These theorists argue that system 
control involves dealing with complex causal networks of inter-related variables, 
which must be uncovered by the problem solver while they deal with dynamic 
changes in the states of the system variables. An attempt is then made to map these 
demands onto those of traditional intelligence tests, and there is little agreement as to 
whether they are similar (Rigas, Carling & Brehmer, 2002; Gonzalez, Thomas, & 
Vanyukov, 2005) or dissimilar (Dörner et al., 1983; Putz-Osterloh, 1993b; Brehmer 
& Dörner, 1993; Elg, 2005).   
The main problem with this approach is that, as Kluwe, Misiak and Haider 
(1991) argue, ―subjects when operating complex systems elaborate highly different 
mental representations of the simulated complex environment, establish different 
goals for system control and apply different strategies‖ (p. 241). Thus, performance 
on the same complex problem does not necessarily reflect the same processes. This 
criticism can be generalised to comparisons of different studies, in which different 
constellations of task and structural characteristics determine whether structural 
knowledge will be acquired, and hence the strategies that are used to control the 
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outcomes of the system. This state of affairs is evident in the inconsistent results of 
previous research regarding the relationship between tests of intellectual abilities and 
control performance. While some studies report that the performance on the two 
types of tasks are highly related (e.g. Funke, 1985; Misiak & Kluwe, 1986; Krörner, 
2001; Wagener, 2001; Kröner & Leutner, 2002; Körner et al., 2005; Bühner, at al., 
2008), other studies report that they are not at all related (e.g. Dörner et al., 1983; 
Funke, 1983; Gediga, Schottke & Tuck-Bressler, 1984; Putz-Osterloh, 1981; 
Reichert & Dörner, 1988; Joslyn & Hunt, 1998). Clearly then, an approach simply 
based on an examination of the correlation between measures of intellectual ability 
and control performance across various studies is insufficient to identify consistent 
sources of individual differences in performance.  
An alternative approach, which is the one adopted in this thesis, is to analyse 
the demands of control performance given certain conditions, in order to predict 
when we might reasonably expect intellectual ability to contribute to control 
performance. As discussed in Chapter 2, the use of ill-defined goals has significant 
consequences for the reliability and validity of control performance measures.  Let us 
assume then that specific goals for the output variables are given. Secondly, in line 
with our discussion in Chapter 3, let us assume that the amount of structural 
knowledge that the problem solver acquires is a key determinant of the processes that 
will be used to control the outcomes of the system. Two extreme situations can be 
imagined with respect to the amount of structural knowledge that is acquired by the 
problem solver. In the first situation, the problem solver has been unable to acquire 
any structural knowledge. In the second situation, the problem solver is able to 
acquire or is instructed as to the complete underlying structure of the system. The 
following discussion will address the processing requirements of each of these 
situations in turn. 
4.3.1 Individual differences in control performance under conditions of no 
knowledge 
When no structural information, or relevant domain pre-knowledge, is 
available then problem solvers will not have any cognitive structures to apply to the 
task. Under these conditions, problem solvers may have to learn by doing, and 
control performance may be the result of ad hoc, or trial-and-error, processes. These 
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demands are not required in traditional psychometric tests of intellectual ability, and 
thus we should not expect to find any relationship between control performance and 
tests of intelligence under these conditions (Raaheim, 1985, 1989; Putz-Osterloh, 
1993).  
An alternative perspective is that if control behaviour is in fact random under 
conditions where no structural knowledge is acquired then it may not reflect any 
consistent source of individual differences. Again, control performance is not 
expected to correlate with measures of intelligence. In other words, zero correlations 
will not be informative as to whether knowledge acquisition took place (i.e. learning 
by doing) or not (i.e. random behaviour). One way to test this would be to compare 
the internal consistency of control performance scores under conditions where no 
knowledge has been acquired to conditions where complete structural knowledge has 
been acquired. The internal consistency of control performance scores should be low 
under conditions of no knowledge, if behaviour is in fact random. In comparison, the 
internal consistency of control performance scores under conditions of complete 
knowledge should be high, if problem solvers are repeatedly trying to apply the same 
rules to control the outcomes of the system. 
The results of two studies provide preliminary support for the claim that the 
internal consistencies of control performance measures vary as function of the 
amount of structural knowledge that is acquired by problem solvers. Strohschneider 
(1986) found that control performance scores in MORO had test-retest coefficients in 
the range of .26 and .44, which indicates that the differences between individuals 
over time are rather unstable. In this study, subjects were required to reach specific 
goals from the start of the task and reported very little knowledge of the underlying 
structure of the system. In comparison, in Körner et al.‘s (2005) study, subjects 
acquired at least half of the underlying structure of the system through a free 
exploration of the system variables prior to control performance, and in a later 
session were instructed as to the complete underlying structure of the system before 
controlling the task again. The internal consistency of the control performance scores 
was high in the two separate sessions (α = .90 and α = .91), and the correlation 
between control performance in the first and second session was also strong (r = .65). 
This indicates that the differences between people were highly stable within each 
testing session and between testing sessions. These results imply that under 
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conditions where no structural information is acquired or available, control 
performance may be random and is thus unlikely to reflect consistent sources of 
individual differences. In comparison, when structural knowledge is acquired, 
control performance appears to reflect stable sources of individual differences.  
However, further, more systematic research is required to adequately test this claim. 
4.3.2 Individual differences in control performance under conditions of complete 
knowledge 
In the alternative scenario, the problem solver has knowledge of the complete 
underlying structure of the system prior to control performance. Verbal protocols of 
successful problem solvers indicate that an efficient strategy for the application of 
structural knowledge entails a number of distinct steps. Firstly, problem solvers 
predict the next state of the output variables, under the assumption that the input 
variables are held constant. This accounts for the influence of autonomic changes in 
the output variables. Secondly, problem solvers then calculate the difference between 
the predicted states and goal states for each output variable. They then consider the 
dependency of each output on the inputs in turn and calculate the intervention 
required to bring each output to the desired state. Finally, they apply the 
interventions (Schoppek, 2002; 2004).  
Schoppek (2004) argues that the consideration of the dependency of each 
output on the inputs during knowledge application requires a different perspective 
than that which is taken during knowledge acquisition. The acquisition of structural 
knowledge by systematically testing hypotheses encourages problem solvers to 
identify effects, given a particular cause. In contrast, knowledge application requires 
problem solvers to determine possible causes, given a particular effect (i.e. the 
desired goal state). In addition, the formulation of an intervention strategy to bring an 
output towards the desired goal state requires the problem solver to chunk the effect 
of multiple inputs together. Thus, structural knowledge must be translated into a 
different format before it becomes useful for system control (see also Beckmann, 
1994, p. 82-86). In support of this hypothesis, Schoppek (2004) found that subjects 
who received instructions regarding the dependency of each output variable on the 
input variables had better control performance than those instructed as to the effect 
of each input variable on each output variable.  
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This suggests that there are three related sources of individual differences in 
control performance under conditions where complete structural information is 
acquired or available. Firstly, there may be differences in problem solvers capacity to 
transform effects-based knowledge into dependency-based knowledge. Secondly, 
problem solvers may have difficulty chunking such information into useable 
components. Finally and thirdly, problem solvers must co-ordinate this information 
in order to plan the correct sequence of interventions to bring about the desired goal 
state. 
4.3.3 Conceptual and empirical overlap with traditional measures of intellectual 
ability 
At a conceptual level, the processes involved in system control under 
conditions where complete structural is acquired have a clear overlap with the 
construct of working memory capacity. Oberauer, Süß, Schulze, Wilhelm, and 
Wittmann (2000) state that it is ―generally assumed that working memory has a 
constrained capacity which acts as a limiting factor on performance in cognitive 
tasks, especially complex reasoning tasks‖ (p. 1018). They go on to argue that 
working memory has three main functional attributes. Firstly, working memory 
influences individuals‘ capacity to manipulate and store information (Daneman & 
Carpenter, 1980). Secondly, it performs a supervisory function in monitoring task 
performance and inhibiting irrelevant responses (Baddeley, 1986; 1996). Thirdly, it 
coordinates and chunks information into structures (Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 
1998; Oberauer, 1993).  Thus, considering our task analysis, it seems likely that 
working memory capacity might contribute a significant source of individual 
differences in control performance when problem solvers attempt to apply their 
knowledge of the system to control its outcomes. 
Studies indicate that performances on tasks designed to assess working 
memory capacity and control performance in complex problem solving are 
moderately correlated (Wittmann & Hattrup, 2004; Wittmann & Süß, 1999; Bühner, 
at al., 2008). The main problem with interpreting the results of these studies, 
however, is that subjects were required to independently acquire knowledge about 
the underlying structure of the tasks. As discussed, this results in the situation where 
subjects are rather heterogeneous in terms of the amount of knowledge that they 
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acquire. Therefore, this is likely to be an underestimation of the effect of working 
memory capacity on control performance under conditions where complete structural 
knowledge is acquired.  
Further support for this claim can be found in studies that have investigated the 
relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance. Although there is an 
extensive and on-going debate as to whether working memory capacity and fluid 
intelligence are distinct constructs (e.g. Ackerman, Beier & Boyle, 2005; Oberauer, 
Schulze, Wilhelm & Süß, 2005), analyses of the processing requirements of tests of 
fluid intelligence, such as the APM, indicate that they place significant demands on 
working memory capacity (e.g. Carpenter, Just & Shell, 1990; DeShon, Chan & 
Weissbein, 1995; Embretson, 1998). Further, many studies have shown a strong 
relationship between measures of fluid intelligence and working memory capacity 
(e.g. Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Kane, Hambrick, Tuholski, Wilhelm, Payne & 
Engle, 2004; Bühner, Krumm & Pick, 2005; Süß, Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm & 
Schulze, 2002). Considering these results, and following our analyses of 
performance under different levels of structural knowledge, we would therefore 
expect that correlations between control performance and measures of fluid 
intelligence to be substantive when complete knowledge is acquired or instructed, 
and close to zero when no knowledge is acquired.  
In line with this expectation, the results of a number of studies suggest that the 
relationship between control performance and measures of fluid intelligence varies 
according the amount of structural information that is available to or was acquired by 
the problem solver. For example, the correlation between scores on the APM and 
control performance is moderate when subjects receive a structural diagram of the 
underlying structure of the system, yet in comparison, when no diagram is given, the 
reported correlation is close to zero (Putz-Osterloh, 1981; Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 
1981; Hörmann & Thomas, 1988). Similarly, Beckmann and Guthke (1995) found 
that the relationship between intellectual ability, as measured by the reasoning sub-
tests of the IST (Amthauer, 1973) and control performance was moderate (r = .36) 
when a complex problem was presented with a novel cover story, and close to zero (r 
= .03) when the same complex problem was presented with a familiar cover story. 
Under conditions where the complex problem was presented with a novel cover story 
subjects acquired a significant amount structural knowledge, while no to little 
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knowledge was acquired when it was presented with a familiar cover story. These 
findings lend support to the claim that the processes used to control complex 
problems differ according to the amount of information that is available about the 
underlying structure of the system, and indicate that working memory capacity, as 
indicated by measures of fluid intelligence, may contribute significantly to individual 
differences in control performance under conditions where structural knowledge is 
available. 
Thus far, we have discussed two extreme positions with respect to structural 
knowledge. One in which the problem solver fails to acquire any knowledge, and one 
in which the problem solver acquires complete knowledge of the underlying 
structure of the system. However, as discussed previously, problem solvers typically 
acquire only an incomplete representation of the underlying structure of the system. 
Under such conditions, it could be predicted that differences between people will still 
be attributable to differences in working memory capacity, if they are trying to apply 
their incomplete representations of the rules governing the systems‘ behaviour.  
If different processes underlie control performance when different amounts of 
knowledge are acquired, this may explain why the relationship between control 
performance and traditional measures of intelligence is so inconsistent across 
different studies. The studies in this area can be broadly categorised in terms of 
whether subjects are given a specific goal from the outset of the task, or first allowed 
to acquire structural knowledge in the absence of a specific goal. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, if subjects receive a specific goal, then they are unlikely to acquire 
structural knowledge. In comparison, if subjects are required to explore the system in 
the absence of a specific goal, then they generally acquire at least some knowledge 
of the underlying structure of the system (Beckmann, 1994; Geddes & Stevenson, 
1997; Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002). Typically, in studies where 
a specific goal is given from the outset of the task, no or only a weak relationship is 
found between control performance and traditional measures of intelligence (e.g. 
Dörner, Keuzig, Reither & Stäudel, 1983; Funke, 1983; Gediga, Schottke & Tuck-
Bressler, 1984; Putz-Osterloh, 1985; Reichert & Dörner, 1988; Joslyn & Hunt, 
1998). There are, however, a few studies that report moderate correlations between 
intellectual ability and control performance, even when subjects did not initially 
explore the complex problem (Rigas, 2000; Rigas, Carling & Brehmer, 2002; Süß, 
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1999; Wittmann & Süß, 1999; Wittmann & Hattrup, 2004). In comparison, in studies 
where subjects are first allowed to explore the system, a moderate to strong 
correlation is found between control performance and these same measures of 
intelligence. In addition, these studies report that subjects acquired at least some 
knowledge of the underlying structure of the system (Funke, 1985; Misiak & Kluwe, 
1986; Krörner, 2001; Wagener, 2001; Kröner & Leutner, 2002; Krörner et al., 2005; 
Bühner, at al., 2008). Although this is to some extent an oversimplification of the 
differences between these studies, the overall pattern of results does suggest that the 
demands of traditional measures of intellectual ability and control performance are 
similar only when control performance is based on previously acquired knowledge. 
This pattern of results must be interpreted cautiously, however, as the 
relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance may be mediated by 
the amount of knowledge that is acquired by the problem solver. As discussed, 
reasoning ability is likely to be a significant source of individual differences in the 
acquisition of structural knowledge through a goal-free exploration of the system 
structure. The quality of problem solvers‘ control performance then becomes an 
indirect function of the amount of knowledge that is acquired. Therefore, the 
question that remains is whether measures of intellectual capacity account for any 
additional variance in control performance, once the influence of structural 
knowledge has been taken into account.  
4.4 Summary and conclusions 
The application of the SDDS model to describe the acquisition of structural 
knowledge has identified two possible sources of individual differences in 
performance: Strategy identification and reasoning ability. A question is the extent to 
which the processes underlying traditional tests of fluid intelligence and strategy 
identification overlap. Theoretical analyses suggest that they should be distinct 
constructs, although the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Secondly, if the 
acquisition of structural knowledge is dependent on the identification and application 
of an efficient strategy, the question is then whether there is remaining variance in 
structural knowledge that can be accounted for by fluid intelligence. As yet, this 
question has not been empirically tested.  
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With regard to possible sources of individual differences in control 
performance, our task analyses suggest that the relationship between intelligence and 
control performance may be moderated by the amount of knowledge that is acquired 
by problem solvers. Under conditions where no knowledge is acquired, control 
performance may be random, or the result of ad hoc interventions. As yet it has not 
been established whether the differences between individuals under such conditions 
are consistent (i.e. if there is anything systematic to be explained), however, it is 
predicted that performance under such conditions should not be related to measures 
of intelligence. Alternatively, when complete structural knowledge is acquired, we 
expect that significant demands are made on working memory capacity, as problem 
solvers are required to simultaneously store and process information and coordinate 
between various sources of information and sub-goals. Therefore, it is predicted that 
under such conditions performance should be strongly related to measures of 
intelligence. Similarly, under conditions where only partial knowledge is acquired, 
we expect that differences between people will still be attributable to differences in 
intelligence, if they are trying to apply their incomplete representations of the rules 
governing the systems‘ behaviour.  
As yet, these predictions have not been sufficiently tested for the following 
reasons. Firstly, in previous studies direct estimates of the impact of intelligence on 
control performance have not been obtained due to carry over effects of individual 
differences in knowledge acquisition. Secondly, few studies report the reliability of 
control performance measures. Therefore, as yet it is unclear whether the sources of 
individual differences in control performance differ according to the amount of 
knowledge that is available to problem solvers. 
The empirical work reported in the subsequent chapters will address these 
challenges in the following ways. Firstly, in order to control for the effect of the 
individual differences in knowledge acquisition, the amount of knowledge available 
to problem solvers will be manipulated experimentally. This should allow us to 
determine whether the relationship between intelligence and control performance 
varies as a function of the amount of knowledge available to problem solvers. 
Secondly, the reliability of control performance measures will be examined across 
different trials and goal states under different levels of knowledge. This should allow 
us to determine whether the differences between individuals are systematic under 
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different levels of knowledge. Thirdly, and finally, we will examine whether there is 
still remaining variance in control performance that can be explained with respect to 
differences in intellectual ability, once differences in structural knowledge have been 
taken into account. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
STUDY 1: THE EFFECT OF STRUCTURAL INFORMATION ON THE 
CONTROL OF DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 The effect of structural information on control performance 
The acquisition of knowledge through an unguided exploration of a system and 
its interrelated variables can be characterised as discovery learning. In this approach, 
the learner is seen as an independent and active agent in the process of knowledge 
acquisition. In order to acquire a mental model of the underlying structure of the 
system they must develop hypotheses, design experiments to test them and 
appropriately interpret the data (see Chapter 4).  
The problems that learners experience with discovery learning in hyper-media 
and computer simulations of conceptual domains are well documented, and there is 
no clear evidence that favours discovery learning over more traditional forms of 
learning such as expository instruction. Reviews of the findings of numerous studies 
show that learners need extensive guidance in order to facilitate the acquisition of 
deep conceptual knowledge (de Jong & van Joolingen, 1998; Mayer, 2004; de Jong, 
2005; 2006; Kirschner, Sweller & Clark, 2006). Overall, unguided discovery 
learning is considered to be insufficient for the purposes of instruction and training, 
especially when it involves novice learners (Mayer, 2004). 
Similarly, in research with complex problems, it has been found that most 
problem solvers are unable to acquire a complete or accurate representation of the 
underlying structure of a system through an unguided exploration of its variables 
(Funke & Müller, 1988, Müller, 1993; Beckmann, 1994; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; 
Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Burns & Vollmeyer 2002; Kröner, 2001; Schoppek, 2002; 
Kröner et al., 2005; Kluge, 2008; Osman, 2008a). These studies also report a 
consistent positive relationship between the amount of structural knowledge that is 
acquired and the quality of problem solvers‘ control performance. It might be 
expected then, that the direct instruction of structural information should result in 
better control performance than an unguided exploration of the system variables, 
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because problem solvers will acquire more knowledge about the underlying structure 
of the system.  
Against expectations, as discussed in Chapter 3, attempts to promote control 
performance through the direct instruction of structural information have proved 
unsuccessful (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993; Preußler, 1996). 
Findings show that structural information only appears to benefit control 
performance after a period of goal-orientated practice (Putz-Osterloh, 1993; 
Preußler, 1998). This suggests that declarative knowledge about the underlying 
structure of a system can only be translated into procedural knowledge about how to 
control a system through practice. 
However, Putz-Osterloh‘s (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993) 
and Preußler‘s (1996; 1998) studies have a number of instructional and 
methodological shortcomings that call this conclusion into question. From an 
instructional design point of view it is quite possible that subjects in Putz-Osterloh‘s 
(Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993) studies may not have understood 
how a causal diagram depicted on paper related to input and output variables 
presented on a computer. Subjects in Preußler‘s (1996) study may not have been able 
to remember the information provided in the instructional phase when they were later 
required to control the outcomes of the system. In effect, problem solvers may not 
have understood the information that they were provided with, or have been able to 
remember it during the control task.  
From a methodological point of view, one limitation of Preußler‘s (1998) study 
is that subjects who were provided with a diagram had more opportunities to interact 
with the system, and therefore independently induce the underlying structure of the 
system, than those who did not receive the diagram. All subjects completed the 
practice tasks. However, only those with the diagram were required to repeat these 
tasks until they found the correct answer. Clearly, this setting provided subjects with 
an opportunity to acquire structural knowledge and evaluate the accuracy of this 
knowledge. It could be speculated that they may not have used the diagram at all. 
Therefore, the results of Preußler‘s (1998) study do not clearly show that practice is 
necessary in order to effectively utilise structural information (see Chapter 3 for a 
detailed critical review of these issues). 
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With the current study the aim is to address some of the identified 
shortcomings in order to determine whether structural information can directly 
benefit control performance without practice, or provide an advantage over 
incomplete knowledge that is acquired through an unguided exploration of the 
system variables. In the proposed design, subjects will first explore a complex, 
dynamic system without guidance and try to acquire knowledge about its underlying 
structure.  They will then try to control the system to reach specific goal values of the 
output variables.  Subjects in an experimental condition will then watch an 
instructional video that explains the underlying structure of the system. Both the 
experimental and the control groups will then control the system again. If a period of 
practice is necessary in order to utilise structural information, then subjects who 
watch the instructional video should not show an improvement in their control 
performance, and should not be better at controlling the system than subjects who do 
not receive information.  
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the structural information, the 
instructional material was designed in accordance with the principles of Cognitive 
Load Theory (CLT) (e.g. Sweller, 1994; 1999; for recent reviews see Beckmann, 
2010; Sweller 2010). In the design of the video, the aim was to reduce the number of 
cognitive activities that subjects would have to undertake to translate the information 
provided into knowledge about the system. In particular, a number of studies have 
shown that cognitive effort is reduced, and learning is facilitated, when explanations 
of visual material are presented aurally, rather than as text (Kalyuga, Chandler & 
Sweller, 1999, 2000; Tindall-Ford, Chandler & Sweller, 1997; Tabbers, Martens & 
Van Merriënboer, 2004). This is known as the modality effect (Sweller, Van 
Merriënboer & Pass, 1998) or the modality principle (Mayer, 2001). In addition, 
findings show that information that is permanently available, or provided as it is 
needed, is much more effective in promoting the acquisition of knowledge than 
information that is given before the interaction with the task begins (Kotovsky, 
Hayes & Simon, 1985; Berry & Broadbent, 1987; Leutner, 1993; Hulshof & De 
Jong, 2006). In accordance with these findings, in the instructional video, visual 
material that shows how each input effects each output is explained by a narrator, 
and a causal diagram depicting this information will remain on screen during the 
control task as an external memory aid. These improvements should reduce the 
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extraneous cognitive effort that may be associated with understanding and 
remembering structural information. 
5.1.2 Individual differences in the acquisition and application of knowledge 
Even when the design of instructional material is optimised to reduce cognitive 
effort, the cognitive abilities of the problem solver may still influence whether such 
information can be effectively utilised. As discussed in Chapter 4, the application of 
structural information requires problem solvers to transform effects-based knowledge 
into dependency-based knowledge, chunk this knowledge into useable components, 
and co-ordinate this information in order to plan the correct sequence of 
interventions to bring about the desired goal state (Schoppek, 2002; 2004). At a 
conceptual level these processes have a clear overlap with the construct of fluid 
intelligence, and we would therefore expect that correlations between control 
performance and measures of fluid intelligence to be substantive when complete 
knowledge is acquired or instructed. In line with this expectation, previous findings 
show that when a causal diagram is provided, control performance is moderately to 
strongly correlated with scores on the APM, which is a key marker test of fluid 
intelligence (Putz-Osterloh, 1981; Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Körner et al., 2005). 
This seems particularly relevant to studies that report that the provision of structural 
information has no effect on control performance (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-
Osterloh, 1993; Preußler, 1996), as it could be speculated that the positive effect of 
structural information on control performance may be contingent on the subjects‘ 
level of fluid intelligence. That is, subjects who are more intelligent may be able to 
make use of structural information, while the provision of structural information may 
have little, or even a negative, impact on control performance for subjects who are 
less intelligent.  
Therefore, in the current study it is predicted that under conditions where 
subjects receive structural information, the extent of improvements in control 
performance will be a function of their fluid intelligence. In comparison, the extent 
of improvements in control performance when subjects do not receive additional 
information should be due to practice applying their partial representations of the 
underlying structure, and therefore less strongly related to fluid intelligence. 
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There are also likely to be individual differences in the extent to which 
problem solvers can acquire knowledge through an unguided exploration of the 
system variables. As discussed in Chapter 4, Klahr and Dunbar‘s (1988) model of 
discovery learning implies that effective knowledge acquisition involves a) the 
design of experiments that are appropriate for abstracting general rules from the data 
or testing hypotheses, b) making predictions based on abstracted rules about the 
values of the outputs given certain inputs and c) the abstraction of general rules from 
the data. In the context of complex problems the pattern of interventions that are 
necessary to generate data that can be used to abstract rules or test hypotheses is 
known as the VOTAT strategy. As argued in Chapter 4, the capacity to identify and 
use the VOTAT strategy is unlikely to be reflected in tests of fluid intelligence. 
Alternatively, b) and c) can be categorised as types of reasoning, and hence are likely 
to be reflected by tests of fluid intelligence. Therefore, it is predicted that the use of 
the VOTAT strategy should be a significant predictor of the amount of structural 
knowledge that subjects are able to acquire through an unguided exploration of the 
system variables, in addition to fluid intelligence.  
5.1.3 Aims and hypotheses 
In summary, the aims of this study are to determine whether the provision of 
structural information confers any additional advantage in controlling a dynamic 
system over knowledge that is acquired through an unguided exploration of the 
system variables, and to investigate possible sources of individual differences in the 
acquisition and application of structural knowledge. Firstly, it is hypothesised that 
VOTAT strategy use should account for additional variance in the acquisition of 
structural knowledge over fluid intelligence (VOTAT Hypothesis). Secondly, it is 
hypothesised that subjects who acquire more structural knowledge through an 
unguided exploration of the variables should show better control performance than 
those who acquire less knowledge (Knowledge Hypothesis). Thirdly, subjects who 
receive structural information should improve their control performance more than 
those who receive no additional structural information (Information Hypothesis). 
Finally, under conditions where subjects receive structural information, the 
improvement in their control performance scores will be a function of their fluid 
intelligence. Under conditions where subjects do not receive structural information, 
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the improvement in their control performance scores will be a result of practice, and 
therefore less related to fluid intelligence (Intelligence Hypothesis).  
5.2. Method 
5.2.1 Subjects 
Ninety-eight first year psychology students at the University of Sydney 
participated for course credit. Nine subjects failed to complete all tasks therefore 
their data were excluded from further analysis. A sample size of 100 would 
guarantee sufficient statistical power (1 – β ≥ .80) in identifying at least medium 
effects (d = .50) at a significance level of α ≤ .05 (one-tailed) in the planned 
comparison between the partial and no information conditions. 
5.2.2 Design 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (45 subjects in the 
Information condition, 44 subjects in No Information condition). As subjects were 
required to control the system on two separate occasions this resulted in a (2) x 2 
design. The within-subjects factor was control performance (phase 1 and phase 2). 
The between-subjects factor was whether or not they received structural information 
(Information and No Information). Subjects were assessed on their VOTAT strategy 
use, the amount of knowledge that they acquired through an unguided exploration of 
the system variables (structural knowledge), control performance for phase 1, control 
performance for phase 2 and performance in a test of fluid intelligence. Figure 5.1 
displays the procedure of the experiment for each condition and indicates which 
performance measures were collected in each phase of the experiment.  
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Figure 5.1: Diagram for the procedure of the experiment, illustrating the phases of the experiment by 
condition and indicating which performance measures were collected in each phase. 
5.2.3 Dependent variables and individual differences measures 
5.2.3.1 VOTAT strategy use 
To determine whether subjects used the VOTAT strategy during the 
exploration phase, the number of trials on which one or less input at a time was 
varied was recorded. VOTAT scores range between 0 and 14, with the higher value 
implying a more frequent use of the VOTAT strategy. 
5.2.3.2 Structural knowledge 
Subjects‘ structural knowledge was assessed by asking them to create causal 
diagrams of the relationships between the input and output variables at the end of 
each trial during the Exploration Phase. The diagram that was generated on the final 
exploration trial (after 2 times 7 trials) was used to derive a structural knowledge 
score. Using a procedure introduced by Beckmann (1994), the operationalisation of 
structural knowledge is based on a threshold model for signal detection (Snodgrass & 
Corwin, 1988). Using the procedure, structural knowledge scores are corrected for 
Information 
Condition 
No Information 
Condition 
Dependent Variables 
Control Phase 1 
(7 trials each) 
Control Phase 1 
(7 trials each) 
 
Control Performance 
Instructional video of 
structural information 
Control Phase 2 
(7 trials each) 
Control Phase 2 
(7 trials each) 
 
Control Performance 
Exploration Phase 
(2 sets of 7 trials each) 
Exploration Phase 
(2 sets of 7 trials each) 
 
Structural knowledge, 
VOTAT strategy use 
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guessing by subtracting the false alarm rate from the hit rate. The hit rate is the 
number of correctly identified relations divided by six (the actual number of relations 
in the system). The false alarm rate is the number of incorrectly identified relations 
divided by six (the number relations that are not present in the system, but that could 
possibly exist given the number of variables). The final score has a theoretical range 
from -1 to 1, where a score below zero indicates inaccurate knowledge and a score 
above zero indicates accurate knowledge.  
5.2.3.3 Control Performance 
The scoring procedure used was based on Beckmann‘s (1994) scoring system 
(see Chapter 2, pp.33 - 35, for a discussion of the relative merits of different scoring 
procedures for control performance and for a detailed example of how Beckman‘s 
scoring procedure is calculated). Control performance was calculated by determining 
the Euclidean Distance between the actual and optimal values of the input variables. 
The ideal values for each input variable were calculated by using the values of the 
output variables on the previous trial and the goal output values to solve the set of 
linear equations underlying the system
4
.  The theoretical range of this score is from 0 
to 34, where a lower score indicates a smaller deviation from optimal control 
interventions and therefore better performance. 
5.2.3.4 Fluid Intelligence 
The Raven‘s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) was used as an indicator 
of fluid intelligence. Raw scores were transformed into percentage correct. This test 
has been extensively validated as an indicator of fluid intelligence for a university 
level population (Raven, Raven & Court, 1998). 
5.2.4 Materials 
The complex problem was programmed using Adobe Flash 8 and Captivate 
3, and administered via a web browser on PCs. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, previous research has found that the presence of a 
familiar context has an unpredictable effect on acquisition of structural knowledge 
                                                        
4 If the ideal values were within the range of possible input values (which was 10 to -10), then the 
ideal values were equal to the optimal values. In cases where the ideal value fell outside this range, 
then the optimal value was adjusted to the nearest possible value. 
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(Beckmann, 1994; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Lazonder et al., 2008; Lazonder et al., 
2009). Therefore, in order to ensure that the complex problem was relatively novel 
for all subjects and thus control for the influence of prior knowledge, the input and 
output variables are neutrally labelled with letters. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, the 
input variables are labelled A, B, and C, while the output variables are labelled X, Y 
and Z. 
 
Figure 5.2: Screenshot of the task, as presented in the information condition after the instructional 
phase. The goals are indicated as dotted lines on the graphs for the output variables. The underlying 
structure of the system is represented on screen as a causal diagram, where the arrows represent the 
relationships between the variables, while the positive and negative signs denote the direction of the 
relationship, and the letters the relative strength. In this example, Input A, B and C were increased on 
Trial 5. As a result, Output X increased, Output Y increased, and Output Z decreased, as depicted in 
the output variable windows.  
The user-interface is in a non-numerical graphical format, in order to 
encourage the formation of mental representations that are more aligned with the 
development of causal diagrams. In accordance with the principles of CLT, this 
should minimise the cognitive activities that are not directly relevant to the task. 
Figure 5.2 shows that the values of the input variables are displayed as bars in the 
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boxes on the input variables, where positive values are show above the input label 
and negative values are shown below. Each box represents the value of the input 
variable on a single trial and in total seven trials can be conducted before the values 
are reset. Although the numerical values of the inputs are not available to subjects, 
the inputs can be varied in increments of one unit, within the range of -10 to 10.  
The underlying structure of the system was originally developed by Beckmann 
(1994), and is based on the Linear Structural Equation approach developed by Funke 
(1985; 1993; 2001) (see Chapter 2). It consists of three input and three output 
variables that are connected by a set of linear equations: 
Xt+1:= 1.0 * Xt  +  0.8 * At +  0.8 * Bt  +  0.0 * Ct   
Yt+1:= 0.8 * Yt  +  1.6 * At +  0.0 * Bt  +  0.0 * Ct  
Zt+1:= 1.2 * Zt   +  0.0 * At   +  0.0 * Bt   - 1.0 * Ct  
Xt,, Yt, and Zt denote the values of the output variables and At,, Bt, and Ct denote the 
values of the input variables during the present trial while Xt+1, Yt+1, Zt+1 denote the 
values of the output variables in the subsequent trial. The system is dynamic because 
the values of the output variables change as a result of the decisions made by the 
subject and independently on each trial. 
5.2.5 Procedure 
The complex problem and the APM were presented to subjects on PCs, over 
two separate sessions.  
The complex problem began with a set of instructions that explained to 
subjects that they were required to perform three tasks. Firstly, they would have to 
explore the system to discover its underlying structure (Exploration Phase). In two 
subsequent tasks, they would have to control the system to reach certain goal values 
of the output variables (Control Phase 1 and 2). Further instructions explained how 
the values of the input and output variables were represented in the user-interface, 
how to change the values of the input variables and how to record what they learnt 
during the Exploration Phase using the causal diagram.  
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The Exploration Phase then began, in which subjects were prompted to explore 
the system for two cycles of 7 trials each by changing any of the input variables and 
observing the effect on the output variables displayed in the graphs.  At the end of 
each trial, subjects had to record what they had learnt about the system using the 
causal diagram that was displayed on the screen.  
The causal diagram could be altered using a set of twelve buttons (one for each 
possible relationship in the system) at the bottom of the screen. Each button referred 
to a particular relationship in the system. Using these buttons, subjects could record 
if they thought there was a relationship between two variables or if they thought the 
output variables changed independently. They could also specify the direction of the 
effect and its perceived strength.  The buttons were designed to restrict subjects‘ 
search of the hypothesis space to the relationships that could potentially exist within 
the system (i.e. autonomic changes of the output variables and direct effects between 
input and output variables).  
Subjects then had to control the system by manipulating the inputs to reach 
goal values of the outputs for seven trials (Control Phase 1). The goals were 
indicated as dotted lines on the output graphs. The causal diagram they had 
constructed during the Exploration Phase remained on screen, providing access to the 
structural knowledge that they had acquired.  
In the information condition, subjects then watched the instructional video that 
explained the actual underlying structure of the system. The instructional video 
consisted of a recording of seven intervention trials with an accompanying narration, 
which explained what could be seen on screen during each trial. On the first trial the 
inputs were set at zero, so that the autonomic changes in the outputs could be 
detected. Subsequently, Input A was increased to maximum while the other inputs 
were set at zero, then on the next trial Input A was reduced to minimum while the 
other inputs were set at zero. This was repeated with Inputs B and C on subsequent 
trials so that the effect of each input on the outputs could be clearly observed. On 
each trial, the narrator explained how the inputs had been altered, how each of the 
outputs had changed and how this reflected the underlying structure of the system. A 
causal diagram was constructed on screen, to record this information, and it remained 
onscreen during Control Phase 2 (see APPENDIX A for a record of these 
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instructions). Figure 5.2 shows a screenshot of the complex problem in the 
information condition after the instructional video. 
Subjects in the no information condition did not receive any additional 
information. In this condition, the causal diagram that subjects had constructed 
during the Exploration Phase remained on screen during Control Phase 2. 
All subjects had to control the system again for seven trials, with different 
goals indicated on the output variables (Control Phase 2).  
In a subsequent session, approximately one week later, subjects completed the 
APM. 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1 Internal consistencies 
Firstly, internal consistency analyses were conducted to determine the 
variability in control performance scores across the trials and for different goal states 
as an estimate of the reliability of the dependent variables. Internal consistency was 
good across the first control phase (αinformation  = .83, αno information = .83) and the second 
control phase (αinformation  = .92, αno information = .90) (Cronbach, 1951). This indicates 
that subjects are rather consistent in their performance and justifies averaging the 
scores across each control phase.  
An additional internal consistency analysis indicated that the reliability of the 
APM scores was acceptable across the 36 items (α  = .75) (Cronbach, 1951).  
Correlations among the variables used in this study as well as their means and 
standard deviations are presented in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics, and inter-correlations between the variables for each condition. 
  M (SD) 2 3 4 5 
No Information 
Condition 
1.VOTAT strategy 5.68 (4.15) .60** -.45** -.49** .11 
N = 44 2. Knowledge .21 (.33) 
… 
-.38* -.51** .45** 
 3. Phase 1 13.88 (4.20) 
… 
… .56** -.24 
 4. Phase 2 13.21 (5.28) 
… 
… … -.18 
 5. APM (% correct) 63.75 (16.32) 
… 
… … … 
Information 
Condition 
1.VOTAT strategy 5.76 (3.94) .60** -.20 -.30 .26 
N = 45 2. Knowledge .22 (.35) 
… 
-.31* -.36* .26 
 3. Phase 1 13.92 (4.14) 
… 
… .27 -.11 
 4. Phase 2 10.24 (5.29) 
… 
… … -.52** 
 5. APM (% correct) 58.00 (17.75) 
… 
… … … 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01 
 
5.3.2 VOTAT hypothesis 
Across the conditions, there was a significant strong correlation between 
VOTAT strategy use and structural knowledge; r = .60, p < .01. This indicates that 
subjects who used the VOTAT strategy more frequently acquired more knowledge of 
the underlying structure of the system during the Exploration Phase than those who 
used it less frequently. Further, there was a significant moderate correlation between 
scores on the APM and structural knowledge scores across the conditions; r = .34, p 
< .01. This indicates that subjects who were more intelligent were able to acquire 
more knowledge of the underlying structure of the system than those who were less 
intelligent. Finally, as predicted, VOTAT strategy use and scores on the APM were 
not significantly correlated; r = .18, p = .09. This indicates that the use of effective 
experiments in order to infer abstract rules is not a matter of fluid intelligence. 
In order to determine whether VOTAT strategy use accounts for additional 
variance in structural knowledge over fluid intelligence, a hierarchical regression 
analysis was conducted. Mean corrected scores on the APM were entered in the first 
step, and VOTAT strategy use in a second step. Fluid intelligence accounted for 
11.3% of the variance in structural knowledge scores, Fchange(1, 87) = 11.09, p < .01. 
VOTAT strategy use accounted for an additional 30% of the variance in structural 
knowledge scores, Fchange(1, 86) = 43.90, p < .01). In support of the VOTAT 
hypothesis, this indicates that although differences in fluid intelligence are important, 
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the largest source of individual differences in the acquisition of structural knowledge 
is the use of effective experiments.  
5.3.3 The acquisition of structural knowledge during the exploration phase 
For both information conditions (no information and information), the amount 
of structural knowledge that was acquired was significantly greater than zero; M = 
.22, SD = .34, t(88) = 6.00, p < .01. This indicates that on average, subjects had 
acquired some knowledge of the underlying structure of the system prior to the first 
control phase. However, as the histograms in Figure 5.3 show, the range of structural 
knowledge scores, -.50 to 1.00, indicates that subjects differed widely in the amount 
of knowledge that they were able to acquire about the underlying structure of the 
system during the initial exploration phase. That is, while some subjects were able to 
acquire complete knowledge of the underlying structure of the system (one subject in 
the no information condition, and two subjects in the information condition), others 
acquired an incorrect representation of the underlying structure. Overall these results 
indicate that subjects found it difficult to acquire an accurate representation of the 
underlying structure of the system through an unguided exploration of the system 
variables, and that for the majority of subjects in the information condition the 
instructions given prior to the second control phase provided a significant source of 
new information about the underlying structure of the system.  
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Figure 5.3: Histograms of structural knowledge test scores, by information condition 
5.3.4 Knowledge hypothesis 
In support of the knowledge hypothesis, across the conditions, there was a 
significant moderate negative relationship between structural knowledge scores and 
control performance in Phase 1 (r = -.34, p < .01). This indicates that subjects who 
acquired more knowledge about the underlying structure of the system through an 
unguided exploration of the system variables produced smaller deviations from 
optimal control interventions, and were therefore better at controlling the system. 
More knowledge is associated with better control performance. 
5.3.5 Information and intelligence hypotheses 
In order to determine whether the provision of structural information facilitates 
control performance (Information Hypothesis) and whether the extraction of 
knowledge from information in this context is determined by fluid intelligence 
(Intelligence Hypothesis) we conducted a series of hierarchical linear modelling 
analyses using the HLM software package (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 
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2000). This approach allowed us to model subject‘s change in performance from 
control phase 1 to control phase 2 as function of their fluid intelligence (see 
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We used a two level model in which performance in 
control phase 1 and control phase 2 (level 1) was clustered within people (level 2).  
Firstly, to examine the effect of condition (no information and information) 
and fluid intelligence on control performance it was necessary to check whether 
control performance under different conditions differed prior to the instructional 
phase. The amount of structural knowledge acquired by subjects during the 
exploration phase did not differ by condition; t(87) = -.09, p = .93, nor did their 
control performance scores in phase 1; t(87) = -.05, p = .96, or scores on the APM; 
t(87) = 1.59, p = .12. This demonstrates that the procedure used to randomly allocate 
subjects to the conditions was effective. 
Secondly, a random coefficient regression analysis was conducted to assess 
whether control performance changed across the two control phases. At level 1, each 
subjects‘ performance was represented by an intercept term that denoted their mean 
performance across control phase 1 and control phase 2, and a slope that represented 
their change in performance from control phase 1 to 2. Control phase (1 or 2, effect 
coded as -.5 and .5, respectively) was entered as an independent variable at this level. 
The mean control performance scores and the change in control performance then 
became the outcome variables in a level-2 model, in which they were modelled as 
random effects. The results of this analysis are presented in the top section of Table 
5.2. This analysis indicated that the mean control performance score was 12.81 
across control phase 1 and 2 and on average, control performance scores improved 
by 2.19 points from control phase 1 to 2. The change in control performance was 
significantly different from zero; t(88) = -3.86, p < .001. There were also significant 
differences between problem solvers in terms of their mean control performance 
scores and the change in their control performance; χ2 = 2867895259.55, df = 88, p < 
.001 and χ2 = 1274245149.43, df = 88, p < .001, respectively. Variability in subjects‘ 
change in control performance from control phase 1 to 2 accounted for 64% of the 
total variability in control performance scores. These findings are an important 
prerequisite for the subsequent analyses, as they indicate that individuals show 
substantial variability in their mean control performance and the extent to which their 
control performance changed across the two phases. 
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Finally, in order to test the Information and Intelligence hypotheses an 
intercept- and slope-as-outcomes regression analysis was conducted in which mean 
control performance and the change in control performance from control phase 1 to 2 
were modelled as a function of condition (as an effect coded variable indicating 
condition: -.5 = no information, .5 = information) and scores on the APM at level 2. 
The level 1 model was the same as in the random coefficients regression analysis. 
The results of this analysis are presented in the middle panel of Table 5.2, and are 
reported in relation to the Information and Intelligence hypotheses in the next 
sections. 
5.3.5.1 Information hypothesis 
The intercept- and slope-as-outcomes regression analysis indicated that 
information had a significant impact on average control performance scores as well 
as on the change in control performance from control phase 1 to 2, controlling for the 
effects of fluid intelligence; t(86) = -2.33, p < .05, ∆R2 = 5% and t(86) =  -3.13, p < 
.01, ∆R2 = 9%, respectively. In the second control phase, subjects in the information 
condition had an average control performance score 1.91 points better than those in 
the no information condition. Similarly, the change in control performance from 
Phase 1 to 2 for subjects in the information condition was 3.43 points higher than 
those in the no information condition. In support of the information hypothesis, as 
can be seen in Figure 5.4, these results indicate that subjects who received additional 
information with regard to the underlying structure of the system performed better in 
the second control phase, and improved at a greater rate from control phase 1 to 
control phase 2 than those who did not receive information. 
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Figure 5.4: Change in control performance scores from Phase 1 to 2, by information condition 
5.3.5.2 Intelligence hypothesis 
The intercept- and slope-as-outcomes regression analysis also indicated that 
subjects scores on the APM had a significant impact on average control performance 
scores and their change in performance from control phase 1 to 2, controlling for the 
effects of condition; t(86) = -3.42, p < .01, ∆R2 = 7%  and t(86) = -2.34, p < .05, ∆R2 
= 2%. On average, a one-point increase in scores on the APM was associated with a 
.07 increase in average control performance, and a .06-point increase in the change in 
performance scores from control phase 1 to 2. These results indicate that subjects 
with a higher score on the APM, tended on average to perform better overall, and 
improved more from control phase 1 to 2. 
In order to determine whether the effect of fluid intelligence on control 
performance differed by condition a third analysis was conducted in which an 
interaction term (APM x Condition) was added to the main effects of the variables at 
level 2. The results are presented in the bottom panel of Table 5.2. There was no 
evidence that the effect of fluid intelligence (as measured via APM scores) on mean 
control performance scores varied by condition, as the interaction term was small 
and insignificant; t(85) = -.03, p = .50, ∆R2 = 0%. However, the effect of fluid 
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intelligence on the change in performance from control phase 1 to control phase 2 
did vary significantly by condition; t(85) = -2.48, p < .05, ∆R2 = 3%. In support of 
the intelligence hypothesis, the results show that the change in performance scores 
for subjects who received information was more strongly related to fluid intelligence 
than for subjects who did not receive information. 
Table 5.2 Results of the Random Coefficients Regression (RCR) Analysis and the Intercept- and 
Slope-As-Outcome Regression (ISAOR) Analyses 
Variable Parameter Estimate SE t ∆R2 
RCR Analysis 
Mean control performance (ß00) 12.81 .43 30.10**  
Mean change in control performance (ß10) -2.19 .57 -3.86**  
ISAOR Analysis 1 
Intercept-as-outcome     
Condition (ß01) -1.91 .82 -2.32* 5% 
APM (ß02) -.08 .02 -3.21** 7% 
Slope-as-outcome     
Condition (ß11) -3.42 1.07 -3.19** 9% 
APM (ß12) -.07 .03 -2.17* 2% 
ISAOR Analysis 2 
Intercept-as-outcome     
Condition (ß01) -1.89 .82 -2.33* 5% 
APM (ß02) -.08 .02 -3.32** 7% 
Condition x APM (ß03) -.03 .04 -.68 0% 
Slope-as-outcome     
Condition (ß11) -3.38 1.03 -3.29** 9% 
APM (ß12) -.06 .03 -2.37* 2% 
Condition x APM (ß13) -.13 .05 -2.48* 3% 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Notes: 
  
Level 1 model (for all analyses): Yti = π0i + πli x (Control Phase), where Yti is person i‘s control 
performance score at time t, π0i is their mean control performance score and πli is their change in 
control performance from control phase 1 to control phase 2. 
Level 2 model for RCR Analysis:  
π0i  = ß00 + r0i and πli = ß10 + rli 
Level 2 model for ISAOR Analysis 1:  
π0i  = ß00 + ß01 x (Condition) + ß02 x (APM) + r0i and πli = ß10 + ß11 x (Condition) + ß12 x (APM) + rli 
Level 2 model for ISAOR Analysis 2:  
π0i  = ß00 + ß01 x (Condition) + ß02 x (APM) + ß03 x (Condition x APM) + r0i  
and  
πli = ß10 + ß11 x (Condition) + ß12  x (APM) + ß13 x (Condition x APM) + rli 
When intercepts are outcomes, ∆R2 is expressed as a percentage of the variability in mean control 
performance scores. When slopes are outcomes, ∆R2 is expressed as a percentage of the variability in 
the change in control performance.  
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5.4. Discussion 
In summary, the results supported each of the hypotheses: 1) VOTAT strategy 
use accounted for additional variance in structural knowledge over and above fluid 
intelligence (VOTAT hypothesis); 2) subjects who acquired more structural 
knowledge during the exploration phase had better control performance in phase 1 
(Knowledge hypothesis); 3) subjects who received additional information improved 
their control performance more than those who received no additional information 
(Information hypothesis) and 4) when subjects received additional information, their 
change in control performance scores from control phase 1 to 2 was more strongly 
related to fluid intelligence than the change in control performance scores for 
subjects who did not receive information (Intelligence hypothesis). These results 
suggest that the provision of structural information does confer an advantage in 
controlling a dynamic system over knowledge that is acquired through an unguided 
exploration of the system variables and that subjects can translate such information 
into effective control actions without practice. However, benefiting from structural 
information depends on fluid intelligence; information needs to be translated into 
knowledge and this process involves intelligence-related capacities. 
As in previous studies, it was found that the amount of structural knowledge 
acquired by problem solvers is strongly related to the quality of control performance 
(Funke & Müller, 1988; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; Vollmeyer et al., 1996, Burns 
& Vollmeyer, 2002; Osman, 2008a). In contrast to previous studies (Putz-Osterloh, 
1993; Preußler, 1998), it was found that the provision of structural information 
provided an immediate advantage over incomplete knowledge that was acquired 
through an unguided exploration of the system variables. These findings suggest that 
the quality of problem solvers‘ control performance is causally dependent on the 
amount of knowledge that they are able to acquire.  
The seemingly discrepant results obtained in previous studies (Putz-Osterloh & 
Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993; Preußler, 1996) can be explained by differences in 
the instructional methods used to provide structural information. The results of the 
present study show that if problem solvers receive a direct demonstration as to how 
each input effects each output and have access to this information in the form of a 
diagram during control performance, then they will be able to immediately and 
 99 
effectively translate this information into the appropriate actions for control. This 
provides further support for the claim that information that is provided as needed is 
much more effective in promoting changes in performance than information that is 
provided before interaction with the task begins (Kotovsky et al., 1985; Berry & 
Broadbent, 1987; Leutner, 1993; Hulshof & De Jong, 2006).  
On the other hand, the argument could be made that subjects‘ exploration of 
the system, prior to the instruction of knowledge, may have prepared them to 
effectively extract knowledge from the diagram. It remains an open question as to 
whether the same instruction might result in effective control performance without 
prior exposure to the complex problem. This issue will be addressed in Study 2 and 
3. Nevertheless, these findings imply that it is not practice in applying information 
that is important for improving system control, but rather the efficacy of the 
instruction.  
Indeed, as subjects in the no information condition showed little improvement 
across the control phases this suggests that practice at controlling the system does not 
have a significant impact upon the quality of problem solvers‘ control performance. 
The high level of internal consistency in control performance scores further suggests 
that problem solvers do not dramatically change their control behaviours through 
practice. Hence, improvements in control performance with practice are rather 
limited.  
With regard to the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance, these results are in line with previous findings that have shown that 
when a causal diagram is provided, control performance is moderately to strongly 
correlated with fluid intelligence. That is, more intellectually capable individuals are 
able to make use of structural information more effectively than individuals who are 
less so (Putz-Oterloh, 1981; Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Kröner et al., 2005). This 
study extended on these previous findings, as it was also found that fluid intelligence 
had an impact on the acquisition of structural knowledge during the exploration 
phase, and subsequently in controlling the system when only incomplete knowledge 
was available. These results suggest that subjects who are more intelligent are at a 
double advantage in comparison to those who are less intelligent with regards to 
acquiring and utilising structural knowledge: They are able to acquire more 
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knowledge without assistance, and they also benefit more from direct instruction. 
These results support the view, frequently advanced by Snow (Snow & Yallow, 
1982; Snow, 1986; Snow, 1989; Snow & Lohman, 1989), that individual differences 
among learners ―…present a pervasive and profound problem to educators‖ (p.1029, 
Snow, 1989). 
On the other hand, the findings with regard to the inter-relationships between 
VOTAT strategy use, fluid intelligence and knowledge acquisition indicates that 
problem solvers who lack in fluid intelligence might benefit from instruction in 
experimental design.  The results found in the current study are in line with previous 
research that has found that the acquisition of structural knowledge is related to the 
use of the VOTAT strategy and that instruction of the VOTAT strategy also 
improves performance (Kröner et al., 2005; Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Putz-Osterloh, 
1993). However, the results extend upon these previous findings, as they indicate 
that the use of this strategy is only weakly related to individual differences in fluid 
intelligence. This supports Dunbar and Klahr‘s (1988) claim that a key difference 
between the demands of traditional rule-induction tasks and scientific discovery 
learning is that the latter situation requires the design of appropriate experiments for 
effective rule induction. The results of the current study suggest that VOTAT 
strategy instruction may significantly reduce the problems that learners experience 
during discovery learning, regardless of their level of fluid intelligence. 
The results with regard to the role of fluid intelligence also provide support for 
the claim that in previous studies (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993; 
Preußler, 1996), the effect of structural information on control performance may 
have been masked by individual differences in the ability to understand and utilise 
the information. In addition, Preußler‘s (1998) finding that all subjects are able to 
effectively utilise information after a period of practice, may now be interpreted in a 
different light. It may be that practice per se is not the essential component, but 
rather that subjects who are less intellectually capable require more extensive 
instructions in order to be able to make sense of, and use, the information that is 
provided. 
Overall, these results imply that the direct instruction of structural information 
has the potential to increase the amount of knowledge acquired by problem solvers 
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and improve the quality of their control performance. The crucial aspect of 
instruction, however, is that it is well designed. These findings are in line with those 
from other domains that show that learners experience many difficulties when they 
are required to acquire knowledge without guidance (de Jong & van Joolingen, 1998; 
Mayer, 2004; de Jong, 2005; 2006). There are also substantial individual differences 
in problem solvers‘ capacity to make use of such information, however, which seem 
to be attributable to differences in fluid intelligence. These results suggest that a 
combination of VOTAT strategy instruction, an exploration of the system variables, 
and direct instruction may be most appropriate for encouraging learners of differing 
levels of ability to develop complete and accurate models of systems for later control 
performance.  
 102 
CHAPTER 6 
STUDY 2: YOU NEED TO KNOW: THERE IS A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN STRUCTURAL KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL PERFORMANCE 
IN COMPLEX PROBLEM SOLVING TASKS 
6.1 Permissions for published work 
The following chapter consists of a published paper: 
Goode, N. & Beckmann, J.F. (2010). You need to know: There is a causal 
relationship between structural knowledge and control performance in complex 
problem solving tasks. Intelligence, 38 (3), 345-352. 
It has been amended in some sections in response to examiners comments. 
The majority of the work in this paper is my own. The second author, 
Associate Professor Jens F. Beckmann, was a full collaborator in the publication of 
this paper. 
 
Signed: Associate Professor Jens F. Beckmann 
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6.2 Introduction 
The production of goods in a factory, managing an economy, and driving a car, 
could all be described as complex, dynamic systems of interdependent relationships 
between variables. Presumably, once the causal relationships between variables have 
been discovered, this information could be used to control the outcomes of the 
system, or change the system, although as yet this has not been established 
empirically. There might also be individual differences in how well problem solvers 
are able to understand or utilise such information. The aim of this study is to 
determine whether the amount of information problem solvers have about a system 
has a causal impact on how well they can control it, and whether their level of fluid 
intelligence co-determines the extent to which this information can be applied. 
Several computer-based complex problem solving (CPS) tasks, sometimes 
referred to as simulations or micro-worlds, have been developed to represent the key 
features of dynamic systems (e.g. Dörner, 1986; Funke, 1992). They consist of a 
number of input and output variables that are represented in a computer program. 
The values of inputs can be changed, which affects the values of the output variables 
through a set of mathematical equations. These tasks are ―dynamic‖ because the 
values of the outputs change in response to user input and independently over time. 
In order to study the role of structural knowledge in system control, often, problem 
solvers are first required to determine how the inputs affect the outputs (i.e. 
exploration phase). This is referred to as the underlying structure of the system. They 
then try to control the system through the input variables to reach and to maintain 
defined goal states of the output variables (i.e. control phase). 
In complex problem solving research a common assumption is that problem 
solvers‘ control of a task is dependent upon their knowledge of the underlying 
structure of the problem (Blech & Funke, 2005). Indeed, the available correlational 
evidence supports this assumption. Funke and Müller (1988) found that control 
performance and knowledge of the underlying structure of the task were significantly 
positively correlated (r = .41), as did Beckmann and Guthke (r = .51, 1995), 
Vollmeyer, Burns and Holyoak (r = .57 and r = .65, 1996), Kröner, Plass & Leutner 
(r = .77 and r = .61, 2005) and Kluge (r = .82, 2008).   
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These findings trigger two seemingly contradictory interpretations. One is that 
the quality of problems solvers‘ control performance is a function of the amount of 
structural knowledge acquired about the task. The other interpretation is that the 
acquisition of structural knowledge and the control of a complex, dynamic system 
depend on the same set of cognitive abilities.  
In line with the latter explanation direct manipulations of the amount of 
structural information available to participants do not appear to improve control 
performance. For example, in an early study by Putz-Osterloh and Lüer (1981) an 
experimental group received a diagram of the underlying structure of the task, while 
a control group received no supporting information. The diagram was presented on 
paper, as a system of arrows linking the input and output variables. Although the 
groups differed in terms of their verbal protocols, they did not differ in the success of 
their control performance. Later, Putz-Osterloh (1993) replicated this design with a 
different task. Again, the experimental group performed no differently to the control 
group. Putz-Osterloh (1993) argues that these results show that successful control 
performance can be accomplished without the aid of specific knowledge, and that a 
simple strategy of trial-and-error may be as efficient in reaching the goal states as the 
application of the rules underlying the system.  
However, in the following section we will argue that the method used to 
inform participants as to the underlying structure of the task in these studies has 
some limitations, and that these studies have not provided a strong enough test of the 
hypothesis that complex problems can be controlled without structural knowledge. 
Firstly, the instructional method used in these studies presents two sources of 
difficulty to the participants. Firstly, the user interface of complex problem solving 
tasks can be quite complicated. Wagener (2001) has found that computer familiarity 
was a significant predictor of complex problem solving, even when reasoning ability 
was partialled out.  Therefore, it may take time for the participant to understand how 
to apply the information that they have been given. This source of difficulty may 
initially diminish any advantage that problem solvers with structural knowledge hold 
with regard to controlling the system. A direct demonstration of how to alter the 
values of the input variables may be needed to familiarize participants with the user 
interface. 
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Secondly, participants are unlikely to have encountered causal diagrams as a 
method of representing relationships between variables in a computer program. 
Therefore, they may not have understood how the diagram presented on paper 
related to the input and output variables as they were presented in the task on the 
computer.  In order to overcome this problem the structure of the task could be 
presented on screen as arrows linking the input and output variables. Given these 
improvements, it is predicted that problem solvers with supporting structural 
information should display better control performance than those without such 
information. 
A question however that cannot be answered through the comparison of control 
performance under different amounts of information is whether a group‘s 
performance that received no information is as good as a group‘s performance that 
received full information or whether the full information group‘s performance was as 
poor as their no-information counterparts‘. That is, whether there are two 
qualitatively different, but equally effective, methods that can be used to control a 
system: One that is knowledge based, and another that is ad hoc, or whether those 
that are given structural information fail to apply it. 
This question is not adequately addressed in Putz-Osterloh‘s (Putz-Osterloh & 
Lüer, 1981; 1993) studies, as they do not provide a clear criterion for successful 
performance. Beckmann (1994) has suggested that control performance should be 
compared with what might have been achieved through the random action of the 
participant (see also Kluge, 2008).  Unless this comparison is undertaken, there is no 
objective measure of successful performance. In the current study control 
performance under different conditions of structural information will be compared to 
scores resulting from simulated random control interventions. It is predicted that 
problem solvers who are given information about the structure of the system should 
perform better than random, while those without such information should perform no 
better than random. 
We expect that even when provided with complete information control 
performance will not be perfect due to significant individual differences in problem 
solvers‘ capacity to apply what they have learnt. Fluid intelligence, as the capacity to 
reason abstractly, seems a likely source of individual differences in the application of 
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knowledge (Cattell, 1971). In particular, tests of fluid intelligence and control 
performance when structural information is given require problem solvers to manage 
sub-tasks related to the application of rules, and once a correct response to a situation 
has been produced, generalise these responses to new items, or in the case of 
complex problem solving tasks, trials with the same goal state. Therefore, we would 
expect that correlations between control performance under full information 
conditions and tests of fluid intelligence to be substantive. However, reported 
correlations between Raven‘s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) and control 
performance under such conditions are rather moderate (Putz-Osterloh, 1981; Putz-
Osterloh & Lüer, 1981). 
In comparison, no relationship has been found between fluid intelligence and 
control performance when participants are not given any structural information, 
which suggests that under such conditions the demands of the two tasks are relatively 
dissimilar (Putz-Osterloh, 1981; Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981).  Putz-Osterloh (1993) 
argues that when little structural information is available problem solvers must learn 
by doing. It could be argued that this skill is usually not required in traditional tests 
of intelligence.   
However, if control performance is in fact not better than random in the first 
place, then we should not expect to find a relationship between intelligence and 
control performance. Another contributor to the lack of substantial correlations 
between control performance and indicators of intellectual capacity may be the poor 
reliability of control performance measures (Kluwe, Misiak & Haider, 1991). CPS 
researchers do not consistently report reliability indices and those reported tend to be 
low (Wenke & Frensch, 2003), with the notable exception of Kröner et al. (2005).   
Therefore, in the present study we will address these issues in three ways: 
Firstly, we will report reliability indices for all performance measures. Secondly, 
control performance will be assessed across different goal states to test whether 
variability in performance is attributable to properties of the system, or the 
individual. Thirdly, control performance will be operationalised in a more 
meaningful way. Classically, knowledge application, or system control performance, 
has been operationalised by calculating the deviation of the current states of the 
output values from the goal states of the output values in terms of the root means 
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squares criterion (RMS). Thus, deviations become higher the further away the actual 
state of the system variables are from the goals (Funke, 1992; 1993). However, this 
approach does not take into account that the value ranges of the input variables are 
usually constrained in CPS tasks. If a poor decision is made on a given trial, a 
number of trials may be required to realign the output values with the goal states. 
Hence, the RMS criterion penalises participants although they may be making an 
optimal intervention towards the goal state given the current state the system is in. 
Therefore, Beckmann‘s (1994) approach to measuring the quality of knowledge 
application will be adopted in which the deviation from an optimal intervention (that 
would bring the system closest to the goal state) and the actual intervention made by 
the problem solver is the operationalisation of the quality of system control. 
As the main goal of this paper is to determine whether there is a causal 
relationship between the amount of structural knowledge and the quality of system 
control we will also introduce a condition in the experimental design where problem 
solvers are provided with partial information. This should allow us to determine 
whether different amounts of structural information lead to quantitative changes in 
performance.   
In summary, three hypotheses are put forward with regards to the effects of 
structural information and fluid intelligence on control performance in complex 
problem solving tasks. Firstly, it is hypothesised that the quality of participants 
control performance will be a function of the amount of structural information that is 
available to them (Information Hypothesis). Secondly, structural information is a 
precondition of better than random performance (Success Hypothesis). Thirdly, the 
magnitude of the relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance 
will increase as a function of the amount of structural information available to 
participants (Intelligence Hypothesis).  
6.3. Method 
6.3.1 Subjects 
75 first year psychology students (32 male) at the University of Sydney 
participated for course credit. The sample size chosen guarantees sufficient statistical 
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power (1 – β ≥ .80) in identifying at least medium effects (f2 ≥ .15) at a significance 
level of α ≤ .05 in the planned contrast analyses. 
6.3.2 Design 
A between-subjects design was used with three levels of structural 
information available to participants (complete, partial and no information). In the 
complete condition, participants were informed as to all the relationships between the 
variables, in the partial they were informed as to all the relationships but one, and in 
the no information condition they did not receive any information about the 
underlying structure of the task. A set of simulated data for twenty-five fictitious 
participants was also constructed based on randomly-generated control inputs. The 
simulated ―random‖ condition served as a benchmark to assess the quality of the 
empirical data in the three experimental conditions. Three dependent variables were 
derived: control performance for phase 1, control performance for phase 2 and 
performance in a test of fluid intelligence. 
6.3.3 Dependent Variables 
6.3.3.1 Control performance 
The system used in the current study consisted of three input variables and the 
participants were given seven trials to reach and maintain the goal values for three 
output variables during each control phase. Control Performance was operationalised 
as the distance between the intervention on the input variables made by the 
participant, and the optimal intervention necessary to reach the goal values for the 
output variables, averaged across the seven trials for each control phase. To calculate 
the distance between the intervention made by the participant and the optimal 
intervention for each trial, the previous values of the output variables and the goal 
state values were used to solve the set of linear equations underlying the system. This 
indicated the ideal values of the input variables.  If the ideal values were between –
10 and 10, (which were the limits of the input variables in this system), then the ideal 
values were equal to the optimal values. However, if an ideal value was greater than 
10, then the optimal value was set at 10. If it was less than -10, then the optimal 
value was set at -10. The Euclidean Distance (DEuclid) between the actual and the 
optimal values of the input variables was calculated using the equation: 
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DEuclid = √∑ (Xit
actual
 - Xit
optimal
)
 2
    (1) 
where Xit
actual
 represents the actual value of input variable i at trial t, and  
Xit
optimal 
represents the optimal value of input variable i at trial t.  
The distances calculated for the first set of seven trials and the second set of 
seven trials were then averaged to provide control performance scores for phase 1 
and 2, respectively. The theoretical range of the score is from 0 to 34, where a lower 
score indicates that participants had better control.  
6.3.3.2 Fluid intelligence 
Raw scores on the Raven‘s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) were used 
as an indicator of fluid intelligence. The maximum score possible was 38. This test 
has been standardised for a university-level population and extensively validated as 
an indicator of fluid intelligence (Raven, Raven & Court, 1998). 
6.3. 4 Materials 
The underlying causal structure of the complex problem employed in the study 
is identical to that used by Beckmann (1994), which is based on Funke‘s (1992) 
linear structural equation approach. The two main differences, in comparison to 
previous studies (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993), refer to the 
interface and the semantic embedment. With regard to the interface all inputs and 
outputs are non-numerical graphical (see Fig. 1). The main argument for this 
decision was that such an interface discourages low-level calculations and attempts 
to infer equations.  Rather, the graphical interface is expected to encourage the 
development of mental representations that are more aligned with the causal 
diagrams that are used to inform participants of the underlying structure of the 
system than equation-like mental models would be. In order to avoid uncontrolled 
influences of prior knowledge the labels used in the complex system are context free. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.1, the input variables were labelled A, B and C, while the 
output variables were labelled X, Y and Z. 
The complex problem consists of three input and three output variables that are 
connected by a set of linear equations: 
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Xt+1:= 1.0 * Xt +  0.8 * At +  0.8 * Bt +  0.0 * Ct    (2) 
Yt+1:= 0.8 * Yt +  1.6 * At +  0.0 * Bt +  0.0 * Ct  
Zt+1:= 1.2 * Zt   +  0.0 * At +  0.0 * Bt  - 1.0 * Ct   
Xt,, Yt, and Zt denote the values of the output variables and At,, Bt, and Ct denote the 
values of the input variables during the present trial while Xt+1, Yt+1, Zt+1 denote the 
values of the output variables in the subsequent trial. Beckmann (1994; Beckmann & 
Guthke, 1995) has used this set of equations in previous studies to study complex 
problem solving in different semantic contexts. The system structure does not 
contain any dependencies between input variables nor between output variables. The 
structure is considered balanced, as out of a possible twelve relationships between 
the variables, six of these are active.  
6.3.5 Procedure 
The complex problem solving task was presented to participants on PCs. In 
contrast to previous studies, participants did not explore the system actively. Instead, 
a recording of seven intervention trials was shown to participants with an 
accompanying narration. As can be seen in Figure 6.1, the boxes on the input 
variables represent the values of the input variables over the seven trials, and for 
each trial positive values of the input variables are show above the input line, while 
negative values are shown below. The strength of the inputs is indicated by the 
vertical dimension of the hatched field in the respective box per trial. After the 
values for each of the three input variables are set, the effects upon the output 
variables were displayed in graphs.  
In the complete condition on the first trial the inputs were set at zero, so that 
the autonomic changes in the outputs could be detected. Subsequently, input A was 
increased to maximum while the other inputs were set at zero, then on the next trial 
input A was reduced to minimum while the other inputs were set at zero. This was 
repeated with inputs B and C on subsequent trials so that the effect of each input on 
the outputs could be clearly observed. After each trial, the narrator explained how 
each of the outputs had changed, and how this reflected the underlying structure of 
the system. A causal diagram was constructed on screen, to record this information.   
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Figure 6.1 shows a screen shot of the task, with the causal diagram as 
presented in the complete information condition. The arrows represent the 
relationships between the variables, while the positive and negative signs denote the 
direction of the relationship, and the letters the relative strength, where ―W‖ 
represents a weak relationship, ―M‖ represents a medium relationship and ―S‖ 
represents a strong relationship. Rather than comparing the absolute value of the 
coefficients, the strength of each relationship was determined by comparing similar 
effects of similar quality.  The direct effect of Inputs A and B on Output X, and Input 
C on Output Z, were considered to be weak effects in comparison to the strong effect 
of Input A on Output Y. The dynamic changes in the system were both considered 
medium effects, as the increase in Input Y is the same as the decrease in Output Z.  
Participants in the partial information condition received similar instructions; 
however, the effect of input B on the outputs was omitted. On the first trial, the 
inputs were set at zero, so that the autonomic changes in the outputs could be 
detected. Subsequently, on the second trial input A was increased to maximum while 
the other inputs were set at zero, then on the third trial input A was reduced to 
minimum while the other inputs were set at zero. On the fourth trial all the inputs 
were increased to maximum and on the fifth trial all the inputs were decreased to 
minimum. This intervention was designed to disguise the effect of input B on the 
outputs.  On the sixth and seventh trial, as in the complete information condition, the 
effect of input C on the outputs was demonstrated. After each of the seven trials, the 
narrator explained how each of the outputs had changed, and how this reflected the 
underlying structure of the system. A causal diagram was constructed on screen to 
record this information. The narration and diagram was identical to that given in the 
complete information condition except that they omitted information concerning the 
effect of Input B on the outputs. 
 In the no-information condition multiple inputs were varied on each 
intervention trial. This pattern of interventions mirrors what can be observed in 
problem solvers who fail to acquire knowledge when confronted with the task to 
explore the causal structure of a system, as if all inputs are varied at the same time 
inferences cannot be made concerning individual effects. In this condition, at the end 
of each trial the narrator explained how the outputs had changed, but did not make 
any inferences with regards to the structure of the system, and they did not receive 
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any additional supporting information. During this period participants were not 
informed about the goals that they would later have to reach. 
 
Figure 6.1: Screenshot of the task, as presented in the complete information condition, with the goals 
indicated as dotted lines on the graphs for the output variables. In this example, the fictitious problem 
solver set all inputs to zero in trial 1; in trial 2 only Input A was set to its maximum positive value 
while all other inputs were set to zero; in trial 3 Input B was set to a medium negative value; in trial 4 
Input C was set to a medium positive value. In trial 5 all inputs were changed: Input A was set at a 
medium positive value, Input B at the maximum positive value and Input C was set to three quarters 
of its maximum positive value 
In the second phase of the task, all participants had to control the system by 
manipulating the inputs to reach certain values of the outputs, which were indicated 
as lines on the output graphs. The structural information appropriate to each 
condition was available on screen. There were two control phases consisting of seven 
trials each. Each trial required three decisions from the participant. On each trial they 
had to decide whether they wanted to increase, decrease or set each input variable to 
zero. This was done step by step, such that after they decided what they wanted to do 
with input A, they then decided what they wanted to do with input B and ultimately 
input C. Previous decisions could not be altered. Although the numerical values of 
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the inputs were not available to participants, the inputs could be varied 
incrementally, within the range of -10 to 10. Each click of the mouse on either the 
―increase‖ or ―decrease‖ button increases or decreases the value of the selected input 
variable by one unit. At the end of seven trials (control phase 1), the graphs were 
reset, and new goals were indicated onscreen (control phase 2).  
Afterwards, participants completed the APM.  
6.4. Results 
6.4.1 Internal consistencies 
Firstly, an internal consistency analysis was conducted to determine the level 
of variability in control performance across the trials and for different goals states. 
Reliability was consistently good in the complete, partial and no information 
conditions across the fourteen trials (αcomplete = .89, αpartial = .79, αno = .82), and for the 
first seven trials (αcomplete  = .87, αpartial = .72, αno  = .73), and the second seven trials 
(αcomplete  = .72, αpartial = .63, αno  = .70). These results indicate that the variability in 
control performance within each individual is rather low, which also justifies 
averaging the scores across each set of seven trials. 
In comparison, and as would be expected, the reliability of the randomly 
generated performance scores was poor across the fourteen trials (αrandom = .34), and 
for the first seven trials (αrandom = .28), and the second seven trials (αrandom = .41). 
This indicates that in comparison to randomly generated inputs, potential differences 
in control performance between the no, partial and complete information conditions 
is the result of systematic sources of variability. 
6.4.2 The success hypothesis 
To determine whether participants‘ control performance was better than 
random, a multiple regression was conducted, using dummy coded variables to 
compare each experimental condition to the random performance scores. Mean 
control performance in the first phase was 11.03 (SD = 4.10) in the complete 
condition, 14.17 (SD = 3.57) in the partial condition and 16.39 (SD = 4.44) in the no 
information condition. In the second phase, mean control performance was 10.33 
(SD = 5.25) in the complete condition, 13.82 (SD = 3.96) in the partial condition and 
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16.76 (SD = 4.25) in the no information condition. The mean random control 
performance was 16.77 (SD = 2.18) in the first phase, and 18.96 (SD = 2.34) in the 
second phase. In support of the success hypothesis, control performance in the 
complete condition was significantly better than random across both phases; b = -
5.74, t(96) = -5.52, p < .01, f
2
 = .32 and b = -8.63, t(96) = -7.46, p < .01, f
2
 = .58 for 
the first and second phase respectively, as was control performance in the partial 
condition; b = -2.60, t(96) = -2.50, p = .01, f
2
 = .07 and b = -5.14, t(96) = -4.44, p < 
.01, f
2
 = .21. In contrast, control performance in the no information condition did not 
differ significantly from random in either of the control phases; b = -.38, t(96) = -
0.37, p = .72, f
2
 = .001 and b = -2.19, t(96) = -1.90, p = .06, f
2
 = .04 respectively. 
This indicates that only participants who received structural information performed 
better than random.   
6.4.3 The information hypothesis 
To determine whether participants‘ control performance was dependent on the 
amount of structural information that was available to them, multiple regression 
analyses were conducted, using Cohen coded variables to conduct a contrast 
analysis. The model contained three predictors of control performance. Firstly, 
scores on the APM were included in order to control for any potential group 
differences in fluid intelligence, contrast 1 compared the conditions that received any 
information (complete and partial) to the no information condition and contrast 2 
compared the complete and partial information conditions. 
In support of the information hypothesis, in the first and second phases, control 
performance in the complete and partial information conditions was significantly 
better than those in the no information condition; b = 3.22, t(71) = 3.30, p < .01, f
2
 = 
.15, and b = 3.81, t(71) = 3.70, p < .01, f
2
 = .19, respectively. Control performance in 
the complete information condition was significantly better than in the partial 
information condition across both control phases; b = -3.07, t(71) = -2.82, p < .01, f
2
 
= .11 and b = -3.81, t(71) = -2.94, p < .01, f
2
 = .12. These reported differences are 
independent of any potential group differences in fluid intelligence, although scores 
on the APM were a significant predictor of performance across both goal phases; b = 
-.23, t(71) = -2.95, p < .01 f
2
 = .12 and b = -.34, t(71) = -4.24 p < .01, f
2
 = .25, 
respectively. These results show that increasing the amount of structural information 
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available to the problem solver improves performance, and that even small changes 
in the amount of information available has a significant impact upon performance.  
6.4.4 The intelligence hypothesis 
We predicted that the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance would increase as a function of the amount of information that problem 
solvers have about the structure of the task. As can be seen in Table 6.1, across both 
control phases the relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance is 
significant and strong in the complete information condition, while in the partial and 
no information conditions it is non-significant and weak to moderate. Overall there 
was a significant moderate correlation between control performance and fluid 
intelligence across the conditions in both control phases. 
Table 6.1 
The Relationship between APM scores and Control Performance in each Phase by Condition 
 Complete information Partial information No information 
Goal 1 -.53* -.25 -.19 
Goal 2 -.61* -.29 -.37* 
*p < .05, one tailed 
 
In order to determine whether the strength of the relationship between fluid 
intelligence and control performance differs across the conditions two moderator 
analyses were conducted, which are presented in Table 6.2. The non-significant 
interaction terms indicate that the relationship between scores on the APM and 
control performance was not significantly moderated by condition in either control 
phase; R
2
change = .01, p = .23, f
2 
= .02 and R
2
change = .02, p = .17, f
2 
= .03, respectively. 
However, the effect sizes for the interaction terms are small and the sample size is 
not sufficient to detect such effects. Nevertheless, our findings do not directly 
support the intelligence hypothesis. Rather, it appears that control performance is 
related to fluid intelligence, to a certain degree, regardless of the amount of 
information available to the problem solver. 
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Table 6.2 
Results of two moderator analyses examining the dependency of the relationship between control 
performance (phase 1 and phase 2, respectively) and fluid intelligence (APM score) 
Control Phase 1: 
Step Variables entered β t p R2change F 
1 APM -.29  -2.90 < .01   
 Condition -.43  -4.28 < .01   
     .312 16.36 
2 APM -.01  -0.05 .96   
 Condition -.02  -0.06 .95   
 APM x Condition -.55  -1.22 .23   
     .014 1.48 
Control Phase 2: 
Step Variables entered β t p R2change F 
1 APM -.39  -4.22 < .01   
 Condition -.43  -4.69 < .01   
     .406 24.64 
2 APM -.10  -0.44 .66   
 Condition -.01  -0.02 .98   
 APM x Condition -.58  -1.39 .17   
     .016 1.92 
Note: The degrees of freedom for the F-test of R
2
change in the step 1 models are (2, 72) and for the 
step 2 models are (1, 71). 
 
6.5 Discussion 
In summary, support was found for the information hypothesis, as performance 
improved systematically as the amount of structural information available to 
participants increased. With regards to the success hypothesis, control performance 
was better than random only when partial or complete information was available to 
participants. This strengthens the conclusions that can be drawn from the differences 
between the conditions, demonstrating again that control performance when partial 
or complete information is available is better than when no information is available. 
Finally, the results did not support the intelligence hypothesis. Although it appears 
that the relationship between control performance and fluid intelligence differs 
between the different information conditions, the potential moderator effect was too 
small to be statistically identified under the given circumstances. This suggests that 
the quality of decision making in CPS tasks under different levels of information is 
associated with measures of intellectual capacity, although to various degrees. 
The results presented contradict some previous findings (Putz-Osterloh & 
Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993). This is likely because of the different method used 
to inform participants of the underlying structure of the problem in previous studies. 
 117 
The results of this study suggest that if participants understand how to interact with 
the problem, and structural information is available on screen during the performance 
of the control task, then structural information does benefit control performance.  
The study provides a causal explanation to the consistent positive correlation 
found between structural knowledge and control performance reported in other 
studies (Funke & Müller, 1988; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; Vollmeyer, Burns & 
Holyoak, 1996; Kröner, 2001; Kluge, 2008).  The finding that control performance 
was better than random only when (any) structural information was available 
demonstrates that complex problems cannot successfully be controlled without 
structural knowledge, and contradicts Putz-Osterloh‘s (1993) claim that participants 
learn by doing when information about the structure of the system is not provided. 
Rather, the results indicate that the quality of control performance is a function of the 
amount of information available (and utilised). The design of the study presented 
also made it possible to establish a causal link between knowledge and control 
behaviour that previously was based on correlational evidence alone. 
With regard to the generalisability of these findings to more complex tasks we 
can speculate that at a certain level of complexity there might be no difference in 
control performance under conditions where partial or complete information is 
available given that there is a limit on how many causal relationships problem 
solvers can consider at one time. Future studies could systematically vary the 
complexity of the system with the amount of information available. However, the 
fact that withholding information about only one out of a total of six relations in the 
current system results in a significant reduction in control performance suggests that 
the sheer count of the number of existing or non-existing relationships between 
variables within a complex system represents a rather poor proxy of its complexity. 
With regard to the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance, the results of this study contradict those reported by Putz-Osterloh 
(1981; Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981) to some extent. Putz-Osterloh found that the 
correlation between fluid intelligence and control performance was moderate when 
complete structural information is available, and close to zero when no information 
is available. In the current study, it was found that the correlation between fluid 
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intelligence and control performance is strong when complete structural information 
is available, and weak to moderate when no information is available.  
The present study extends upon previous findings, as it was found that the 
correlation between performance and fluid intelligence is weak to moderate even 
when partial structural information is provided. This indicates that when incomplete 
structural information is available to the problem solver, success in controlling a 
complex system cannot be sufficiently predicted by fluid intelligence. Given the 
complexity of the environment we are living in on one hand and the limitations of 
human information processing capacity on the other, it seems quite likely that people 
often operate using incomplete representations of the systems they attempt to control, 
a situation that appears to be reflected by control performance under incomplete 
information conditions. However, it remains an open question as to whether 
performance under such conditions has the potential for incremental validity in 
predicting real world problem solving over and above traditional intelligence tests.  
It could be argued that the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance might be attenuated because information about the system was 
presented, and problem solvers did not have a chance to actively explore the task in 
order to acquire information about the underlying structure of the system. If problem 
solvers were required to actively acquire knowledge, then it might be expected that 
intellectually more capable problem solvers would be able a) to create system states 
that are more informative with regard to the underlying structure, and b) to extract 
more knowledge about the system. Given that control performance is dependent 
upon the amount of structural knowledge acquired, they should then have an even 
greater advantage when they are required to control the system. From this 
perspective, the decision to homogenise the amount of information available to 
participants within each experimental group leads to a rather conservative testing of 
the intelligence hypothesis.  
Findings in the current study may also indicate that control performance under 
different levels of knowledge has differential validity. That is, the processes used to 
control the task under different levels of information may differ. The strong 
correlation between control performance and scores on the APM suggest that when 
complete structural information is available the demands of the two tasks are highly 
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similar, as previously discussed. In comparison, the correlation between control 
performance and fluid intelligence is weak to moderate when partial or no 
information is available. This, in conjunction with the high levels of consistency in 
performance observed across trials and goal states, indicates that under these 
conditions control performance is systematically influenced by factors not 
sufficiently captured by traditional measures of intelligence.  However, further 
studies are needed to investigate the determinants of control performance under 
different levels of information. 
In conclusion, the results of this study indicate that successful problem solving 
in complex and dynamic situations requires task-specific knowledge, which is 
unlikely to be acquired while trying to control the system. Furthermore, individual 
differences in fluid intelligence appear to play a role in the utilisation of available 
information and the subsequent application of the acquired knowledge. Thus, 
complex problem solving performance, as measured by the current task, can be seen 
as a function of the amount of information available combined with the ability to 
utilise such information. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
STUDY 3: THE EFFECT OF SYSTEM COMPLEXITY ON THE ACQUISITION 
OF STRUCTURAL KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROLLING THE OUTCOMES OF 
A DYNAMIC SYSTEM 
7.1 Introduction 
The research documented in this thesis indicates that the quality of system 
control is a function of the amount of structural information that is available to 
problem solvers (Study 1 and 2), and that dynamic systems cannot be successfully 
controlled without structural knowledge (Study 2). However, in previous research, 
the provision of structural information did not show the expected benefit to control 
performance (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993; Preußler, 1996). In 
Chapter 5 and 6 it was argued that these results were inconsistent due to differences 
in the method used to inform subjects about the underlying structure of the system. 
An alternative, or perhaps complementary, explanation is that the underlying 
structures of the systems, TAILORSHOP (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981) and LINAS 
(Putz-Osterloh, 1993; Preußler, 1996) that were used in previous studies, may be 
more complex than that used in Study 1 and 2.
5
 This may have made it more difficult 
for subjects to understand and utilise the information that they were given. Therefore, 
the aim of the study reported in this chapter is to determine to whether the 
complexity of the system has an impact on the translation of information into 
structural knowledge and effective control actions. 
As a starting point then, we need to establish what makes one system more or 
less complex than another, and why a more complex system should be more difficult 
to acquire knowledge about and to control. However, although a number of 
researchers have commented on the need for a framework to compare the complexity 
                                                        
5
 In comparison to the complex problem used in Study 1 and 2, TAILORSHOP and LINAS differ on 
a number of dimensions. LINAS was constructed using Funke‘s (1985; 1993; 2001) Linear Structural 
Equation approach, and so it is comparable to the complex problem used in Study 1 and 2. In both 
problems, the underlying structure of the system is described by a set of linear equations, specific 
goals were given for system control and abstract labels are given to the system variables to control for 
the influence of prior knowledge. In contrast, the construction of TAILORSHOP is more aligned with 
the Dynamic Decision Making approach (which is described in Chapter 2). The problem is embedded 
in a rich semantic context and ill-defined goals were given for system control. These factors may 
influence the difficulty of system control, independently of the complexity of the system. Therefore, 
comparisons in this chapter will be limited to LINAS and the complex problem used in Study 1 and 2. 
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of different systems (Quesada, Kintsch & Gomez, 2005; Gonzalez, Vanyukov & 
Martin, 2005; Osman, 2010), as yet this has not materialised. Moreover, in past 
research, system complexity has been only defined at an operational level. Due to a 
lack of proper theoretical conceptualisation, the explanatory link between system 
complexity and task performance is unclear.  
Therefore, in the following sections, firstly system complexity will be defined 
at a conceptual level. This will a) establish an explanatory link between system 
complexity and task performance and b) identify a basis for the manipulation of 
system complexity that will be used in the empirical study reported in this chapter. 
Secondly, we will discuss the implications of this conceptualisation of system 
complexity for the effect of structural information on the acquisition of structural 
knowledge and system control, and the relationship between fluid intelligence and 
system control. 
7.1.1 Definition of a construct: System complexity 
In research concerned with dynamic systems, system complexity is often 
discussed as a potential moderator variable, although it is usually only defined at an 
operational level and there exist multiple views as to what makes one system more or 
less complex than another. For example, many researchers argue that the number of 
relations in a system is indicative of system complexity (e.g. Kluge, 2008; Gonzalez, 
Thomas & Vanyukov, 2005; Sterman, 2000). Other researchers argue that the 
characteristics of the entire system are important, such as the number of variables 
and the number and kind of relations that exist among those variables (e.g. Brehmer 
& Dörner, 1993; Kerstholt & Raaijmakers, 1997; Gonzalez, Vanyukov & Martin, 
2005; Brehmer & Allard, 1991; Leutner, 1993). Funke (2001) argues that it is the 
connectivity of the system that is most important because it requires problem solvers 
to figure out the connections between variables. Connectivity is understood as the 
―dependency between two or more variables‖ (Funke, 2001, p. 73). The common 
theme across these perspectives is an emphasis on the number of certain system 
properties, where a higher number is taken as indicative of a higher level of system 
complexity, which in turn is thought to make it more difficult to acquire structural 
knowledge and to control the outcomes of the system (e.g. Dörner, 1987; Brehmer & 
Dörner, 1993; Kerstholt & Raaijmakers, 1997; Kluge, 2008). 
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However, any account of system complexity that defines the construct through 
the value of a particular system property is likely to be problematic for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, such an account does not explain why we might expect certain 
system properties to be indicative of system complexity, and not others. The 
explanation usually given, which is consistent with a predominantly data driven 
approach, is that these properties reliably predict the difficulty of knowledge 
acquisition and system control. However, a range of system properties, such as 
feedback delays (Brehmer & Allard, 1991; Brehmer, 1995), the consistency of the 
relationships between the inputs and the outputs (Ackerman & Cianciolo, 2002), the 
type of connectivity pattern (Howie & Vicente, 1998), and whether the relationships 
in the system are linear or non-linear (Dörner, 1987; Dörner & Scholkopf, 1991), 
have been shown to have significant impacts on the difficulty of knowledge 
acquisition and control performance. Hence, the justification for the selection of any 
particular system property over others is unclear.  
Secondly, such an approach assumes that estimates of system complexity will 
be the same regardless of the task to be performed in relation to the system (i.e. 
acquiring knowledge on one hand, controlling the outcomes on the other). This is 
inconsistent with findings that show dissociations between the difficulty of 
knowledge acquisition and system control when certain system properties are 
manipulated (e.g. the number of variables; Preußler, 1997).  
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, system properties cannot be used as a 
psychological explanation as to why one system is more or less complex than 
another, and thus more or less difficult to acquire knowledge about or to control.  
Such an explanation requires some reference to the impact that system properties 
have on the processes that must be executed by the problem solver. Overall, these 
issues highlight the need for a theoretically driven account of system complexity. 
The problem of complexity is not confined to research with dynamic systems, 
and there exists an extensive literature on how the complexity of cognitive tasks 
might be conceptualised and measured. One perspective on this problem is that 
complexity can conceptualised as a function of the information processing demands 
of a task (Wood, 1986; Campbell, 1988; Bonner, 1994; Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 
1998a; Spilsbury, Stankov & Roberts, 1990; Stankov & Crawford, 1993; Stankov, 
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1999; Park & Jung, 2007). Although a number of different frameworks exist to 
measure these demands, they converge on the idea that complexity is a function of 
the number of cognitive processes that need to be executed in the performance of a 
task, and the dependencies among those processes. This is determined by the internal 
representation of the task-doer and the objective requirements of the task. Hence, 
decrements in performance related to complexity are explained by constraints on the 
human information processing system (see Appendix D for a review of the literature 
on task complexity). 
Under this approach, system complexity could be conceptualised as one facet 
of task complexity. Task complexity represents the overall information processing 
demands of the task to be performed (i.e. acquiring knowledge in one case, 
controlling the outcomes of the system in the other). System complexity indicates the 
information processing demands of the task to be performed engendered by the 
properties of the system. This approach provides an explanatory link between the 
properties of the system and task performance, such that systems with more complex 
structures are more difficult to acquire knowledge about and to control because 
problem solvers must execute a larger number of processes in the performance of 
each of these tasks.  
This approach has a number of implications for the operationalisation of 
system complexity. Firstly, it implies that estimates of system complexity may differ 
according to whether the task to be performed is to acquire knowledge or to control 
the system. Some system properties may have an impact on the number of processes 
that must be executed in order to acquire knowledge about the structure of a system, 
but not on system control. Conversely, some system properties may have a greater 
impact on the information processing demands of system control in comparison to 
knowledge acquisition. This accounts for dissociations between the difficulty of 
knowledge acquisition and system control. Secondly, under this view, any system 
property that has an impact on how the tasks of knowledge acquisition and system 
control are performed could be used to manipulate system complexity, or to compare 
different systems. These implications address some of the limitations associated with 
a purely operational approach to system complexity.  
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7.1.2 Indicators of system complexity 
The aim of this section is to identify system properties that might be used to 
manipulate system complexity, and compare the complexity of LINAS to the system 
used in Study 1 and 2. As discussed above, system complexity can only be estimated 
in relation to a particular task to be performed. In this study we are primarily 
interested in how system complexity might influence the effect of structural 
information on control performance. This can be conceptualised as two separate 
tasks. Firstly, the problem solver must acquire structural knowledge through direct 
instruction. That is, convert information into knowledge (knowledge acquisition). 
Secondly, they must translate knowledge into effective and systematic control 
actions (system control). System properties may have a differential impact on the 
complexity of each of these tasks. 
A complete review of the system properties that might influence the 
complexity of these tasks is far beyond the scope of this chapter. It is also 
unnecessary considering that we are primarily interested in whether the complexity 
of the underlying structure of LINAS differed to the system used in Study 1 and 2. 
These systems only differ on three dimensions: The number of variables, the number 
of relations and connectivity. Each of these properties may have a differential impact 
on the information processing demands of the task to be performed, although it 
should be noted that they are not entirely independent of each other, as connectivity 
is limited by the number of relationships in the system, which in turn is limited by 
the number of variables in the system. The following sections will examine how each 
of these properties might influence the information processing demands of 
knowledge acquisition and system control. 
7.1.2.1 The number of variables 
It could be argued that the number of variables in a system is likely to have a 
stronger impact on the complexity of knowledge acquisition and less impact on 
system control. With regard to knowledge acquisition, systems with more variables 
require problem solvers to incorporate more information into their mental model of 
the system, and this is likely to make it more difficult to acquire complete structural 
knowledge. In comparison, the total number of variables may not always provide an 
appropriate indicator of the information processing demands of system control. If the 
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problem solver is aware that some variables can be ignored while controlling the 
system (e.g. input variables that do not have any effect on other variables or output 
variables that do not have defined goal states) then they should have only a small 
effect on the information processing demands of the control task. At a conceptual 
level then, the number of variables is not a good candidate for estimating the 
complexity of both knowledge acquisition and system control. 
In line with these expectations, findings show that the number of variables is 
related to the difficulty of knowledge acquisition, but not system control. Preußler 
(1997) presented subjects with a complex problem with abstract letters for the system 
variables. The underlying structure consisted of a set of linear equations. In one 
condition, subjects were presented with a system that contained four inputs and three 
output variables. In a second condition, the system contained four additional input 
variables that had no effect on the output variables. Subjects in both conditions tried 
to control the system to reach specific goals for two sets of 8 trials, after which they 
were given a test of structural knowledge.  Subjects controlling the version of the 
system with fewer variables acquired significantly more structural knowledge, yet 
for control performance, the pattern was reversed; those who dealt with the system 
with more variables performed significantly better.  
These results confirm our expectations that systems with more variables will be 
more complex in relation to knowledge acquisition but not necessarily in relation to 
system control. Further, they suggest that variables influence the information 
processing demands of system control via their relationship to other variables. It is 
not the variables per se that are important, but rather the relationships between them. 
This suggests that the number of relationships in a system may provide a more 
appropriate indicator of system complexity in relation to system control.  
7.1.2.2 The number of relations 
It has often been argued that the number of relations in a system is a key 
indicator of system complexity (e.g. Kluge, 2008; Gonzalez, Thomas & Vanyukov, 
2005; Sterman, 2000). However, again, it could be argued that the number of 
relations may be related to system complexity in relation to knowledge acquisition, 
but not necessarily to system control. With regard to knowledge acquisition, a larger 
number of relations will increase the amount of information that must be 
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incorporated into the problem solvers‘ mental model. Hence, it should be more 
difficult to acquire knowledge about systems with more relations.  
With regard to system control, the goals set for the problem solver must be 
taken into account. If some relations can be ignored because they link variables that 
do not have defined goal states, then the number of relations may not be directly 
related to system complexity in relation to system control. Alternatively, in cases 
where all relations do impact upon desired goal states, then systems with more 
relations, but the same level of connectivity, will be more difficult to control because 
more information must be processed serially in order to make decisions about the 
goal states. However, this distinction between the number of relations in a system 
and the number of relations that impact upon goal states has not been made in 
previous research, so as yet there is insufficient empirical evidence to support this 
claim.  
Nevertheless, a number of studies have examined the effect of the number of 
relations on knowledge acquisition and system control (Funke, 1985; 1992; Kluge, 
2008). The experimental design of these studies is identical: Subjects were presented 
with a complex problem which consisted of three input and three output variables 
which were linked by a set of linear equations. Abstract labels were used for the 
system variables in order to control for the influence of prior knowledge. The 
number of relations in the system was varied across different experimental 
conditions, and all of the relations were linked to output variables with desired goal 
states. Subjects were first instructed to explore the system in order to acquire 
structural knowledge. Subsequently, they were instructed to control the system to 
reach specific goals for all of the output variables. Across these studies, findings 
indicate that systems with more relations, but the same number of variables, are more 
difficult to acquire knowledge about, and to control.  
However, the conclusions that can be drawn from the results of Funke‘s (1985; 
1992) studies with regard to the effect of the number of relations on system control 
are limited because the analysis did not take into account the controllability of 
different systems. Controllability reflects the control performance score that can be 
achieved through random interventions. If the underlying structure of the system 
changes, the controllability may change too. This may artificially inflate or deflate 
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control performance scores. This will confound comparisons of control performance 
across different system (Strauß, 1993; Kluge, 2008). Funke (1985; 1992) did not 
correct for controllability, and hence his findings may be attributable to differences 
in controllability, rather than differences in the information processing demands of 
the control task engendered by the system properties.  
Kluge (2008), however, did correct for controllability in her comparisons of 
control performance across different systems. These results replicate those reported 
by Funke (1985; 1992), which makes it possible to conclude that the number of 
relations in a system appears to affect the difficulty of both knowledge acquisition 
and system control. Therefore, it appears that the number of relations in a system 
may provide an appropriate indicator of system complexity in relation to both of 
these tasks.  
7.1.2.3 Connectivity 
As discussed, Funke (2001) defines connectivity as the number of 
dependencies between two or more variables. It should be noted that connectivity 
and the number of relations in a system are not identical. A system may have many 
relations, but a low level of connectivity if they form single connections between 
many variables. Alternatively, systems with few relations may form highly 
interconnected structures if they exist between few variables. Systems may also have 
the same number of variables and relations, but different levels of connectivity, as 
Figure 7.1 shows. Thus, connectivity can be distinguished from the number of 
relations in a system. 
(A) 
 
 
 
(B) 
 
Figure 7.1: Diagram A depicts a system that has four relations between two input and two output 
variables. The value of Output U depends on three relations and the value of Output V depends on one 
relation. Diagram B depicts a system that has the same number of variables and relations. However, 
the connectivity is different; the value of Output U and V both depend on two relations. 
Input A Input B 
Output U Output V 
Input A Input B 
Output U Output V 
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Connectivity is likely to have a significant impact on the complexity of 
knowledge acquisition, as the number of dependencies will determine the amount of 
information that must be integrated into the problem solvers‘ mental model of the 
system. However, connectivity may have less of an impact on how system control is 
performed if these variables are not relevant to achieving the desired goal states.  
Therefore, in the current chapter, we offer a revised definition of connectivity, 
based on our view of system complexity as a function of the information processing 
demands of the task to be performed engendered by the system properties. We 
propose that connectivity will be closely related to the complexity of system control 
when it is estimated in relation to output variables that have defined goal states. This 
can be undertaken by counting the number of relations that affect an output variable 
with a defined goal state. Under these circumstances, connectivity indicates the 
number of relations that must be processed in parallel in order to make a decision 
about a particular goal state. This will also impact upon the complexity of knowledge 
acquisition, as it reflects the number of relations that must be processed in parallel in 
order to understand how a particular output variable can be altered. Therefore, in the 
current chapter, all future references to connectivity define it in relation to the goal 
states.  
Conceptually, the connectivity implied by the goal states has a close 
correspondence to the information processing demands of the task. The amount of 
information that can be processed in parallel has long been recognised as a critical 
constraint on human performance (e.g. Miller, 1956), and findings show that 
increases in the number of relations that must be processed in parallel in reasoning 
tasks consistently lead to increases in task difficulty (e.g. Halford et al., 1998a; 
Andrews & Halford, 1998; Birney & Halford, 2002; Halford, Baker, McCredden & 
Bain, 2005). In terms of the limit on human information processing, initial estimates 
placed it at seven relations, plus or minus two (Miller, 1956). However, this estimate 
has since been revised downwards in the light of further empirical evidence (e.g. 
Broadbent, 1975; Fisher, 1984; Halford, Maybery & Bain, 1986; Halford et al., 
2005), which suggests that human information processing capacity is likely to be 
constrained to a soft limit of processing four relations in parallel (Halford et al., 
1998a; Halford et al., 2005). This suggests that the connectivity implied by the goal 
states should be closely aligned with system complexity in relation to knowledge 
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acquisition and system control. Moreover, floor effects on performance should be 
expected when the connectivity implied by the goal states requires problem solvers 
to process four or more relations in parallel.  
To the authors‘ knowledge, there have been no studies that have directly 
examined the effect of connectivity in general, or the connectivity implied by the 
goal states on the difficulty of system control or knowledge acquisition. However, in 
Funke‘s (1985; 1992) and Kluge‘s  (2008) studies the manipulation of the number of 
relations also resulted in changes in the connectivity implied by the goal states. Thus, 
the results of these studies could also be interpreted as evidence that the connectivity 
implied by the goal states provides a good indicator of system complexity in relation 
to knowledge acquisition and system control. However, obviously, it cannot be 
determined whether these results are attributable to the number of relations, the 
connectivity implied by the goal states or both. The current study will attempt to 
determine whether each of these factors has an independent effect on system 
complexity. 
In summary, it seems plausible that the number of relations and the 
connectivity implied by the goal states should impact upon the information 
processing demands of knowledge acquisition and system control, although for 
different reasons. Systems with larger numbers of relations, but similar levels of 
connectivity, require more information to be processed serially during knowledge 
acquisition and system control. Systems with higher levels of connectivity implied 
by the goal states, but the same number of relations, require problem solvers to 
process larger amounts of information in parallel during knowledge acquisition and 
system control. In the following section, these properties will be used to compare 
LINAS and the system used in study 1 and 2, to determine whether system 
complexity may account for the inconsistent effect of structural information on 
control performance. 
7.1.3 The effect of system complexity on the effect of structural information on 
knowledge acquisition and system control 
The question of interest in the current chapter is whether the inconsistent effect 
of structural information on system control is attributable to differences in the 
complexity of the systems used in different studies (i.e. Study 1 and 2; Putz-Osterloh, 
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1993; Preußler, 1996). We predict that the number of relations and the connectivity 
implied by the goal states can be used as an estimate of system complexity in relation 
to knowledge acquisition and system control. However, with regard to system 
control, the goals set for performance must be taken into account. 
The underlying structure of LINAS entails more relations and a higher level of 
connectivity implied by the goal states than the complex problem used in Study 1 
and 2. LINAS contains four input and seven output variables interconnected by 
fifteen relations. In comparison, the complex problem used in Study 1 and 2 contains 
three input and three output variables interconnected by six relations. In both of these 
systems, all relations were relevant to system control, as they all impacted upon 
output variables with defined goal states. In terms of the connectivity implied by the 
goal states, in LINAS, the maximum number of relations to be considered to reach a 
goal state is three.  In comparison, in the system used in Study 1 and 2, the maximum 
number of relations to be considered to reach a goal state was two. This suggests that 
LINAS is at a higher level of system complexity in relation to knowledge acquisition 
and system control than the complex problem used in Study 1 and 2. 
This may explain why we found in Study 1 and 2 that structural information 
benefited control performance, while Putz-Osterloh (1993) and Preußler (1996) did 
not. In effect, the information processing demands implied by LINAS may have been 
too high for subjects to effectively convert information into knowledge or translate 
knowledge into effective control actions (or at least the effect may have been too 
small to detect given the power implied by the sample size). It should be noted that 
this interpretation differs significantly from that given by Putz-Osterloh (1993), who 
argues that problem solvers can perform effectively without structural knowledge. In 
comparison, we argue that floor effects are to be expected on performance when the 
information processing demands implied by the system properties are too high for 
problem solvers to understand or utilise the information that has been provided 
through direct instruction. 
Concomitantly, this implies that it should be easier to acquire knowledge about 
and to control systems that are less complex than LINAS and the complex problem 
used in Study 1 and 2. If the underlying structure of the system contains few relations 
or a low level of connectivity there will be less information for problem solvers to 
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incorporate into their mental model. Hence, it should be easier for problem solvers 
who are provided with structural information to acquire a complete representation of 
the system, which in turn should result in better control performance. When complete 
structural knowledge is acquired, systems with fewer relations or a lower level of 
connectivity implied by the goal states should also be easier to control because less 
cognitive steps are required to formulate effective control interventions.  
However, the effect of structural information may not necessarily be stronger 
when the system is less complex as it could be speculated that it may be possible to 
learn to control such systems through trial-and-error. If this is the case, then problem 
solvers provided with structural information would not have an advantage over those 
who are required to control the system without such information. This implies that 
the provision of structural information may have a weak effect on control 
performance when the complexity of the system is low, although the overall quality 
of control performance will be high. 
This suggests that the relationship between structural knowledge and control 
performance may be dependent on the complexity of the system. At high levels of 
system complexity, as realised in LINAS, there may be little relationship between 
structural knowledge and control performance because it may be too difficult for 
problem solvers to acquire knowledge or to control the system. In contrast, at 
moderate levels of system complexity, as in the complex problem used in Study 1 
and 2, information can be successfully converted into knowledge. Subsequently, the 
effectiveness of control actions crucially depends on the amount of knowledge that 
can be acquired. At low levels of system complexity, there may be little relationship 
between structural knowledge and control performance because problem solvers may 
be able to adequately control the system either through trial-and-error or knowledge-
based interventions. This may explain why the effect of structural information on 
control performance has been found to be inconsistent.  
7.1.4 The relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance  
Based on the insights gained in Study 1 and 2 in regard to the role of fluid 
intelligence in problem solving, we assume that more intelligent problem solvers 
benefit more from the provision of structural information and are better able to 
control the outcomes of dynamic systems than their less intelligent counter-parts. 
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Hence, in the current study we will test whether these findings generalise to systems 
of differing complexity.  
Evidence from the psychometric literature suggests that the magnitude of the 
relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance may vary as a 
function of system complexity. Findings show that tasks that entail the execution of 
more processes (i.e. complexity) load more highly on broad ability factors, such as 
fluid intelligence. Snow, Kyllonen and Marshalek (1984) have proposed that even 
though they are derived using different mathematical techniques, the radex and 
hierarchical models of intelligence ―…suggest a complexity continuum along which 
tasks can be arrayed‖ (Snow et al., 1984, p. 107). The most complex tasks in this 
framework, such as Raven‘s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM), tend to load 
most highly on the central part of the radex model and on the general ability factor in 
hierarchical models. In comparison, more elementary cognitive tasks, such as 
Perceptual Speed, show only modest correlations with the general factor and lie on 
the periphery of the radex model. A similar conclusion can be derived from a series 
of studies conducted by Kyllonen (1985). Additive-factors logic was used to 
construct a set of information processing tasks that varied from tasks that entailed 
single processes, such as reaction time tasks, to tasks that entailed many processes, 
such as sentence verification tasks. Mirroring the findings observed in factor analytic 
studies, Kyllonen (1985) found that as the number of processes involved in task 
performance increased, so did the correlations with broad ability factors. This 
suggests that the association (correlation) between fluid intelligence and control 
performance should increase as system complexity increases because the control of 
more complex systems should require the execution of more processes. However, 
this effect may be attenuated in systems that are too complex to be effectively 
controlled; if there is a floor effect on control performance then there will not be any 
relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance. Therefore, we 
predict that the relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance 
should increase with system complexity, until there are floor effects on control 
performance.  
In Study 1 and 2 we also found preliminary evidence that the relationship 
between fluid intelligence and control performance may be stronger under conditions 
where complete structural information is available, in comparison to when partial or 
 133 
no information is available. This finding is consistent with previous research (Putz-
Osterloh, 1981; Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Krörner et al., 2005). It was argued that 
this indicates that the demands of system control and tests of fluid intelligence are 
more similar when control actions are knowledge-based, rather than the result of 
trial-and-error. However, the effect size was too small to draw strong conclusions. In 
this study, we will test whether this effect can be replicated, and whether this finding 
holds across systems of differing complexity. 
7.1.5 Task manipulations and hypotheses 
In the current study, a between-subjects design will be utilised with three levels 
of structural information available to participants (information condition: Complete, 
partial and no information) and four levels of system complexity. The first factor 
replicates the design of Study 2. In the complete information condition, subjects will 
be informed as to all the relationships between the variables, in the partial 
information condition they will be informed as to all the relationships but one, and in 
the no information condition they will not receive any information about the 
underlying structure of the system. Subsequently, they will be given a test of 
structural knowledge, and then they will be asked to control the system to reach 
specific goals.  
With respect to system complexity, the underlying structure of the system used 
in Study 1 and 2 will be manipulated in order to create four systems of a 
comparatively increased and decreased system complexity. In two of the systems, we 
will manipulate the number of relations independently of the level of connectivity 
implied by the goal states to determine how each of these system properties impacts 
upon system complexity in relation to knowledge acquisition and system control. 
The complexity of each system will be defined in terms of the number of input 
and output variables (V(number of inputs) x (number of outputs)), relations between 
these variables (R) and the connectivity implied by the goal states (C). Although this 
may seem a rather complicated way of labelling the levels of system complexity, it is 
designed to remind the reader of the structural characteristics of each system because 
the proposed levels of system complexity do not increase in a linear fashion.  
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All of the relations in the systems will be relevant to system control, as all 
output variables will have defined goal states. As in Study 1 and 2, in order to control 
for the influence of prior knowledge, the variables will be labelled with letters. 
Figure 7.2 shows a graphical representation of the underlying structure of the four 
systems (see Appendix E for equations). 
The original system used in Study 1 and 2, which in this study is referred to as 
V3x3-R-6-C-2, contains six relations between three input variables and three output 
variables. The problem solver must consider two relations in parallel when making a 
decision about any of the goal states (i.e. connectivity = 2).  
V3x3-R-3-C-1 is less complex than V3x3-R-6-C-2. It contains three relations 
between three inputs and three outputs. The problem solver needs only to consider 
the effect of a single relation on each goal state (i.e. connectivity = 1).  
V6x6-R-12-C-2 is more complex than V3x3-R-6-C-2. The number of relations 
and input and output variables is double that of the V3x3-R-6-C-2, and consequently, 
problem solvers must reach six goals, rather than three. However, the connectivity is 
the same as V3x3-R-6-C-2 (i.e. connectivity = 2). V6x6-R-12-C-2 is similar to 
LINAS in terms of the number of relations in the system. 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 is again more complex than V3x3-R-6-C-2, as it contains seven 
relations between six variables and a maximum of three relations must be considered 
in parallel when making a decision about a goal state (i.e. connectivity = 3). The 
connectivity of V3x3-R-7-C-3 is the same as LINAS.  
To summarise, V3x3-R-3-C-1 is less complex than V3x3-R-6-C-2. V6x6-R-
12-C-2 and V-6-R-7-C-3 are more complex than V3x3-R-6-C-2. At the present point 
in time, we do not have sufficient evidence to predict whether V6x6-R-12-C-2 is 
more complex than V-6-R-7-C-3, or whether the reverse is to be expected. V6x6-R-
12-C-2 contains almost twice the number of relations of V-6-R-7-C-3, yet the 
connectivity of V-6-R-7-C-3 is higher than V6x6-R-12-C-2. This manipulation 
should allow us to determine whether the number of relations and the connectivity 
implied by the goal states have independent effects on the complexity of knowledge 
acquisition and system control.  
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V3x3-R-3-C-1: 3 inputs, 3 outputs, 3 relations, connectivity 1  
 
 
 
V3x3-R-6-C-2: 3 inputs, 3 outputs, 6 relations, connectivity 2 
 
 
 
V6x6-R-12-C-2: 6 inputs, 6 outputs, 12 relations, connectivity 2 
 
 
 
V3x3-R-7-C-3: 3 inputs, 3 outputs, 7 relations, connectivity 3 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: A graphical representation of the underlying structure of the four systems  
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In summary, the primary aim of this study is to examine the effect of structural 
information and system complexity on the acquisition of structural knowledge and 
system control. Firstly, it is hypothesised that the effect of structural information on 
structural knowledge will be moderated by system complexity, as it will be more 
difficult to convert information into knowledge in more complex systems.  Secondly, 
system complexity will also moderate the effect of structural information on control 
performance, as the provision of structural information is not expected to confer an 
advantage to control performance at low and high levels of system complexity. 
Thirdly, it is hypothesised that the relationship between structural knowledge and 
control performance should be moderated by system complexity. The relationship 
should be curvilinear: With high correlations at medium levels of system complexity, 
and low correlations at low and high levels of system complexity, due to either floor 
or ceiling effects on control performance, respectively. 
 A secondary aim of this study is to consider the relationship between fluid 
intelligence and system control. Firstly, it is hypothesised that the magnitude of the 
relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance will increase as a 
function of the amount of structural information available to subjects, because the 
demands of the APM and the control task should be more similar when control 
behaviour is knowledge based rather the result of trial-and-error or random 
interventions. Secondly, it is hypothesised the magnitude of the relationship between 
fluid intelligence and control performance will increase with system complexity, 
because the number of processes involved in executing the control task should 
increase with system complexity.  
The exploratory component of this investigation involves an examination of 
the contribution of the number of relations and connectivity implied by the goal 
states to system complexity. Overall, V3x3-R-3-C-1 is less complex than V3x3-R-6-
C-2, which is less complex than V6x6-R-12-C-2 and V3x3-R-7-C-3. It is predicted 
that these differences should be reflected in structural knowledge and control 
performance scores and the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance. However, at this stage, we cannot specify whether V6x6-R-12-C-2 is 
more or less complex than V3x3-R-7-C-3. It remains to be seen whether the number 
of relations, or the level of connectivity implied by the goal states both have an effect 
on system complexity.  
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7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Subjects 
Three hundred first-year psychology students at the University of Sydney 
participated for course credit (M = 19.06 years, SD = 3.56, range 17 – 55 years). 
Seven subjects failed to complete all of the tasks therefore their data was excluded 
from further analysis. A sample size of 286 would guarantee sufficient statistical 
power (1 – β ≥ .90) in identifying at least medium effects (f2 = .25) at a significance 
level of α ≤ .05 to detect the potential interaction effects. 
7.2.2 Procedure 
Subjects were randomly allocated to one of twelve experimental conditions, 
which determined the level of system complexity and structural information they 
would receive. All tasks were presented on PCs. The general procedure consisted of 
instructions relevant to the level of structural information (complete, partial and no 
information), a test of structural knowledge and two control phases. All subjects then 
completed the Raven‘s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM).  
7.2.2.1 Instructions in each condition 
During the instructions subjects were not informed about the goals that they 
would later have to reach in the control phases. The instructional procedure used to 
implement the different levels of structural information was identical to that used in 
Studies 1 and 2. A recording of a number of intervention trials was shown to subjects 
with an accompanying narration, while a causal diagram was constructed on screen 
to record this information that remained on screen during the control phases. The 
number of intervention trials in the instructions differed according to the level of 
system complexity because the number of variables in each system differed and in 
the complete information condition the aim was to demonstrate the autonomic 
changes in the output variables and the independent effect of each input on the 
outputs. Thus, subjects who dealt with systems that contained six variables were 
shown seven intervention trials (V3x3-R-3-C-1, V3x3-R-6-C-1 and V3x3-R-7-C-1). 
Subjects who dealt with the system that contained twelve variables were shown 
thirteen intervention trials (V6x6-R-12-C-2). 
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In the instructions given in the complete information condition, on the first trial 
the inputs were set at zero, so that the autonomic changes in the outputs could be 
detected. Subsequently, Input A was increased to maximum while the other input 
variables were set at zero, and then on the next trial it was decreased to minimum 
while the other input variables were set at zero. This was repeated for each input 
variable, so that the effect of each input on the outputs could be clearly observed. 
After each trial, the narrator described how the inputs had been altered, how each of 
the outputs had changed, and how this reflected the underlying structure of the 
system. As in Study 1 and 2, a causal diagram was constructed concurrently on 
screen to record the information presented to subjects, which remained on screen 
during the control phases. 
Subjects in the partial information condition received similar instructions. 
However, they were not shown the effect of input B on the outputs, nor did their 
causal diagram reflect this piece of information. Instead, on these trials all the inputs 
were increased to maximum, and then all the inputs were decreased to minimum. In 
the no information condition multiple inputs were varied on each trial. In this 
condition, at the end of each trial the narrator explained how the outputs had 
changed, but did not make any inferences with regards to the structure of the system, 
and a causal diagram was not developed on screen.  
7.2.2.2 Test of structural knowledge 
Subjects then had to complete a test of structural knowledge. The structural 
information (i.e. the causal diagram) was available on screen in the partial and 
complete information conditions. For each item of the structural knowledge test, 
subjects were shown the input variables in a particular configuration. They then had 
to predict whether each output variable would increase, decrease or stay the same as 
a result of this intervention. The items replicated the intervention pattern that was 
shown to subjects in the complete information condition, at the appropriate level of 
system complexity. Thus, subjects who dealt with systems that contained six 
variables completed seven items (V3x3-R-3-C-1, V3x3-R-6-C-2 and V3x3-R-7-C-
3), while subjects who dealt with the system that contained twelve variables 
completed thirteen items (V6x6-R-12-C-2). This should allow us to determine 
whether problem solvers are aware of whether or not the output variables change 
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autonomously and how each input affects each output. This method has been used to 
assess structural knowledge in previous studies (e.g. Funke & Müller, 1988; 
Beckmann, 1994; Vollmeyer, Burns & Holyoak, 1996; Kröner et al., 2005; Bühner et 
al., 2008). 
7.2.2.3 Control Phase 1 and 2 
The third and fourth part of the task consisted of two control phases of seven 
trials each. Subjects had to manipulate the inputs to reach certain values of the 
outputs, which were indicated as lines on the output graphs. The goals for each 
control phase were identical to those used in Study 1 and 2. However, as V6x6-R-12-
C-2 had six outputs, the goals set for outputs X, Y and Z were the same as those set 
for U, V and W.  
During the control phases, the structural information appropriate to each 
condition was available on screen. On each trial subjects had to decide whether they 
wanted to increase, decrease or set each input variable to zero. This was done step by 
step, such that in V3x3-R-3-C-1, V3x3-R-6-C-2 and V3x3-R-7-C-3, subjects first set 
the value for Input A, then B and ultimately input C. In addition, in V6x6-R-12-C-2, 
subjects had to subsequently decide what to do with inputs D, E and F. Previous 
decisions could not be altered. Although the numerical values of the inputs were not 
available to subjects, the inputs could be varied incrementally, within the range of -
10 to 10 units. At the end of seven trials (control phase 1), the graphs were reset, and 
the second set of goals were indicated on screen (control phase 2).  
The key difference between the test of structural knowledge and the control 
phases was that the former primarily requires the reproduction of knowledge about 
the individual effect of each input variable on any of the output variables. In 
comparison, the control phases require the joint analysis of relations between 
multiple variables in the system and the application of the results of this analysis to 
manipulate the input variables in order to reach values of the output variables.  
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7.2.3 Dependent variables and individual differences measures 
7.2.3.1 Structural knowledge 
For each item, the predicted value of all output variables had to be in the 
correct direction in order to receive one point. Partial credit was not awarded. As the 
number of items completed was dependent on the number of input variables in the 
task, the maximum number points that could be gained was seven for V3x3-R-3-C-1, 
V3x3-R-6-C-2 and V3x3-R-7-C-3, and thirteen for V6x6-R-12-C-2. The scores were 
transformed into percentages, in order to compare the scores from the different 
systems.  
7.2.3.2 Control performance 
The scoring procedure used was the same as that used in Study 1 and 2 (see pp. 
34 – 35 for a detailed example). Control performance was calculated by determining 
the Euclidean Distance between the actual and optimal values of the input variables. 
The ideal values for each input variable was calculated by using the values of the 
output variables on the previous trial and the goal output values to solve the set of 
linear equations underlying the appropriate system.
6
 A lower score indicates a 
smaller deviation from optimal control interventions and therefore better 
performance. 
7.2.3.3 Fluid intelligence 
Raw scores on the APM were used as an indicator of fluid intelligence. This 
test has been extensively validated as an indicator of fluid intelligence for a 
university-level population (Raven, Raven & Court, 1998). 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Internal consistencies 
Firstly, internal consistency analyses were conducted to determine the 
variability in raw control performance scores across the trials and for different goal 
states as an estimate of the reliability of the dependent variables in each experimental 
                                                        
6 If the ideal values were within the range of possible input values (which was 10 to -10), then the 
ideal values were equal to the optimal values. In cases where the ideal value fell outside this range, 
then the optimal value was adjusted to the nearest possible value. 
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condition. Table 7.1 shows the raw control performance scores and the associated 
alpha coefficients, by condition.  
Across the different systems, in the complete and partial information 
conditions, the internal consistency of the control performance scores was acceptable 
to excellent across the fourteen trials and individually for the first and second set of 
seven trials. Similarly, for V3x3-R-3-C-1 and V6x6-R-12-C-2, in the no information 
condition, the internal consistency was acceptable to good across the fourteen trials 
in the control phases and individually for the first and second set of seven trials 
(control phase 1 and 2, respectively). For V3x3-R-6-C-2, in the no information 
condition, internal consistency was poor across the fourteen trials and individually 
for the first and second set of seven trials. For V3x3-R-7-C-3, in the no information 
condition, internal consistency was poor across the fourteen trials and the first set of 
seven trials, but acceptable for the second set of seven trials.  
The pattern of internal consistency scores suggests that the reliability of the 
control performance scores depends on the level of structural information and system 
complexity. If any information was available with regard to the underlying structure 
of the system or system complexity was low, then the differences between people 
were consistent across different trials and goal states. However, when no information 
was available with regard to the underlying structure of the system, and system 
complexity was high, the differences between people were much less consistent. This 
also implies that control behaviour tends to be random when the amount of 
information available mismatches the requirements in more complex systems. This 
claim will be tested further in relation to the effect of structural information on 
control performance.  
In comparison, and as would be expected, the reliability of the random control 
performance scores was poor across the fourteen trials and individually for the first 
and second set of seven trials. This indicates that in comparison to randomly 
generated inputs, potential differences in control performance in the partial and 
complete information conditions are the result of systematic sources of variability. 
An analysis of internal consistency of the APM scores indicated that the 
reliability of this scale was acceptable across the 36 items (α  = .72).  
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Table 7.1 
Raw scores for control performance and alpha coefficients across the trials and for different goal states 
by condition 
System Information Phase 1  
(Trial 1 – 7) 
Phase 2  
(Trial 8 – 14) 
All trials 
(Trials 1 – 14) 
  M SD α M SD α M SD α 
V3x3-R-3-C-1 Complete 
n = 23 
3.12 3.42 .83 2.26 1.67 .80 2.56 1.93 .86 
 Partial 
n = 23 
3.40 3.42 .92 2.26 1.67 .83 2.83 2.15 .89 
 No 
n = 22 2.58 2.58 .79 2.50 1.52 .81 2.54 1.88 .86 
 Random 
n = 25 12.45 1.58 .06 11.41 1.67 .28 11.93 1.03 .13 
V3x3-R-6-C-2 Complete 
n = 25 13.32 3.95 .77 12.61 5.64 .91 12.97 4.64 .92 
 Partial 
n = 23 
14.25 3.52 .73 15.21 4.25 .76 14.73 3.47 .83 
 No 
n = 24 
16.38 3.03 .46 17.08 3.60 .67 16.73 3.05 .75 
 Random 
n = 25 
17.16 2.88 .57 17.20 2.87 .57 17.18 2.32 .66 
V6x6-R-12-C-2 Complete 
n = 23 
15.99 6.02 .90 14.34 7.21 .94 15.18 6.25 .95 
 Partial 
n = 26 
18.44 5.03 .85 19.27 6.34 .92 18.85 5.45 .94 
 No 
n = 26 
22.74 5.23 .82 22.36 6.55 .86 22.55 5.74 .92 
 Random 
n = 25 
24.44 2.31 .39 22.67 3.65 .62 23.55 2.43 .47 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 Complete 
n = 26 
12.72 3.43 .73 14.81 4.28 .83 13.77 3.41 .85 
 Partial 
n = 26 
10.02 3.31 .75 16.01 3.73 .85 13.01 2.68 .79 
 No 
n = 26 
13.43 2.37 .17 17.59 3.56 .73 15.51 2.49 .66 
 Random 
n = 25 
14.17 2.51 .43 16.08 2.87 .53 15.12 2.13 .53 
 
7.3.2 Correcting for controllability 
So that it is possible to compare control performance scores across the different 
systems, we need to correct for differences in the mean random control performance 
scores across the different systems (i.e. controllability). An analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) indicated that the mean random control performance scores in phase 1 
and phase 2 differed significantly across the systems; F(3, 96) = 124.73, p < .01 and 
F(3, 96) = 65.69, p < .01. To correct this problem, subjects‘ control performance 
scores were then divided by the mean random control performance scores of the 
appropriate system. The corrected scores then reflect the success of subjects control 
performance relative to random interventions for the appropriate system. 
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Subsequent analyses refer to the corrected control performance scores. As 
before a score close to zero means that performance approximates the goal state. In 
addition, scores less than 1.00 indicate that performance is better than random, while 
scores greater than 1.00 indicate that performance is worse than random. Table 7.2 
shows the means and standard deviations of the structural knowledge test scores, 
corrected control performance scores and APM scores by condition.  
Table 7.2 
Structural knowledge, corrected control performance and APM scores  
System Information Structural 
Knowledge  
Corrected 
Control 
Performance 
Phase 1 
Corrected 
Control 
Performance 
Phase 2 
APM 
  M SD M SD M SD M SD 
V3x3-R-3-C-1 Complete 
n = 23 
98.18 4.32 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.14 66.81 14.10 
 Partial 
n = 23 
98.55 4.10 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.15 55.86 18.80 
 No 
n = 22 
99.24 2.45 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.14 64.34 15.90 
 Random 
n = 25 
- - 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.16 - - 
V3x3-R-6-C-2 Complete 
n = 25 
60.00 24.30 0.78 0.23 0.74 0.33 60.00 15.59 
 Partial 
n = 23 
54.71 16.63 0.83 0.21 0.89 0.25 64.78 13.69 
 No 
n = 24 
40.63 11.08 0.96 0.18 1.00 0.21 67.50 19.09 
 Random 
n = 25 
- - 1.00 0.17 1.00 0.17 - - 
V-12-R-12-C-2 Complete 
n = 23 
70.39 23.87 0.66 0.24 0.63 0.32 54.81 17.23 
 Partial 
n = 26 
65.65 24.40 0.75 0.20 0.85 0.28 58.65 15.52 
 No 
n = 26 
58.42 15.91 0.93 0.21 0.99 0.29 62.11 16.38 
 Random 
n = 25 
- - 1.00 0.10 0.99 0.16 - - 
V3x3-R-12-C-3 Complete 
n = 26 
49.67 22.78 0.95 0.27 0.93 0.27 54.81 17.23 
 Partial 
n = 26 
51.28 21.17 0.74 0.25 1.00 0.24 54.42 16.08 
 No 
n = 26 
48.72 17.11 0.98 0.17 1.10 0.23 62.11 16.38 
 Random 
n = 25 
- - 1.00 0.18 1.00 0.18 - - 
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7.3.3 The effect of structural information and system complexity on the acquisition 
of structural knowledge 
In order to determine the effect of structural information and system 
complexity on the acquisition of structural knowledge a multiple regression analysis 
was conducted using effect-coded variables to conduct contrast analyses. The model 
contained 12 predictors of structural knowledge. Firstly, mean centred scores on the 
APM were included in order to control for any potential group differences in fluid 
intelligence, three contrasts examined the main effect of system complexity, two 
contrasts examined the main effect of structural information and six contrasts 
computed the interaction terms between these variables. It should be noted that in the 
construction of the system variants, system complexity was manipulated in relation 
to the system that was used in Study 1 and 2 (V3x3-R-6-C-2 in this study). 
Therefore, V3x3-R-6-C-2 is used as the baseline condition to evaluate the effect of 
system complexity on the outcome variables in this, and all subsequent, analyses.  
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7.3, and the interpretation of 
main effects and interactions are presented in the subsequent sections. These reported 
differences are independent of any potential group differences in fluid intelligence, 
although scores on the APM were a significant predictor of structural knowledge; b = 
.27, t(280) = 4.53, p < .01 f
2
 = .26. Figure 7.3 shows structural knowledge test scores 
by information condition and level of system complexity. 
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Figure 7.3: Structural knowledge test scores by information condition and system complexity (error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals) 
7.3.1 The effect of system complexity on the acquisition of structural knowledge  
It was predicted that in comparison to V3x3-R-6-C-2, subjects would acquire 
more knowledge about V3x3-R-3-C-1, and less knowledge about V6x6-R-12-C-2 
and V3x3-R-7-C-3. Across the levels of structural information, mean structural 
knowledge test scores were 98.65 (SD = 3.71) for V3x3-R-3-C-1, 51.58 (SD = 19.84) 
for V3x3-R-6-C-2, 64.60 (SD = 21.91) for V6x6-R-12-C-2 and 49.89 (SD = 20.25) 
for V3x3-R-7-C-3.  
As predicted, on average, subjects who interacted with V3x3-R-3-C-1 acquired 
significantly more structural knowledge than subjects who interacted with V3x3-R-
6-C-2; b = 47.11, t(280) = 16.16, p < .01, f
2
 = .70. Against expectations, subjects 
who interacted with V6x6-R-12-C-3 acquired significantly more structural 
knowledge than subjects who interacted with V3x3-R-6-C-2; b = 13.36, t(280) = 
4.69, p < .01, f
2
 = .27. This is surprising considering that V6x6-R-12-C-3 contains 
 146 
more than twice the number of relations in comparison to V3x3-R-6-C-2. As 
predicted, on average structural knowledge test scores were higher for subjects who 
interacted with V3x3-R-6-C-2 in comparison to V3x3-R-7-C-3, although this 
difference was not significant; b = -.18, t(280) = -.06, p = .95, f
2
 = .004. These results 
show that the underlying structure of the system does have a significant impact on 
the amount of knowledge that subjects acquire through direct instruction. However, 
more relations per se does not seem to make the task of acquiring structural 
knowledge more difficult, rather, there is a trend that suggests that it is more difficult 
to acquire knowledge about systems with a higher level of connectivity implied by 
the goal states.  
7.3.3.2 The effect of structural information on the acquisition of structural 
knowledge 
It was predicted that the amount of structural knowledge acquired by subjects 
would be a function of the amount of structural information that was available to 
them. Across the levels of system complexity, mean knowledge test scores were 
68.68 (SD = 27.47) in the complete information condition, 66.99 (SD = 25.96) in the 
partial information condition and 60.79 (SD = 25.30) in the no information condition.  
On average, subjects who received any (complete or partial) structural 
information acquired more structural knowledge than those who received no 
information; b = -6.05, t(280) = -4.20, p < .01, f
2
 = .24. Although the means were in 
the expected direction, the amount of knowledge acquired by subjects in the 
complete information condition did not differ significantly from the partial 
information condition; b = -3.58, t(280) = -1.43, p = .15, f
2
 = .09. This indicates that 
those who received any structural information acquired more knowledge than those 
who did not receive such instructions. However, increments in the amount of 
information available to subjects did not have a significant impact on the amount of 
structural knowledge acquired. This is perhaps unsurprising, considering that the 
instructions in the partial information condition only omitted information about one 
relationship in the system.  
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7.3.3.3 Interaction between structural information and system complexity on the 
acquisition of structural knowledge  
The main effects of system complexity and structural information on structural 
knowledge, however, are characterised by significant interaction effects, as depicted 
in Figure 7.3. The effect of structural information on the amount of knowledge that 
subjects acquired was much stronger in V3x3-R-6-C-2 in comparison to V3x3-R-3-
C-1; b = 5.53, t(280) = 2.67, p < .01, f
2
 = .16. An inspection of the means reveals that 
for subjects interacting with the least complex system (V3x3-R-3-C-1) structural 
knowledge test scores were close to ceiling level across the information conditions. 
This suggests that subjects interacting with this system who received only partial or 
no information were able to independently infer the complete underlying structure of 
the system.  
Similarly, the effect of structural information on the amount of knowledge that 
subjects acquired was much stronger for V3x3-R-6-C-2 in comparison to V3x3-R-7-
C-3; b = 4.75, t(280) = 2.38, p < .01, f
2
 = .14. An inspection of the means reveals that 
for the system with the highest level of connectivity (V3x3-R-7-C-3), structural 
knowledge test scores were uniformly poor across the information conditions. This 
suggests that when the level of connectivity was high, subjects who were given 
information were unable to convert it into knowledge.  
The effect of structural information on the amount of knowledge that subjects 
acquired was similar for V3x3-R-6-C-2 in comparison to V6x6-R-12-C-2. An 
inspection of the means reveals that under these conditions, the impact of 
information on the acquisition of structural knowledge is in the expected direction, 
with more structural information being associated with better structural knowledge 
test scores. As V6x6-R-12-C-2 has twice the number of relations of V3x3-R-6-C2, 
this indicates that the number of relations in a system does not have the expected 
detrimental impact on knowledge acquisition. 
In summary, we expected that the effect of structural information on the 
acquisition of structural knowledge would diminish as system complexity (as 
indicated by the number of relations or connectivity) increased. This expectation was 
partially supported as it was found that the connectivity implied by the goal states 
moderates the impact of structural information on the acquisition of structural 
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knowledge, and that this effect is curvilinear. The results show that the provision of 
structural information conferred little advantage to the acquisition of structural 
knowledge at low (V3x3-R-3-C-1) and high (V3x3-R-7-C-3) levels of connectivity. 
Information did confer an advantage to structural knowledge when the system was at 
a medium level of connectivity (V3x3-R-6-C-2 and V6x6-R-12-C-2). The number of 
relations in the system did not have a consistent impact on the acquisition of 
structural knowledge. This indicates that the number of relations in a system is not a 
good indicator of system complexity in relation to knowledge acquisition. 
Table 7.3 
Results of a regression analysis examining the effect of structural information and system complexity 
on structural knowledge test scores 
Variables entered β t p f 2 
APM .283 4.53 < .01 .26 
Main effect: System complexity     
V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 47.11 16.16 < .01 .70 
V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 13.36 4.69 < .01 .27 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.18 -.06 .95 .004 
Main effect: Structural information     
No vs. Any information -6.05 -4.20 < .01 .24 
Partial vs. Complete information -3.58 -1.43 .15 .09 
Interaction effects     
(No vs. Any information) X (V3x3-R-
3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
5.53 2.67 < .01 .16 
(No vs. Any information) X (V6x6-R-
12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
2.07 1.04 .30 .06 
(No vs. Any information) X (V3x3-R-
7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
4.75 2.38 < .05 .14 
(Partial vs. Complete information) X 
(V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
4.78 1.32 .19 .08 
(Partial vs. Complete information) X 
(V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
1.40 .40 .69 .02 
(Partial vs. Complete information) X 
(V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
4.43 1.28 .20 .08 
 
7.3.4 The effect of structural information and system complexity on the quality of 
system control 
7.3.4.1 Comparisons to random control performance scores 
Firstly, in order to appropriately interpret the effect of structural information on 
control performance, it is necessary to compare the control performance scores in 
each condition to random control performance scores. If control performance were in 
fact not better than random then it would be inappropriate to claim that efficient 
control performance is dependent on the amount of structural information that is 
available, regardless of whether subjects who receive structural information perform 
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better than those who do not receive such information. Therefore, to determine 
whether subjects‘ control performance was better than random, a series of multiple 
regressions were conducted, using dummy coded variables to compare performance 
in each information condition to the random performance scores for each system. 
Note that lower control scores indicate better performance. 
Subjects controlling V3x3-R-3-C-1 in the complete, partial and no information 
conditions performed significantly better than random in both control phases; bcomplete 
= -.77, t(89) = -12.61, p < .01, f
2
 = .80, bpartial = -.74, t(89) = -12.25, p < .01, f
2
 = -.79 
and bno = -.81, t(89) = -13.38, p < .01, f
2
 = .82, for the first phase, and bcomplete = -.84, 
t(89) = -19.26, p < .01, f
2
 = .89, bpartial = -.81, t(89) = -19.26, p < .01, f
2
 = .90 and bno 
= -.80, t(89) = -18.85, p < .01, f
2
 = .89, for the second phase.  
Subjects controlling V3x3-R-6-C-2 in the complete information condition 
performed significantly better than random across both phases; b = -.22, t(93) = -
4.01, p < .01, f
2
 = .38 and b = -.27, t(93) = -3.78, p < .01, f
2
 = .37. Similarly, in the 
partial information condition, subjects performed significantly better than random in 
the first phase; b = -.17, t(93) = -2.99, p < .01, f
2
 = .29. However, although the means 
are in the expected direction, subjects did not perform significantly better than 
random in the second phase; b = -.11, t(93) = -1.57, p = .12, f
2
 = .16. Subjects in the 
no information condition did not perform better than random in either control phase; 
b = -.04, t(93) = -.63, p = .53, f
2
 = .07 and b = -.01, t(93) = -.07, p = .94, f
2
 = .01.  
Subjects controlling V6x6-R-12-C-2 in the complete information condition 
performed significantly better than random across both phases; b = -.34, t(96) = -
6.13, p < .01, f
2
 = .53 and b = -.36, t(96) = -4.63, p < .01, f
2
 = .43. Similarly, in the 
partial information condition, subjects performed significantly better than random in 
the first phase; b = -.25, t(96) = -4.50, p < .01, f
2
 = .41. However, although the means 
are in the expected direction, performance was not significantly better than random 
in the second phase; b = -.14, t(96) = -1.89, p = .06, f
2
 = .19. Subjects in the no 
information condition did not perform better than random in either control phase; b = 
-.07, t(96) = -1.27, p = .21, f
2
 = .13 and b = -.01, t(96) = -.07, p = .94, f
2
 = .01. 
Subjects controlling V3x3-R-7-C-3 in the complete information condition did 
not perform better than random in either phase; b = -.05, t(99) = -.81, p = .42, f
2
 = .08 
and b = -.07, t(99) = -1.10, p = .27, f
2
 = .11, respectively. Subjects in the partial 
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information condition performed significantly better than random in the first phase, b 
= -.27, t(99) = -4.29, p < .01, f
2
 = .40, but not in the second phase; b = .01, t(99) = -
.05, p = .96, f
2
 = .01. Subjects in the no information condition did not perform better 
than random in either phase; b = -.02, t(99) = -.37, p = .71, f
2
 = .04 and b = -.10, t(99) 
= 1.60, p = .11, f
2
 = .16, respectively.  
In summary, these results suggest that the effect of structural information is 
dependent on the complexity of the system, and in particular, on the connectivity of 
the system. When the connectivity was low (i.e. V3x3-R-3-C-1), successful control 
performance did not depend on access to structural information. Rather, subjects 
performed better than random regardless of the amount of information that was 
available. At medium levels of connectivity (V3x3-R-6-C-2 and V6x6-R-12-C-2), 
complete structural information was a pre-condition of better than random 
performance. However, at high levels of connectivity (i.e. V3x3-R-7-C-3), even 
those provided with complete or partial structural information did not consistently 
perform better than random. This suggests that any differences between the 
information conditions for subjects interacting with V3x3-R-7-C-3 should be 
interpreted cautiously; as subjects who received information did not on average 
perform better than random, the claim cannot be made that structural information 
confers an advantage to control performance under these conditions. These results 
support our hypotheses, and extend upon the findings reported earlier, which showed 
that the effect of structural information on the acquisition of structural knowledge 
was moderated by system complexity.  
7.3.4.2 The effect of information condition on the quality of control performance 
In order to determine whether structural information conferred an advantage to 
control performance, and whether this effect was moderated system complexity, 
multiple regression analyses were conducted using effect-coded variables to conduct 
contrast analyses. These analyses excluded the random control performance scores 
and the model contained 12 predictors of control performance. Mean centred scores 
on the APM were included in order to control for any potential group differences in 
fluid intelligence, two contrasts examined the main effect of structural information, 
three contrasts examined the main effect of system complexity and six contrasts 
computed the interaction terms between these variables. The results of these analyses 
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are reported in Tables 7.4 and 7.5, and the interpretation of the main effects and 
interactions are presented in the subsequent sections.  These results are independent 
of any potential group differences in fluid intelligence, although scores on the APM 
were a significant predictor of performance across both control phases; b = -.01, 
t(280) = -4.81, p < .01 f
2
 = .28 and b = -.01, t(280) = -6.03, p < .01, f
2
 = .34, 
respectively. Figure 7.4 and 7.5 shows the corrected control performance scores, by 
information condition and level of system complexity. 
  
Figure 7.4: Corrected control performance scores in phase 1 by information condition and system 
complexity (error bars represent 95% confidence intervals) 
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Figure 7.5: Corrected Control performance scores in phase 2 by information condition and system 
complexity (error bars represent 95% confidence intervals) 
7.3.4.3 The effect of system complexity on system control 
It was predicted that in comparison to V3x3-R-6-C-2, subjects would have 
better control over V3x3-R-3-C-1, and worse control over V6x6-R-12-C-2 and 
V3x3-R-7-C-3. For V3x3-R-3-C-1, the mean control performance scores across the 
levels of structural information were .23 (SD = .23) in the first phase and .18 (SD = 
.14) in the second phase. For V3x3-R-6-C-2, the mean control performance scores 
were .86 (SD = .22) in the first phase, and .87 (SD = .29) in the second phase. For 
V6x6-R-12-C-2, the mean control performance scores were .79 (SD = .24) and .83 
(SD = .33). For V3x3-R-7-C-3, mean control performance scores were .89 (SD = .25) 
in the first phase and 1.01 (SD = .25) in the second phase.  
In line with our predictions, subjects had significantly better control over 
V3x3-R-3-C-1, in comparison to V3x3-R-6-C-2 in phase 1 and 2; b = -.63, t(280) = -
17.49, p < .01, f
2
 = .72 and b = -.69, t(280) = -17.51, p < .01, f
2
 = .72, respectively. 
Against expectations, subjects had significantly better control over V6x6-R-12-C-2, 
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in comparison to V3x3-R-6-C-2 in phase 1; b = -.08, t(280) = -2.30, p < .05, f
2
 = .14. 
This result was particularly surprising, considering that V6x6-R-12-C-2 has twice the 
number of relations of V3x3-R-6-C-2. However, although it was in the same 
direction, this difference was not significant in phase 2; b = -.06, t(280) = -1.43, p = 
.16, f
2
 = .09. As expected, subjects had better control over V3x3-R-6-C-2 in 
comparison to V3x3-R-7-C-3, although this differences was only significant in phase 
2; b = .01, t(280) = .22, p = .83, f
2
 = .01 and b = .11, t(280) = 2.81, p < .01, f
2
 = .17, 
respectively. These results suggest that systems that contain more relations are not 
more difficult to control. Rather, there is a trend that suggests that systems that entail 
a higher level of connectivity are more difficult to control. 
7.3.4.4 The effect of structural information on system control 
It was predicted that the quality of subjects‘ control performance would be a 
function of the amount of structural information that was available to them, with 
more information being associated with better control performance. In the complete 
information condition, across the levels of system complexity, the mean control 
performance scores in the complete information condition were .67 (SD = .35) in the 
first phase and .63 (SD = .39) in the second phase. In the partial information 
condition, the mean control performance scores were .65 (SD = .32) in the first phase 
and .74 (SD = .39) in the second phase. In the no information conditions, the mean 
control performance scores were .78 (SD = .37) in the first phase, and .84 (SD = .42) 
in the second phase.  
In line with our predictions, in the first and second phases, control performance 
when any information was available (complete and partial) was significantly better 
than when no information was available; b = .06, t(280) = 3.37, p < .01, f
2
 = .20, and 
b = .07, t(280) = 3.56, p < .01, f
2
 = .21, respectively. We predicted that control 
performance in the complete information condition should be better than in the 
partial information condition. In the first control phase, this difference was not 
significant, although the means are in the expected direction; b = .04, t(280) = 1.26, p 
= .21, f
2
 = .08. However, in the second control phase, control performance in the 
complete information condition was significantly better than in the partial 
information condition; b = .09, t(280) = 2.75, p < .01, f
2
 = .16. Overall, these results 
show that structural information shows an advantage to control performance, with a 
 154 
trend that suggests that increasing levels of structural information results in better 
control performance.  
7.3.4.5 Interaction between structural information and system complexity on the 
quality of system control 
These main effects on control performance, however, are further qualified by 
significant interaction effects between the level of structural information and system 
complexity, as depicted in Figures 7.4 and 7.5. The results indicate that the 
difference in control performance for subjects who received any information in 
comparison to no information was much larger for V3x3-R-6-C-2 in comparison to 
V3x3-R-3-C-1 in phase 1 and 2; b = -.07, t(280) = -2.90, p < .01, f
2
 = .17 and b = -
.06, t(280) = -1.96, p < .05, f
2
 = .12, respectively. Similarly, the difference in control 
performance for subjects who received complete information in comparison to partial 
information was much larger for V3x3-R-6-C-2 in comparison to V3x3-R-3-C-1 in 
phase 2; b = -.11, t(280) = -2.23, p < .05, f
2
 = .13. These interactions support the 
findings observed in relation to the comparisons to the random control performance 
scores. For subjects controlling V3x3-R-3-C-1, across the information conditions, 
control performance was close to ceiling level, and all subjects performed better than 
random. In comparison, for subjects controlling V3x3-R-6-C-2, structural 
information was a pre-condition of better than random performance, and hence the 
difference between the information conditions in terms of control performance is 
much larger than for V3x3-R-3-C-1. 
The effect of structural information on control performance was similar for 
V3x3-R-6-C-2 in comparison to V6x6-R-12-C-2. An inspection of the means reveals 
that under these conditions, the impact of information on control performance is in 
the expected direction: With more structural information being associated with better 
control performance. Again, this supports the findings reported in relation to random 
control performance scores, as subjects controlling these systems only performed 
better than random when structural information was provided. Thus, we can infer 
that under this level of system complexity, structural information does have a 
beneficial impact on control performance.  
The difference in control performance for subjects who received complete 
information in comparison to partial information was much larger for V3x3-R-6-C-2 
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in comparison to V3x3-R-7-C-3 in phase 2; b = -.15, t(280) = -3.45, p < .01, f
2
 = .20. 
Again, this supports the findings in relation to the comparisons to random 
performance scores, as control performance for subjects controlling V3x3-R-7-C-3 
was uniformly poor across the levels of structural information. In comparison, 
subjects controlling V3x3-R-6-C-2 who received structural information performed 
better than random.  
Overall, these results indicate that system complexity, as indicated by the 
connectivity implied by the goal states, to some extent determines whether structural 
information will be utilised. The number of relations does not seem to be a good 
indicator of system complexity in relation to system control. In contrast, the 
connectivity implied by the goal states appears to be systematically related to system 
complexity in relation to system control. At low and high levels of connectivity 
structural information does not show an advantage to control performance. In 
comparison, at medium levels of connectivity, structural information has the 
expected effect on control performance. These results support our hypothesis and 
further clarify the relative contribution of the number of relations and connectivity to 
system complexity. 
Table 7.4 
Results of a multiple regression analysis examining the effect of structural information, system 
complexity and the interaction between these variables on control performance in phase 1 
Variables entered β t p f 2 
APM -.01 -4.81 < .01 .28 
Main effect: System complexity     
V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.63 -17.49 < .01 .72 
V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.08 -2.30 < .05 .14 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 .01 .22 .83 .01 
Main effect: Structural information     
No vs. Any information .06 3.37 < .01 .20 
Partial vs. Complete .04 1.26 .21 .08 
Interaction effects     
(No vs. Any information) X (V3x3-
R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
-.07 -2.90 < .01 .17 
(No vs. Any information) X (V6x6-
R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
.03 1.02 .31 .06 
(No vs. Any information) X (V3x3-
R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
-.01 -.24 .81 .01 
(Partial vs. Complete information) X 
(V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
-.04 -.99 .32 .06 
(Partial vs. Complete information) X 
(V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
.01 .19 .86 .01 
(Partial vs. Complete information) X 
(V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
-.15 -3.45 < .01 .20 
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Table 7.5 
Results of a multiple regression analysis examining the effect of structural information, system 
complexity and the interaction between these variables on control performance in phase 2 
Variables entered β t p f 2 
APM -.01 -6.03 < .01 .34 
Main effect: System complexity     
V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.69 -17.51 < .01 .72 
V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.06 -1.43 .16 .09 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 .11 2.81 < .01 .17 
Main effect: Structural information     
No vs. Any information .07 3.56 < .01 .21 
Partial vs. Complete information .09 2.75 < .01 .16 
Interaction effects     
(No vs. Any information) X (V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. 
V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
-.06 -1.96 < .05 .12 
(No vs. Any information) X (V6x6-R-12-C-2 
vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
.02 .10 .32 .06 
(No vs. Any information) X (V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. 
V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
-.01 -.40 .69 .02 
(Partial vs. Complete information) X (V3x3-R-
3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
-.11 -2.23 < .05 .13 
(Partial vs. Complete information) X (V6x6-R-
12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
.01 .28 .78 .02 
(Partial vs. Complete information) X (V3x3-R-
7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
-.06 -1.21 .23 .07 
 
7.3.5 The relationship between structural knowledge and system control 
It was predicted that the relationship between structural knowledge and control 
performance would be weaker at lower and higher levels of system complexity in 
comparison to V3x3-R-6-C-2. In order to test this prediction, a moderator analysis 
was conducted for each control phase. The model included: The information 
condition to control for the effect of the experimental manipulation of knowledge, 
effect-coded variables to compare control performance in V3x3-R-6-C-2 to each of 
the other systems, mean centred structural knowledge test scores and the interactions 
between system complexity and structural knowledge test scores. The results of these 
analyses are reported in Table 7.6 below.  Overall, the results indicate that 
controlling for the level of structural information and system complexity, subjects 
who acquired more structural knowledge had better control performance across both 
phases; b = -.006, t(284) = -4.35, p < .01, f
2
 = .25 and b = -.007, t(284) = -4.73, p < 
.01, f
2
 = .27, respectively.  
In line with our expectations, in the first control phase, this result is qualified 
by a significant interaction effect that indicates that the strength of this relationship is 
stronger in V3x3-R-6-C-2 than in V3x3-R-7-C-3; b = .005, t(284) = 2.82, p < .01, f
2
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= .17. The findings reported in the preceding sections may account for the weaker 
relationship between structural knowledge and control performance observed for 
V3x3-R-7-C-3. Subjects dealing with this system were unable to convert information 
into knowledge and subjects did not perform better than random regardless of the 
amount of information that they received. It is therefore not surprising that the 
relationship between structural knowledge and control performance should be weak: 
Control interventions cannot be knowledge-based when knowledge has not been 
acquired. However, these results should not be over interpreted, as this effect was not 
significant in the second control phase. 
The relationship between structural knowledge and control performance was 
similar for V3x3-R-6-C-2 in comparison to V3x3-R-3-C-1 and V6x6-R-12-C-2 
across both phases. Overall, these results do not support the hypothesis that the 
relationship between structural knowledge and control performance is moderated by 
system complexity. Rather, it appears that the amount of structural knowledge that 
subjects acquire is a significant predictor of performance regardless of the 
complexity of the system. 
Table 7.6 
Results of a moderator analysis examining the relationship between structural knowledge and control 
performance by system complexity for phase 1 and 2, respectively 
Variables entered β t p f 2 
Control Phase 1     
Information condition -.036 -2.22 .03 .13 
Structural knowledge -.006 -4.35 < .01 .25 
V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.550 -2.23 < .05 .13 
V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 .003 .07 .94 < .01 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 .099 2.22 < .05 .13 
(Structural knowledge) X  
(V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
.006 .80 .43 .05 
(Structural knowledge) X  
(V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
.001 .69 .49 .04 
(Structural knowledge) X  
(V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
.005 2.82 < .01 .17 
Control Phase 2     
Information condition -.080 -4.68 < .01 .27 
Structural knowledge -.007 -4.73 < .01 .27 
V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.516 -2.01 < .05 .12 
V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 .041 .97 .33 .06 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 .172 3.67 < .01 .21 
(Structural knowledge) X  
(V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
.004 .54 .59 .03 
(Structural knowledge) X  
(V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
.001 .32 .75 .02 
(Structural knowledge) X  
(V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) 
.003 1.50 .13 .09 
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7.3.6 The relationship between fluid intelligence and system control by information 
condition 
It was predicted that the magnitude of the relationship between fluid 
intelligence and control performance would increase with the amount of information 
available to subjects. As can be seen in Table 7.7, across both control phases the 
relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance is strong in the 
complete information condition, while it is weak in the partial and no information 
conditions. 
Table 7.7 
The relationship between APM scores and control performance in each phase, by information 
condition 
 Complete 
information 
Partial information No information 
Phase 1 -.42** -.10 -.11 
Phase 2 -.43** -.16 -.17 
** p < .01 
In order to test whether the strength of the relationship between fluid 
intelligence and control performance varied across the information conditions two 
moderator analyses were conducted, which are presented in Table 7.8. The 
significant interaction terms indicate that the relationship between scores on the 
APM and control performance was significantly moderated by the amount of 
information available to subjects across both phases, b = -.004, t(289) = -2.45, p < 
.05, f
2
 = .14, and b = -.003, t(289) = -1.91, p < .05, f
2
 = .11. This indicates that the 
strength of the relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance 
increased as the amount of information available to subjects increased. Thus, 
subjects with a higher level of fluid intelligence were at a greater advantage in terms 
of control performance when more structural information was available. 
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Table 7.8 
Results of two moderator analyses examining the dependency of the relationship between control 
performance and fluid intelligence (APM score) for phase 1 and 2. 
Step Variables entered β t p R2change F 
Control Phase 1 
1 Information 
condition 
-.066 -2.66 < .01  
 
 APM -.004 -3.27 < .01   
     .052 7.88 
2 Information 
condition 
-.062 -2.52 < .05  
 
 APM .003 .96 .340   
 Information 
condition X APM 
-.004 -2.45 < .05  
 
     .019 6.01 
Control Phase 2 
1 Information 
condition 
-.119 -4.25 < .01  
 
 APM -.006 -4.28 < .01   
     .100 16.06 
2 Information 
condition 
-.116 -4.14 < .01  
 
 APM .000 .07 .949   
 Information 
condition X APM 
-.003 -1.91 < .05  
 
     .011 3.65 
Note: The degrees of freedom for the F-test of R
2
change in the step 1 models are (2, 290) and for the step 
2 models are (1, 289).  
 
7.3.7 The relationship between fluid intelligence and system control by system 
complexity 
It was predicted that the magnitude of the relationship between fluid 
intelligence and control performance would increase with system complexity, as long 
as there were no floor effects on control performance. As can be seen in Table 7.9, 
across both control phases, the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance appears to be weak to moderate across the levels of system complexity. 
Table 7.9 
The relationship between APM scores and control performance in each phase, by system 
complexity 
 V3x3-R-3-C-1 V3x3-R-6-C-2 V6x6-R-12-C-2 V3x3-R-7-C-3 
Phase 1 -.23 -.33* -.27* .01 
Phase 2 -.19 -.25* -.29* -.25* 
*p < .05 
 
However, as the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance varies according to the amount of structural information available to 
subjects (see section 7.3.6) we must also take this into account. Therefore, in order to 
test whether the strength of the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
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performance differed according to the level of system complexity, a moderator 
analysis was conducted for each control phase at each level of structural information. 
The model included: a) mean centred scores on the APM, b) dummy-coded variables 
to compare control performance in V3x3-R-6-C-2 to each of the other systems and c) 
the interaction between these variables to compare the differences in the strength of 
the relationship between the APM and control performance for each of the systems. 
The results are reported in Table 7.10 for the no information condition, in Table 7.11 
for the partial information condition and in Table 7.12 for the complete information 
condition.  Against expectations, the interaction terms are not significant, which 
indicates that controlling for the amount of structural information that subjects 
received, the strength of the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance did not vary across the levels of system complexity. 
Table 7.10 
Results of moderator analyses examining the relationship between fluid intelligence (APM score) 
and control performance by system complexity for the no information condition 
Variables entered β t p f 2 
Control Phase 1     
APM -.003 -1.71 .091 .18 
V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.782 -14.16 < .01 .83 
V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.022 -.40 .688 .04 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.007 -.13 .899 .01 
(APM) X (V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .001 .47 .638 .05 
(APM) X (V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) -.001 -.49 .628 .05 
(APM) X (V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .004 1.32 .191 .14 
Control Phase 2     
APM -.004 -1.63 .106 .17 
V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.803 -12.34 < .01 .79 
V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 .015 .23 .817 .02 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 .091 1.46 .148 .15 
(APM) X (V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .001 .28 .781 .03 
(APM) X (V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) -.003 -.82 .416 .09 
(APM) X (V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .001 .24 .813 .03 
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Table 7.11 
Results of moderator analyses examining the relationship between fluid intelligence (APM score) 
and control performance by system complexity for the partial information condition 
Variables entered β t p f 2 
Control Phase 1     
APM -.007 -2.04 < .05 .21 
V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.612 -8.75 < .01 .68 
V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.114 -1.70 .092 .18 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.128 -1.85 .068 .19 
(APM) X (V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .004 .86 .393 .09 
(APM) X (V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .002 .48 .631 .05 
(APM) X (V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .006 1.40 .167 .15 
Control Phase 2     
APM -.009 -2.62 < .01 .27 
V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.742 -10.95 < .01 .76 
V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.086 -1.32 .189 .14 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 .036 .54 .590 .06 
(APM) X (V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .008 1.85 .068 .19 
(APM) X (V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .003 .65 .519 .07 
(APM) X (V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .002 .50 .622 .05 
 
Table 7.12 
Results of moderator analyses examining the relationship between fluid intelligence (APM score) 
and control performance by system complexity for the complete information condition 
Variables entered β t p f 2 
Control Phase 1     
APM -.008 -2.57 < .05 .26 
V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.499 -7.18 < .01 .61 
V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.105 -1.59 .115 .17 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 .185 2.80 .006 .29 
(APM) X (V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .005 .99 .322 .11 
(APM) X (V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .001 .21 .831 .02 
(APM) X (V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .006 1.52 .133 .16 
Control Phase 2     
APM -.008 -2.13 < .05 .22 
V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.544 -6.72 < .01 .58 
V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 -.092 -1.21 .231 .13 
V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2 .186 2.42 < .05 .25 
(APM) X (V3x3-R-3-C-1 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .007 1.30 .197 .14 
(APM) X (V6x6-R-12-C-2 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) -.002 -.45 .653 .05 
(APM) X (V3x3-R-7-C-3 vs. V3x3-R-6-C-2) .003 .66 .510 .07 
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7.4 Discussion 
In summary, the results indicate that the effect of structural information on the 
acquisition of structural knowledge and control performance is dependent on system 
complexity, as indicated by the connectivity implied by the goal states. It was more 
difficult for subjects to understand and utilise information in relation to systems with 
higher levels of connectivity. The effect of the number of relations on knowledge 
acquisition and system control was inconsistent. The strength of the relationship 
between fluid intelligence and control performance increased with the amount of 
information available to subjects, which suggests that the demands of system control 
most closely match those required in traditional measures of intelligence when 
control behaviour is knowledge-based. The strength of the relationship between fluid 
intelligence and control performance did not vary as a function of system 
complexity, which suggests that more intelligent problem solvers have a general 
advantage over their less intelligent counter-parts regardless of the complexity of the 
system.  
The results elucidate important boundary conditions for the effect of structural 
information on control performance. Consistent with the results reported in Study 1 
and 2, when the system consisted of 6 relations between 6 variables, and two 
relations had to be considered in parallel, only subjects provided with structural 
information performed better than random. This result was shown to generalise to a 
system that entailed the same level of connectivity, but twice the number of variables 
and relations. However, subjects who interacted with the system that had a lower 
level of connectivity and half the number of relations performed better than random 
regardless of the amount of information they received. In contrast, subjects who 
interacted with the system that required the consideration of three relations in 
parallel, and consisted of 7 relations between 6 variables had poor control 
performance regardless of the amount of information that they received. Overall, the 
results indicate that the beneficial effect of structural information on control 
performance is dependent on the complexity of the system. 
This may explain why previous studies have found that structural information 
did not benefit control performance (Putz-Osterloh, 1993; Preußler, 1996). In both 
LINAS and V3x3-R-7-C-3 three relations must be considered in parallel in order to 
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make a decision about a goal state. The results of the current study show that at this 
level of system complexity, it is difficult for problem solvers to acquire structural 
knowledge through direct instruction or utilise structural information to control the 
outcomes of dynamic systems. This suggests that the level of system complexity 
entailed in LINAS may have been too high for problem solvers to effectively make 
use of structural information. 
However, the criticism that the instructional method used in previous studies 
may have been inadequate remains valid. In the current study, subjects interacting 
with V3x3-R-7-C-3 failed to convert information into structural knowledge. In 
effect, this demonstrates that at this level of system complexity, even a direct 
demonstration of how each input affects each output, combined with a verbal 
explanation of the material and the presentation of the information on screen while 
the control task is performed, is insufficient to promote structural knowledge. The 
question that remains unanswered is whether any form of direct instruction would 
result in the acquisition of knowledge, and subsequently influence control 
performance, in systems with highly complex structures. It may be that under such 
conditions, problem solvers require an extended period of goal-orientated practice in 
order to acquire knowledge and chunk it into useable components. Effectively, this 
would reduce the information processing demands of the task (i.e. complexity) and 
hence the overall level of difficulty experienced by the problem solver. 
In Study 2, the effect of structural knowledge on control performance could 
only be inferred indirectly through the effect information on control performance. 
However, in the current study the test of structural knowledge directly after the 
instructions allowed us to test whether efficient control performance is dependent on 
the acquisition of structural knowledge. It was found that better than random 
performance was consistently associated with the acquisition of a high level of 
structural knowledge prior to control performance, and under these conditions the 
relationship between structural knowledge and control performance was strong. 
Concomitantly, performance was not better than random when little knowledge was 
acquired prior to the control phase, and under these conditions the relationship 
between structural knowledge and control performance was weak. These results 
clarify the results observed in Study 2, and demonstrate that successful control 
performance is dependent on the acquisition of structural knowledge. 
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However, an alternative conclusion might be drawn from the control 
performance scores of subjects who interacted with the low complexity system 
(V3x3-R-3-C-1) and did not receive structural information. These subjects had 
almost perfect control over the system. This could be interpreted as evidence that 
systems at a low level of complexity can be controlled without structural knowledge, 
through a process of trial-and-error. However, it seems likely that subjects‘ efficient 
control interventions were knowledge-based under these conditions. Firstly, their 
structural knowledge test scores were almost perfect, indicating that they acquired 
almost complete structural knowledge prior to the control phase. Secondly, their 
control performance scores showed high levels of internal consistency, which would 
not be expected if they were learning to control the system through trial-and-error. 
Thirdly, the relationship between structural knowledge and control performance was 
similar to that observed in relation to V3x3-R-6-C-2, which suggests that the amount 
of knowledge that subjects acquired determined the quality of their control 
performance. Taken together, these findings suggest that at low levels of system 
complexity problem solvers can easily infer the underlying structure of the system 
without assistance, and that efficient control actions are the result of knowledge-
based interventions. 
Nevertheless, it was particularly surprising that subjects dealing with the low 
complexity system in the no information condition acquired almost perfect structural 
knowledge. In the instructional phase in the no information condition multiple 
variables were changed on each trial. This pattern of interventions was selected to 
prevent subjects from independently inferring the underlying structure of the system. 
This suggests that the relationship between VOTAT strategy use and the acquisition 
of structural knowledge is dependent on the complexity of the system. That is, a 
strong relationship between the two will only be found when the system is 
sufficiently complex to require a systematic testing strategy for the acquisition of 
knowledge. 
With regard to the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance, it was found that the strength of this relationship increased with the 
amount of structural information available to subjects. These results cross-validate 
those reported in Study 2, and support the hypothesis put forward in Chapter 4 that 
control performance under different levels of knowledge has differential validity. 
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That is, the processes used to control the systems under different levels of knowledge 
may differ.  
The strong relationship between control performance and scores on the APM 
when complete structural information is available is consistent with a number of 
previous studies (Putz-Osterloh, 1981; Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Hörmann & 
Thomas, 1988). The strong relationship suggests that when complete structural 
information is available there is a large overlap between the underlying processes of 
the two tasks. As discussed in Chapter 4, Carpenter et al.‘s (1990) analysis of the 
requirements of the APM suggests that the main sources of individual differences in 
performance are the ability to induce abstract relations and dynamically manage 
information in working memory. One could argue, that the high correlation between 
the APM and control performance under conditions where complete information is 
available suggests that in both instances abstract relations have to be induced and 
dynamically managed.  
The lower correlations under partial and no information conditions, however, 
would suggest that the aforementioned processes are less prevalent. Considering that 
subjects in the no information condition did not perform better than random this 
suggests that their control actions were the result of random interventions. There 
should be no systematic differences in the success of random interventions, and 
therefore we would not expect a relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance. In comparison, under conditions of partial information, control 
interventions may be a combination of knowledge-based interventions and trial-and-
error. The presence of random interventions may introduce unsystematic sources of 
variability that may lower the relationship to fluid intelligence. Overall, these results 
suggest that a lower relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance 
is to be expected when problem solvers do not have access to complete knowledge of 
the underlying structure of the system, and thus are forced to act randomly to some 
extent. 
These results may explain why the relationship between fluid intelligence and 
control performance is so inconsistent in previous research. Typically, when problem 
solvers are required to control the system without an initial exploration phase, the 
relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance has been found to be 
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low (e.g. Dörner et al., 1983; Funke, 1983; Gediga et al., 1984; Putz-Osterloh, 1985; 
Reichert & Dörner, 1988; Joslyn & Hunt, 1998).  In contrast, when problem solvers 
first explore the system in order to acquire structural knowledge and then control the 
system, the relationship between fluid intelligence and control performance is 
moderate (Beckmann, 1994; Funke, 1985; Misiak & Kluwe, 1986; Krörner, 2001; 
Wagener, 2001; Kröner & Leutner, 2002; Krörner et al., 2005; Bühner et al., 2008). 
This pattern of results is consistent with the results of the current study, which 
suggests that if problem solvers do not get a chance to acquire knowledge then 
performance will be the result of random interventions, and thus will not reflect 
differences in fluid intelligence. Alternatively, when problem solvers acquire 
knowledge, performance is knowledge-based, and thus reflects differences in fluid 
intelligence. 
Against expectations, the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance did not vary as a function of system complexity. This is particularly 
surprising considering that it was more difficult to control the systems that were 
designed to be more complex. This would suggest that the control of more complex 
systems requires the execution of a greater number of processes. One explanation for 
this result may be that the change in the number of processes to be executed across 
the levels of system complexity was too small to be detected by changes in the 
relationship to fluid intelligence. 
Nevertheless, the results of this chapter make an important contribution to our 
understanding of system complexity. In the introduction it was argued that system 
complexity could be conceptualised as a function of the information processing 
demands imposed by system properties in the performance of a particular task. In 
support of this claim, it was found that the connectivity implied by the goal states, 
rather than the number of relations, was a consistent predictor of the difficulty of 
knowledge acquisition and system control. This is interpretable from an information-
processing point of view, as increases in connectivity increase the amount of 
information that must be processed simultaneously by the problem solver. In 
contrast, an increase in the number of relations in a system, without an increase in 
connectivity, simply increases the number of operations that must be performed 
sequentially. The results of the present study are in line with those from other 
domains that have shown that the amount of information that must be processed in 
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parallel is directly related to task complexity (e.g. Halford et al., 1998a; Andrews & 
Halford, 2002; Birney & Halford, 2002; Halford et al., 2005; Beckmann, 2010). 
These results qualify those reported by Kluge (2008) and Funke (1985; 1992) 
in relation to the effect of the number of relations on the difficulty of knowledge 
acquisition and system control. In these studies, manipulations of the number of 
relations in systems with the same number of variables resulted in concomitant 
increases in the connectivity implied by the goal states. The results of the current 
study suggest that the connectivity implied by the goal states, rather than the number 
of relations, may be responsible for the decrements in knowledge acquisition and 
control performance observed in these studies. 
In contrast to the thinking of many researchers in this domain, the results 
suggest that a system complexity framework based on counting the number of certain 
system properties will be insufficient for predicting the difficulty of knowledge 
acquisition or control performance. Rather, the framework must take into account a) 
the task to be performed by the problem solver and b) how system properties 
influence the amount of information that must be processed in parallel in the 
performance of this task. One approach to this problem might be to decompose task 
performance into a series of sub-tasks, and then count the number of system 
properties that influence performance on each sub-task. The sub-task with the highest 
processing load could be taken as indicative of overall system complexity in relation 
to performing that particular task. Halford and colleagues (Halford et al., 1998a; 
Halford et al., 2005) have developed and successfully used a similar approach to 
estimate the complexity of reasoning tasks (i.e. Relational Complexity Theory). The 
results suggest that such an approach to system complexity might prove useful for 
the comparisons of different systems and for the prediction of knowledge acquisition 
and control performance. 
The results also point to the need to construct systems at the appropriate level 
of complexity for studying processes such as reasoning and decision-making, and to 
assess problem solving competencies. If the system is too complex, performance is 
likely to be random, and consequently there will be floor effects on performance. 
Under such conditions it would be inappropriate to derive inferences about cognitive 
processes or problem solving competencies from the data. The results of the current 
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study suggest that systems become ―too complex‖ when problem solvers are required 
to integrate three sources of information in order to make a decision about a goal 
state. However, strong conclusions cannot be drawn from the results of a single 
study. Further research is required to establish the limit on human performance in 
dynamic systems, and establish guidelines for the construction of systems at 
appropriate levels of complexity. 
In conclusion, the results of this study indicate that successful problem solving 
in complex and dynamic environments requires structural knowledge. The likelihood 
that problem solvers will be able to acquire such knowledge through direct 
instruction and use it to effectively control systems is dependent on fluid intelligence 
and system complexity. In particular, it was found that it is more difficult to convert 
information into knowledge and control systems that have a high level of 
connectivity. The number of relations in the system did not have a consistent impact 
on knowledge acquisition or system control. This indicates that the amount of 
information to be processed in parallel is an important determinant of performance 
on these tasks. This is congruent with our conceptualisation of system complexity as 
a function of the information processing demands of the task to be performed 
engendered by the properties of the system. Overall, the success of system control 
can be seen as a function of the interaction between the limitations imposed by the 
system in terms of the amount of information that must be processed in parallel and 
the knowledge and abilities of the problem solver. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
The overall goals of this project were to determine the conditions that are 
required to learn how to effectively control dynamic systems, and the psychological 
processes that separate successful from less successful problem solvers in the 
performance of this task. The main emphasis of this investigation was to clarify the 
role of structural knowledge in the control of dynamic systems, and to identify 
sources of individual differences in problem solvers capacity to acquire such 
knowledge and apply it in a goal-orientated application.  A combined experimental 
and differential approach was adopted to address these goals, which consisted of the 
experimental manipulation of the task and structural characteristics of complex 
problems combined with the use of process indicators and external psychometric 
tests. This allowed us to identify a causal relationship between structural knowledge 
and control performance across systems of differing complexities, and to account for 
individual differences in the strength of this relationship. This chapter will 
summarise the main findings from this project, and discuss the implications for the 
use of complex problems as a tool for the assessment of problem solving 
competencies and training. We will also identify some key issues in this domain that 
are in need of further research. 
8.2 How does structural knowledge influence the control of dynamic systems? 
At the outset of the project, a comprehensive review of the literature was 
conducted to integrate the findings from the three major research paradigms that 
have investigated how people learn to control dynamic systems (Dynamic Decision 
Making, Implicit Learning and Linear Structural Equations). This review revealed 
that the role of structural knowledge in the control of dynamic systems was unclear. 
While some studies had found that the amount of structural knowledge subjects 
acquire is positively associated with the quality of their control performance (e.g. 
Funke & Müller, 1988; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Kröner 
et al., 2005; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Osman, 2008a), others had found evidence 
that subjects learn to control dynamic systems seemingly in the absence of structural 
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knowledge (e.g. Broadbent, 1977; Broadbent et al., 1986; Berry & Broadbent, 1984; 
1988). This inconsistency had not been adequately addressed in the literature, as each 
research approach had largely operated independently of the others. 
In order to reconcile this inconsistent pattern of results, a framework was 
constructed to describe complex problems in terms of their task, surface and 
structural characteristics. It was argued that each approach entails the application of a 
specific set of these characteristics to the design and use of complex problems, which 
in turn influences the type of knowledge that will be acquired and utilised. Based on 
this synthesis of the results of previous research, it was concluded that a positive 
association between structural knowledge and control performance is consistently 
observed when system states can be generated that are informative to the underlying 
structure of the system, the problem is presented in a novel context and problem 
solvers are given the opportunity to acquire knowledge prior to the instruction to 
control the system to achieve specific goals.  
However, the dependency of efficient system control on the acquisition of 
structural knowledge had not been clearly established. The results of a number of 
studies had found that subjects provided with structural information do not show 
better control performance than subjects who perform without such information, or 
who are required to acquire structural knowledge through an unguided exploration of 
the system variables (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993; Preußler, 
1996). This was particularly surprising considering that many studies had shown that 
the majority of subjects do not acquire complete knowledge of the underlying 
structure of systems through an unguided exploration of the system variables (Funke 
& Müller, 1988, Müller 1993; Beckmann, 1994; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; 
Vollmeyer, etal., 1996; Burns & Vollmeyer 2002; Kröner, 2001; Schoppek, 2002; 
Kröner, etal., 2005; Kluge, 2008; Osman, 2008a). These findings had led some to 
argue that systems can be controlled successfully without the aid of specific 
knowledge, and that a simple strategy of trial-and-error may be as efficient in 
achieving goal states as the application of the rules underlying a system (Putz-
Osterloh, 1993).  
Our findings do not support this claim, but rather converge on the relevance of 
the acquisition of structural knowledge for successful system control. The main 
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findings were:  1) the amount of structural knowledge that problem solvers acquire 
has a systematic impact on the quality of their control performance, with increasing 
levels of structural knowledge resulting in better system control; 2) we found no 
evidence that problem solvers can efficiently control the outcomes of dynamic 
systems in the absence of structural knowledge. When structural knowledge was not 
acquired control performance was no better than random. When control performance 
was not better than random, individual differences in control performance were also 
rather inconsistent. This suggests that when problem solvers do not acquire structural 
knowledge their control performance is the result of trial-and-error, which is not a 
sufficient strategy for learning to control the outcomes of dynamic systems; and 3) 
these results were shown to generalise to systems at different levels of complexity. 
Overall, these results demonstrate that in order to successfully control the outcomes 
of dynamic systems, problem solvers must develop an accurate model of the 
underlying structure of the system. 
These findings are particularly significant considering that in many studies that 
have investigated how people learn to control dynamic systems, subjects have not 
been given the opportunity to build up their knowledge base prior to the instruction 
to control the system (e.g. The Dynamic Decision Making Approach; Dörner, 1975, 
Brehmer, 1987; Sterman, 1994; Busemeyer, 2002; Dörner, 1980; Dörner & Wearing, 
1995; Kerstholt & Raaijmakers, 1997). The conclusion that has been drawn from the 
results of these studies is that people perform poorly because they must process 
multiple sources of information in parallel, while co-ordinating between different 
goals and sub-tasks and acting within time constraints. It has been argued that these 
demands overwhelm the resources of the information processing system, which 
results in sub-optimal performance. However, the results of the current project 
suggest that problem solvers simply do not have the chance to acquire sufficient 
domain specific-knowledge to make effective decisions under such conditions. 
Previously, the benefit of structural information had only been observed when 
subjects first practiced applying structural information to reach specific goals (Putz-
Osterloh, 1993; Preußler, 1998). These results were interpreted as evidence that the 
application of structural information was a skill that had to be practiced in addition to 
learning the structure of the system. It was argued that structural knowledge alone is 
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insufficient to control the outcomes of dynamic systems (Schoppek, 2004; Preußler, 
1996; Preußler, 1998). 
The results of the current project lead to a significant revision of this view as 
well. We found that if problem solvers can convert information into structural 
knowledge, then it has a positive impact on the quality of control performance, 
without a period of goal-orientated practice or prior exposure to the system. Indeed, 
once structural knowledge was acquired, the quality of subjects‘ control performance 
was rather stable over a number of intervention trials and across different goal states. 
This indicates that practice does not have any significant impact on the effectiveness 
with which subjects are able to apply structural knowledge (at least within a limited 
time frame).  
The differing pattern of results observed in comparison to previous research 
may be attributable to two factors. Firstly, the instructions used in the current project 
may have been more effective in promoting structural knowledge as they were 
designed in accordance with the principles of CLT. Previous studies employed either 
a diagram of the underlying structure of the system presented on paper (Putz-
Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Putz-Osterloh, 1993) or standardised examples as to how 
each input effected each output with text-based explanations (Preußler, 1996). In the 
current project, standardised examples with a concurrent audio explanation were 
utilised to try to minimise the number of cognitive activities that subjects would have 
to undertake to translate the information provided into knowledge about the system. 
Additionally, a diagram that depicted this information remained on screen during the 
control tasks as an external memory aid.  
It should be noted, however, that one potential confound is that the method 
used to instruct structural knowledge also demonstrated a useful strategy for 
acquiring that knowledge (i.e. the VOTAT strategy). It may be argued that if the 
structural information was not understood, subjects may have used the VOTAT 
strategy to acquire additional knowledge during the control phase. Improvements in 
performance may then be due to the instruction of the VOTAT strategy, rather than 
the instruction of structural information. However, this seems unlikely considering 
that a) in order to successfully control the system subjects must vary multiple inputs 
at the same time which is incompatible with the use of the VOTAT strategy and b) 
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subjects in Study 1 showed significant improvements in control performance directly 
after they received structural information. It therefore seems unlikely that they were 
trying to acquire knowledge during the control phase. Similarly, in Studies 2 and 3, 
control performance in the complete information conditions was consistently 
superior to control performance in the no information conditions. This would not be 
the case if subjects in the complete information condition were attempting to acquire 
new knowledge while they controlled the system.  Nevertheless, it must be 
acknowledged that the instruction of structural knowledge also demonstrated the best 
strategy for the acquisition of new knowledge.  
To return to the differing pattern of results observed in comparison to previous 
research, secondly, the results of the current project suggest that the complexity of 
the system, as indicated by the connectivity implied by the goal states, to some extent 
determines whether structural information will be understood and utilised by 
problem solvers.  In the study reported in Chapter 7, we constructed a complex 
problem that had an underlying structure that had the same level of connectivity 
implied by the goal states to that used by Putz-Osterloh (1993) and Preußler (1996). 
It was found that subjects interacting with this system failed to convert information 
into knowledge and subsequently did not perform better than random. This suggests 
that the benefit of practice proposed in previous studies may be attributable to the 
additional time needed to understand the information provided when the system is 
highly complex, rather than an effect of practice per se. Further research is required 
to determine the type of instructions that are required to promote structural 
knowledge when systems have highly complex structures. 
8.3 What differentiates successful from less successful problem solvers in the control 
of dynamic systems? 
Clearly, the results of this project establish the primary importance of the 
acquisition of structural knowledge for effective system control. Overall then, the 
quality of problem solvers‘ control performance can be seen as a product of their 
individual capacity to acquire knowledge and then use it to control the system. Few 
previous studies had considered the acquisition of structural knowledge and system 
control as capacities that might be determined by divergent sources of individual 
differences.   
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8.3.1 Individual differences in the acquisition of structural knowledge 
The results show that the acquisition of structural knowledge through an 
unguided exploration of the system variables is largely determined by the 
identification and use of the VOTAT strategy and fluid intelligence (indicated by 
scores on the APM). Importantly, these variables were found to be relatively 
unrelated to one another. On the one hand, this suggests that training on how to 
design effective experiments to test hypotheses, or homogenising the system states 
that subjects can observe during the exploration phase, might significantly reduce the 
difficulties that problem solvers at all levels of ability experience when they try to 
acquire structural knowledge. On the other hand, more intelligent problem solvers 
will still be at an advantage as they are able to more effectively induce the rules from 
the data and test hypotheses.  
In situations where problem solvers receive direct instruction with regard to the 
underlying structure of the system, the main requirement is that they effectively 
translate the information provided into knowledge. The results of the study reported 
in Chapter 7 showed that many subjects who received complete structural 
information had difficulty converting this information into knowledge. This was 
particularly surprising considering that the test of structural knowledge essentially 
required subjects to replicate system states that they had viewed in the instructional 
phase. It was also found that performance on the structural knowledge test was 
largely unrelated to fluid intelligence. Again, this suggests that training interventions 
designed to improve structural knowledge might have significant benefits to problem 
solvers at all levels of ability.  
Overall these results indicate that more successful problem solvers are better 
able to: 1) design experiments that provide clear tests of hypotheses; 2) convert 
structural information into knowledge about the system and 3) have a higher level of 
fluid intelligence.  Individual differences in structural knowledge are determined by a 
combination of acquired skills and cognitive ability. 
8.3.2 Individual differences in control performance 
The results of the current project indicate that individual differences in control 
performance can primarily be accounted for by the amount of knowledge that 
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problem solvers acquire. However, once the amount of structural knowledge is taken 
into account, control performance is strongly related to fluid intelligence. 
Importantly, the strength of this relationship did not depend on the complexity of the 
system or whether structural knowledge was acquired through direct instruction or an 
unguided exploration of the system variables. Indeed, it did not diminish even when 
subjects had practice on the control task prior to receiving structural information. 
Overall, this indicates that more successful problem solvers possess more structural 
knowledge and have a higher level of fluid intelligence.  
However, it must be acknowledged that it cannot be ruled out that the 
consistent correlation between fluid intelligence and control performance is not due 
to some other common factor. A number of studies have found that non-cognitive 
factors such as motivation, metacognition and emotions have a significant impact on 
the cognitive processes involved in the acquisition of structural knowledge and 
system control (e.g. Vollmeyer, Rollett & Rheinberg, 1997, 1998; Vollmeyer & 
Rheinberg, 1999, 2000; Spering, Wagener & Funke, 2005; Barth & Funke, 2009). It 
is therefore possible that one of these unmeasured sources of individual differences 
could account for some of the variance in control performance currently attributed to 
fluid intelligence.  
The results of the current thesis do, however, clarify the conditions that are 
required to observe a strong relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance: The strength of the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance appears to depend, to a certain degree, on whether or not structural 
knowledge has been acquired. When complete structural knowledge was acquired, 
the quality of subjects‘ control performance was strongly related to fluid intelligence, 
which suggests that under these conditions the demands of the two tasks are similar. 
The main processes that distinguish between individuals on tests of fluid intelligence 
are the ability to induce abstract relations and working memory capacity (Carpenter 
et al., 1990). Since the requirements of system control precludes the acquisition of 
further structural knowledge (i.e. the abstraction of relations or rules), it can be 
inferred then, that the main source of individual differences in control performance is 
working memory capacity. These results support our task analysis that was presented 
in Chapter 4, and the results of previous research that has shown that control 
performance and working memory capacity are moderately correlated (Wittmann & 
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Süß, 1999; Wittmann & Hattrup, 2004; Bühner et al., 2008). These results extend 
upon these previous findings, as they show that the relationship holds when the 
amount of structural knowledge acquired by problem solvers has been taken into 
account. That is, that the effect of fluid intelligence on control performance is 
independent of the effect on fluid intelligence on the acquisition of structural 
knowledge.  
When no structural knowledge was acquired, the relationship between fluid 
intelligence and control performance was somewhat weaker, although those who 
were more intelligent were still at a significant advantage compared to those who 
were less intelligent. However, as the reliability of control scores was low and 
performance was not better than random under these conditions, it seems likely that 
the differences between people may be the result of unsystematic sources of 
variance. Thus, it seems inappropriate to draw inferences about the processes that 
separate successful from less successful problem solvers when no structural 
knowledge has been acquired.  
When only partial structural knowledge was acquired, the relationship between 
fluid intelligence and control performance was similar to that observed when no 
knowledge was acquired. This may be because for some subjects, the partial 
information instruction helped them gain insight into the structure, and for others it 
may have hindered learning. Thus, some subjects may have been using a knowledge-
based strategy to control the system and others may have been acting through trial-
and-error. This would weaken the relationship between fluid intelligence and control 
performance. This issue has significant implications for the assessment of problem 
solving competencies which will be discussed in more detail in the following section. 
8.4 Implications for the use of complex problems as a tool for the assessment of 
problem solving competencies 
Currently, no guidelines are available which describe how complex problems 
should be constructed and administered for the purposes of assessment and selection. 
Consequently, the task, structural and surface characteristics of the complex 
problems that are used in assessment settings are rather heterogeneous. Clearly, the 
results of the current project and previous research indicate that this has significant 
consequences in terms of what these so-called tests of complex problem solving are 
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actually measuring. However, it is usually claimed that complex problems measure 
the capacities to acquire and utilise structural knowledge (Hornke & Kersting, 2005; 
Kluge, 2008; Greiff & Funke, 2008; 2009. Therefore, in this section we will suggest 
some general guidelines for the construction and administration of complex problems 
that will ensure that performance does indeed reflect these capacities, based on the 
findings of the current project. 
The results of the current project indicate that the acquisition of structural 
knowledge and system control impose different cognitive demands on the problem 
solver. However, system control is dependent on the acquisition of structural 
knowledge; structural knowledge cannot be acquired while problem solvers try to 
control the outcomes of a system. Thus, in concordance with Funke (1984; 1992; 
2001), we argue that these tasks need to be separated experimentally in order to 
assess performance on each of these tasks independently of the other. This means 
that, firstly, test-takers should be given an opportunity to acquire structural 
knowledge through an unguided exploration of the system variables before they are 
required to control the outcomes of the system. This allows for an appropriate 
assessment of the problem solvers‘ capacity to design effective experiments, test 
hypotheses and induce rules. In addition, we suggest that before test-takers are 
required to control the outcomes they should be directly instructed as to the 
underlying structure of the system. This should allow for valid comparisons of 
control performance to be made between test-takers who may otherwise have 
acquired different levels of structural knowledge.  If complex problems are 
administered in this way, the capacity to acquire structural knowledge can be 
assessed independently of the capacity to utilise knowledge. 
There is some debate over whether it is appropriate to administer a single 
complex problem in order to assess problem-solving competencies, as is the typical 
practice in most assessment settings. The rationale for this practice is that complex 
problems are analogous to a work sample, in which the test-taker is required to deal 
with a complex and dynamic system (U. Funke, 1998; Kluge, 2008). Grieff and 
Funke (2008; 2009) argue that this practice is psychometrically questionable, and 
that multiple complex problems of differing complexity need to be administered in 
order to make valid inferences with regard to problem solving competencies. They 
propose that problems of differing complexity can be constructed by varying their 
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underlying structures. However, the results of Study 3 show that even small changes 
in the underlying structure of a system can result in ceiling and floor effects on 
performance. This suggests that the administration of multiple complex problems 
with different underlying structures may not provide any more information about 
test-takers than the administration of a single complex problem. The important point 
is that the complex problem must be at an appropriate level of complexity to 
differentiate between test takers, and that extensive pilot testing is required to ensure 
that performance on any individual complex problem does indeed reflect the 
capacities to acquire and utilise structural knowledge. 
The current project clearly demonstrates the necessity of comparing test-takers‘ 
control performance to control performance that has been produced through random 
interventions, in order to establish a clear standard for successful performance. While 
this is not a new idea (see Beckmann, 1994), it has rarely been employed (with the 
notable exceptions of Beckmann, 1994; Kluge, 2008). The results of Study 3 clearly 
demonstrate that if the controllability of the system is not taken into account then 
―good‖ performance may be attributable to ―good‖ decision making on the part of 
the test-taker or, alternatively, structural characteristics that result in ―good‖ control 
performance no matter what interventions are undertaken. 
The importance of structural knowledge for system control suggests that 
complex problems should be presented in a novel context. Currently, most of the 
complex problems that are used for personnel selection and assessment purposes are 
presented with familiar cover stories and labels for the system variables (U. Funke, 
1998; J. Funke, 1998; Greiff & Funke, 2009). While the situations are usually 
selected so that test-takers do not have direct experience with them in their everyday 
life, it is most likely that will be familiar with the variables in question, which may 
allow them to form assumptions about the underlying structure of the system. These 
assumptions may not be consistent across test-takers, and as such, the familiarity of 
the context represents a source of uncontrolled variance that is likely have a 
significant impact on the acquisition of structural knowledge and subsequent control 
performance. The presentation of problems in entirely novel contexts (i.e. with 
abstract labels for the system variables) will ensure that it is possible to make valid 
comparisons between test-takers. 
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All of the issues discussed so far, however, have only been concerned with 
how best to measure the capacities to acquire structural knowledge and use it to 
control the outcomes of dynamic systems. Clearly, a critical consideration in 
personnel selection and educational assessment must also be whether the scores that 
are produced are in fact meaningful predictors of job or academic performance. In 
addition, it is crucial to show that they have incremental validity in the prediction of 
job and academic performance over and above traditional measures of intelligence, 
which have been show to be one of the best predictors of these criterions (Neisser et 
al., 1996; Hunter & Schmidt, 1997). Although the current project did not address the 
first issue, with regard to the second, the results indicate that the acquisition of 
structural knowledge has some demands that are divergent from those that are 
captured in traditional tests of intelligence, such as the APM. In particular, problem 
solvers must design experiments that will yield data that can be used to test 
hypotheses in order to acquire structural knowledge. This skill is likely to be 
particularly relevant in jobs that require research and development, and educational 
settings that foster a constructivist perspective on learning. This suggests that the 
capacity to acquire structural knowledge through an unguided exploration of the 
system variables may show incremental validity in the prediction of success in 
certain types of jobs and academic settings over and above traditional measures of 
intelligence.  
8.5 Directions for future research 
It remains an important question as to whether structural information is useful 
when problem solvers already have a partial mental model of the system that is based 
on their real world experiences. The results of Study 1 suggest that problem solvers 
can incorporate new information into an existing mental model. However, this 
knowledge had only been acquired moments before, in the same context. If that 
knowledge was acquired over a more extensive period of time, in multiple contexts 
in the real world, then it may be more difficult to revise. To the authors‘ knowledge, 
there has not been any research that has addressed this question, although a number 
of studies have investigated how familiarity and domain expertise influences the 
acquisition of knowledge through an exploration of the system variables, and the 
results are rather inconsistent (e.g. Reither, 1981; Beckmann, 1994; Beckmann & 
Guthke, 1995; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Rolo & Diaz-Caberera, 2005; Lazonder et 
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al., 2008; 2009). In order to address this issue, future research could examine the 
effect of structural information on system control with complex problems that are 
embedded in a familiar context. 
In other domains, it has been shown that practice influences the organisation of 
knowledge and strategies for performance in complex tasks. Findings show that 
increasing amounts of practice are associated with better performance (Holyoak, 
1991; Ericsson, 2003), and that the influence of intelligence declines as performance 
becomes more automatised (Ackerman, 1988; 1990; 1992; Kanfer & Ackerman, 
1989). In the current project, we did not find that practice had a significant impact on 
the quality of system control, or the relationship between control performance and 
fluid intelligence. However, our investigations were rather time-limited. Therefore, 
the need is apparent to determine whether and how control performance changes 
with practice over longer periods of time, and whether the sources of individual 
differences in control performance change as a result of practice.  
The current project primarily focussed on the role of cognitive factors in 
complex problem solving. Other research has shown that non-cognitive factors, such 
as motivation and emotions, also have a significant impact on performance in 
complex and dynamic environments (Vollmeyer et al., 1997, 1998; Vollmeyer & 
Rheinberg, 1999, 2000; Spering et al., 2005; Barth & Funke, 2010). Moving forward, 
one of the biggest challenges facing researchers in this field is to determine how 
cognitive and non-cognitive factors might interact and influence performance. Until 
then, our model of performance in complex and dynamic environments remains 
incomplete. 
8.6 Conclusion 
The conditions that are required to learn how to effectively control the 
outcomes of dynamic systems are now clear. The results of the current project 
demonstrate that the successful control of complex systems requires domain-specific 
knowledge. That is, knowledge of the relationships between the variables in the 
system. Without such knowledge, control behavior is rather unsystematic, and as a 
result, performance is no better than what might be achieved through random 
interventions on the system variables. The acquisition of structural knowledge can be 
achieved either through an unguided exploration of the system variables, or direct 
 181 
instruction. Direct instruction is preferable if the aim is to provide the problem solver 
with maximal amounts of structural knowledge, however, it may be ineffective if the 
underlying structure of the system is highly complex. Individual differences in the 
capacity to design effective experiments in order to test hypotheses plays a crucial 
role in the acquisition of knowledge, as does fluid intelligence, which also influences 
the subsequent application of the acquired knowledge. The success of control 
performance can then be seen as a function of the amount of knowledge that is 
acquired, combined with the intelligence of the problem solver.  
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS IN THE COMPLETE INFORMATION CONDITION 
The following screenshots and text show the instructions given in the 
information condition for Study 1, and in the complete information condition in 
Study 2 and 3. The text was presented as a concurrent narration. 
 
On the first trial, we should determine whether any of the outputs change 
independently of the inputs. So we should set each input to zero, and see if the 
outputs change.  
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So we set each of the inputs to zero, and U didn‘t change, V decreased, and W 
increased. So it looks like V and W change on their own over time.  
 
Let‘s record that result. So we found that V and W changed. So output V, yes it 
changes. It decreased, so that‘s a negative effect, and I‘m going to say that it‘s a 
medium effect. Output W, yes it changed, it increased, so that‘s a positive effect, and 
it‘s quite small, so I‘m going to say it‘s a weak effect. 
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This time I‘m going to look at the effect of input A on the outputs. So I‘m going to 
increase A to maximum, and set each of the other inputs to zero.  
 
o I increased A to maximum, and U increased, V increased and W increased. Now 
we would expect W to increase on its own anyway, so it has not effect there. So we 
can say A effects U and V. 
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Let‘s record that result. So we found that input A effects output U. Yes there‘s an 
effect, increasing A increases U, so it‘s a positive effect. And I‘m going to say it‘s a 
weak effect. We also found that A effects V. Increasing A increases V, yes there‘s an 
effect, it‘s a positive effect, and I‘m going to say it‘s a strong effect because it has to 
work against the independent decline in V. 
 
So this time I‘m going decrease A to minimum and set the inputs to zero.  
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So we decreased A, and U decreased, V decreased and W increased slightly.   
 
So I‘ve already recorded that result that A affects U and V. 
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This time I‘m going to look at the effect of B on the outputs. So I‘m going to set A at 
zero, increase B to maximum, and set C at zero.  
 
So increased B, and U increased, V decreased and W increased slightly. We know 
that V and W change on their own anway, so it looks like B only effects U.  
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So let‘s record that result. B only affected U. Yes there was an effect, we increased B 
and U increased, so that‘s a positive effect, and I‘m going to say it‘s a weak effect. 
 
This time I‘m going to look at the effect of B again, but I‘m going to decrease it to 
minimum and set the other inputs at zero.  
 217 
 
So I decreased B, and U decreased, V decreased and W increased slightly.  
 
So I‘ve already recorded that B only effects U. 
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This time I‘m going to look at the effect of C on the outputs. So I‘m going to set A to 
zero, B to zero and increase C to maximum.  
 
So I set C to maximum, U stayed the same, V decreased slightly, and W decreased. 
So I would expect V to decrease on its own anyway, so there‘s no effect there. And 
this time W decreased, so we found that C effects W. 
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So let‘s record that result. We found that C affected W. Yes there was an effect. We 
increased C and W decreased, so that‘s a negative effect, and I‘m going to say it‘s a 
medium effect. 
 
OK, so looking at the effect of C again, setting A to zero, B to zero and decreasing C 
to minimum.  
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We decreased C to minimum. U stayed the same, V decreased slightly and W 
increased slightly. So C only effects W.  
 
So I‘ve already recorded that C has a positive, medium effect on W. 
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APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTIONS IN THE PARTIAL INFORMATION CONDITION 
The following screenshots and text show the instructions given in the partial 
information condition (Study 2 and 3). The text was presented as a concurrent 
narration. 
 
On the first trial, we should determine whether any of the outputs change 
independently of the inputs. So we should set each input to zero, and see if the 
outputs change.  
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So we set each of the inputs to zero, and U didn‘t change, V decreased, and W 
increased. So it looks like V and W change on their own over time.  
 
Let‘s record that result. So we found that V and W changed. So output V, yes it 
changes. It decreased, so that‘s a negative effect, and I‘m going to say that it‘s a 
medium effect. Output W, yes it changed, it increased, so that‘s a positive effect, and 
it‘s quite small, so I‘m going to say it‘s a weak effect. 
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This time I‘m going to look at the effect of input A on the outputs. So I‘m going to 
increase A to maximum, and set each of the other inputs to zero.  
 
So I increased A to maximum, and U increased, V increased and W increased. Now 
we would expect W to increase on its own anyway, so it has not effect there. So we 
can say A effects U and V. 
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Let‘s record that result. So we found that input A effects output U. Yes there‘s an 
effect, increasing A increases U, so it‘s a positive effect. And I‘m going to say it‘s a 
weak effect. We also found that A effects V. Increasing A increases V, yes there‘s an 
effect, it‘s a positive effect, and I‘m going to say it‘s a strong effect because it has to 
work against the independent decline in V. 
 
So this time I‘m going decrease A to minimum and set the inputs to zero.  
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So we decreased A, and U decreased, V decreased and W increased slightly.   
 
So I‘ve already recorded that A affects U and V. 
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This time I‘m going to look at the effect of C on the outputs. So I‘m going to set A to 
zero, B to zero and increase C to maximum.  
 
So I set C to maximum, U stayed the same, V decreased slightly, and W decreased. 
So I would expect V to decrease on its own anyway, so there‘s no effect there. And 
this time W decreased, so we found that C effects W. 
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So let‘s record that result. We found that C effects W. Yes there was an effect. We 
increased C and W decreased, so that‘s a negative effect, and I‘m going to say it‘s a 
medium effect. 
 
OK, so looking at the effect of C again, setting A to zero, B to zero and decreasing C 
to minimum.  
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We decreased C to minimum. U stayed the same, V decreased slightly and W 
increased slightly. So C only affects W.  
 
So I‘ve already recorded that C has a medium, negative effect on W. 
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This time I‘m going to increase all the inputs to maximum. So increasing A to 
maximum, B to maximum and C to maximum.  
 
So all the inputs are set at maximum.  U increases, V increases and W decreases. 
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So nothing new to record on that trial. 
 
This time I‘m going to increase all the inputs to minimum. So increasing A to 
minimum, B to minimum and C to minimum.  
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So all the inputs are set at minimum.  U decreased, V decreased and W decreased. 
 
So nothing new to record on that trial. 
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APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTIONS IN THE NO INFORMATION CONDITION 
The following screenshots and text show the instructions given in the no 
information condition (Study 2 and 3). The text was presented as a concurrent 
narration. 
 
OK on the first trial I‘m going to look at the effect of input A and B on the outputs. 
So I‘m going to increase A to maximum, increase B to maximum and set input C to 
zero.  
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So we increased A and B, and U increased, V increased and W increased slightly.  
 
OK, I‘m going to look at the effect of A and B on the outputs again. This time I‘m 
going to increase A to maximum, decrease B to minimum, and set C to zero.  
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So we increased A and decreased B. U stayed the same. V increased and W 
increased slightly. 
 
OK on the third trial I‘m going to look at the effect of B and C on the outputs. So I‘m 
going to set A at zero, increase B to maximum, and increase C to maximum. 
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So we increased B and C and U increased, V decreased and W decreased. 
 
OK on the fourth trial I‘m going to look at the effect of B and C on the outputs again. 
So I‘m going to set A at zero, decrease B to minimum, and increase C to maximum. 
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OK, so we decreased B and increased C and U decreased, V decreased and W 
decreased. 
 
So on the fifth trial I‘m going to look at the effect of A and C. So I‘m going to 
increase A to maximum. Set B at zero, and increase C to maximum.  
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So we increased A and C, and U increased, V increased and W decreased. 
 
OK, so on the sixth trial I‘m going to look at the effect of all the inputs on the 
outputs. So I‘m going to increase A to maximum, increase B to maximum and 
increase C to maximum.  
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So we increased A, B and C, and U increased, V increased and W decreased.  
 
OK, so this time I‘m going to decrease all the inputs to minimum. So decreasing A to 
minimum, decreasing B to minimum, and decreasing C to minimum. 
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So I decreased A, B and C and U increased, V decreased, and W increased slightly.   
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APPENDIX D 
THE CONCEPTUALISATION AND MEASUREMENT OF TASK COMPLEXITY 
D.1 Introduction 
Task complexity has been discussed as a potential moderator variable on 
performance in a wide range of applied and experimental settings, such as medical 
diagnosis (Xiao, Hunter, MacKenzie & Jefferies, 1996; Park & Jung, 2007), the 
maintenance of electronic systems (Wohl, 1982; Rouse & Rouse, 1979; Rasmussen 
& Lind, 1981), instructional design (Speier, 2006; Stahl, Pieschl & Bromme, 2006; 
Beckmann, 2010), goal-setting (Wood, Mento & Locke, 1987), problem solving 
(Kotovsky, Hayes & Simon, 1985; Sweller, 1976; Haerem & Rau, 2007; Vakkari, 
1999; Spilsbury, Stankov & Roberts, 1990; Halford et al., 2005) and decision-
making (Hu, Huhmann & Hyman, 2007; Olshavsky, 1979; Payne, 1976; Earley, 
1985; Simon & Tversky, 1992; Mone & Shalley, 1995; Paquette & Kida, 1988). 
Currently, task complexity is conceptualised, measured, and operationalised in 
multiple ways, even within particular fields of research. Firstly, in this chapter we 
will review this diverse literature in order to clarify what is meant by task 
complexity. Secondly, the various frameworks that are available to estimate task 
complexity will be evaluated in terms of whether they are likely to provide accurate 
estimates of task performance.  Overall, the purpose of this chapter is to derive a 
more comprehensive account of complexity than is currently given in the complex 
problem solving literature. 
D.2 Dimensions of Task Complexity 
Within the literature, task complexity is often treated as a multi-dimensional 
construct. The primary dimension, which is consistently referred to in all fields of 
research, captures notions of intricacy and inter-connectedness (Spilsbury, Stankov 
& Roberts, 1990). Under this view, typically, task complexity is defined as the 
number of components of the task or mental operations involved when solving the 
task. Different researchers tend to emphasise either the sheer number of procedures 
and/or task elements as the most important contributor to task complexity (e.g. Park 
& Jung, 2007), or the extent to which these procedures and/or task elements must be 
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integrated in a single step (e.g. Halford et al., 1998a) or a combination of the two 
(e.g. Wood, 1986; Campbell, 1988) in order to reach a particular goal.  
Dynamics (Wood, 1986; Woods, 1988), risk (Woods, 1988), task structure 
(Bonner, 1994; Byström & Järvelin, 1995; Haerem & Rau, 2007) and uncertainty 
(Schroder, Driver & Streufert, 1967; Wood, 1986; Woods, 1988; Xiao, Hunter, 
Mackenzie & Jeffries, 1996; Osman, 2010) have been proposed as additional 
dimensions of task complexity by various researchers. Dynamics refers to whether 
the outcomes of the task change in response to the decisions made by the problem 
solver and independently over time. It may also refer to whether there are feedback 
delays in the task (Wood, 1986; Woods, 1988). It could be argued that the extent to 
which a task is dynamic essentially captures a temporal aspect of the primary 
dimension, relating to intricacy and inter-connectedness, and so, these two factors 
should not be considered to be independent.  
Risk refers to the possibility that incorrectly enacting the procedures needed to 
reach a desired solution can have large costs in certain situations (Woods, 1988). For 
example, the negative impact would be considerable if workers fail to correctly 
perform the emergency procedures in a nuclear power plant. Woods (1988) argues 
that risk is typically low in most problem solving and decision-making tasks that are 
performed in a laboratory setting. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the evaluation 
of risk by the task-doer essentially increases the number of mental activities, or 
number of variables that need to be taken into account when performing the task, and 
thus is likely captured by the primary dimension of task complexity relating to 
intricacy and inter-connectedness. 
Task structure usually refers to the level of specification of what is to be done 
in the task. This includes whether the goals are ill or well defined and whether the 
procedures needed to solve the task are known to the task-doer (Bonner, 1994; 
Byström & Järvelin, 1995). However, Haerem and Rau (2007) propose an alternative 
interpretation of task structure. In an extension of Chomsky‘s (1957) work on 
linguistics to an analysis of cognitive tasks they refer to task structure as the level of 
processing that is required in the task. In deep structure tasks, solution requires a 
search through the processes or procedures related to the task. In surface structure 
tasks, solution requires a search through the inputs and outputs of the task. Mixed 
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structure tasks require a combination of the two. As with risk, it seems reasonable to 
expect that task structure, under either definition, is also likely impact upon the 
intricacy and inter-connectedness of the task.  
Uncertainty can be defined as either as an objective property of the task or a 
subjective experience of the problem solver. From an objective perspective, Wood 
(1986) argues that uncertainty exists when the relationships between the variables in 
the task change, or the relationships between actions and outcomes change. 
Similarly, but from a subjective perspective, Osman (2010) defines uncertainty as the 
extent to which the problem solver is confident in predicting the outcome of events 
and that an action will lead to an expected outcome. Alternatively, Guastello (2004) 
argues that uncertainty exists when ―the decision maker knows what the possible 
outcomes would be, knows the probabilities associated with each outcomes, but is 
compelled to guess which of the outcomes will actually take place… [or when] the 
decision maker knows what the possible outcomes would be, but does not know the 
probabilities that each will take place.‖ The common theme across these 
conceptualizations of uncertainty appears to be reliability of the task, where 
subjective uncertainty occurs as a result of objective uncertainty. Of course, a 
situation can also be imagined in which the objective uncertainty of the task is low, 
while the subjective uncertainty of the task is high due to lack of information about 
the task (Osman, 2010). 
Certainly, it seems likely that intricacy and interconnectedness, risk, task 
structure and uncertainty might all contribute to overall task difficulty. However, it 
could be argued that the inclusion of each of these factors within the construct of task 
complexity might reflect a somewhat misplaced desire to unite every aspect of task 
difficulty under the banner of task complexity. Such a strategy, however, is likely to 
be counter-productive because a) it is unclear whether each of these facets are 
independent, and thus whether they should be measured separately, and b) the 
construct may become too broad to posit as a clear explanation for task performance. 
Nevertheless, this problem is largely ignored in the literature as most of the 
frameworks that have been developed to estimate task complexity focus almost 
exclusively on the primary facet that relates to the intricacy and inter-connectedness 
of the task. 
 243 
In the following sections, the frameworks that have been developed to estimate 
the intricacy and inter-connectedness of task (i.e. complexity) will be reviewed, with 
the general organising principle as to whether task complexity is treated as an 
objective property of the task or an interaction between psychological and task 
characteristics. Objective treatments of task complexity claim to consider the task 
independently of any task doer, although it will be argued that this assumption is not 
met in most objective formulations of task complexity. Interactive perspectives 
consider the task in relation to the psychological processes that must be performed in 
order to reach a particular goal.  
D.3 A starting point: The relationship between difficulty and task complexity 
Firstly, however, it is necessary to differentiate between task complexity and 
difficulty. It should be noted that difficulty is not synonymous with task complexity, 
although sometimes the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably (e.g. Kluge, 
2008a; Woods, 1988; Byström & Järvelin, 1995; Earley, 1985; Sweller, 1976). Tasks 
can become more difficult, without necessarily becoming more complex (Rouse & 
Rouse, 1979; Wood, 1986; Campbell, 1988; Bonner, 1994; Spilsbury, Stankov & 
Roberts, 1990; Quesada, Kintsch & Gomez, 2005; Halford et al., 1998a). For 
example, Rouse and Rouse (1979) note that ―While lifting weights, running ten miles 
and monitoring a radar screen for long periods of time may be difficult tasks, they 
are not necessarily complex tasks. A task can be difficult because it is a physically 
hard thing to do, or hard to put up with (i.e. boring) or perhaps because it is complex. 
Thus, complexity should be viewed as a possible component of difficulty‖ (p.724). 
Essentially, complexity is not the only factor that influences difficulty; therefore, it is 
not appropriate to use the terms synonymously.  
However, given our conceptualization of complexity as the intricacy and inter-
connectedness of the task, a more complex task should also be one that is more 
difficult. If hypothesised changes in complexity do not result in empirical changes in 
difficulty, then we might have reason to suspect that our operationalisation of 
complexity may be lacking. In the following sections, alternative conceptualizations 
of task complexity will be evaluated with respect to this assumption.  
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D.4 Complexity as an objective property of the task 
D.4.1 Computational Complexity 
Computational complexity theory examines the complexity of effective 
computations for solving problems that consist of a set of instances (i.e. goals for 
performance) and a set of solutions to these problem instances. Computational 
complexity can be expressed as a function of the amount of time needed to solve a 
particular instance of a problem using the most efficient computation or algorithm. 
Similar calculations can be made in terms of the computer resources needed to solve 
an instance with a particular algorithm. Problems that cannot be solved within a 
certain time frame are referred to as intractable problems. Such problems are 
assigned the highest level of computational complexity, and hence difficulty (Gary & 
Johnson, 1979; Wagner & Wechsung, 1986). 
In the early stages of theoretical development, it was argued that computational 
complexity might provide an index of task complexity for human problem solvers, 
and hence task difficulty (Gary & Johnson, 1979; Rouse & Rouse, 1979; Wagner & 
Wechsung, 1986). However, from a theoretical perspective, the concept of 
computational complexity seems inadequate for this purpose, for at least three 
reasons. Firstly, computational complexity essentially provides an estimate of how 
difficult it is to apply an algorithm, and ignores the difficulty of algorithm selection. 
This is problematic because many tasks require human problem solvers to identify 
and apply solutions, and it is well known that solution identification accounts for a 
large proportion of task difficulty. To cite an extreme example, the effort to create an 
algorithm that can solve the game of checkers (8 x 8 draughts), in the sense that 
perfect play on both sides leads to a draw, started in 1989 and was only recently 
completed in 2007 (Schaeffer, Burch, Björnsson, Kishimoto, Müller, Lake, Lu & 
Sutphen, 2007). Secondly, it has been argued that computational complexity is 
limited in its application to human problem solving because it is only relevant for 
algorithms that guarantee a solution to every instance (i.e. every possible goal state) 
of a problem.  Human problem solvers, on the other hand, tend to search for 
solutions that are relevant to a particular goal state, unless instructed otherwise 
(Brattico, 2008). Thirdly, in mathematical proofs ―…not only is it necessary to make 
explicit the changes an action brings about, it is also necessary to make explicit the 
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things that do not change, and for most actions this will be a great deal‖ (Shanahan & 
Baars, 2005, p.158). It seems doubtful that at a day to day level human problem 
solvers explicitly consider the trivial non-effects of their actions (the frame problem, 
McCarthy & Hayes, 1969; Shanahan & Baars, 2005). Thus, the problems that are 
relevant to the formulation of mathematical proofs or their application are quite 
unlike those that are relevant to human problem solvers in many cognitive tasks.  As 
such, it seems unacceptable to appropriate the concept of computational complexity 
to estimate task complexity.  
Secondarily, the empirical evidence shows that humans can solve many 
problems that are considered to be intractable with little difficulty, and conversely, 
many computationally ―simple‖ problems are quite difficult for human problem 
solvers (Halford et al., 1998a; Quesada, Kintsch & Gomez, 2005). For example, one 
of the most frequently cited examples of an intractable problem is the traveling 
salesman problem. In this problem, subjects are given a list of European cities and 
their distances, and the task is to find the shortest possible route between them, in 
which each city is visited only once. As the number of possible routes increases 
exponentially with the number of cities to be visited, determining the shortest route is 
usually impossible for a computer. Human subjects, on the other hand, solve this 
problem, and it‘s variants, relatively easily (Pizlo, Stefanov, Saalweachter, Li, 
Haxhimusa & Kropatsch, 2006). In contrast, some logic problems such as Wason‘s 
(1966; Wason & Shapiro, 1971) selection task, that have a low computational 
complexity, are extremely difficult for many human problem solvers (Quesada, 
Kintsch & Gomez, 2005). These results suggest that computational complexity does 
not provide a useful metric for operationalising task complexity in the context of 
human problem solvers, or for explaining why one task is more complex than 
another.  
D.4.2 Size of the problem space 
Newell and Simon (1972) proposed that problems, and by extension tasks, 
could be represented by a ―problem space‖, which consists of an initial state, a goal 
state, all the possible states of the problem, and a number of operators that contain 
constraints for moving between states. This idea has been utilised in a study 
conducted by Buchner and Funke (1993) to estimate the complexity of a complex 
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problem in which they argued that ―…complexity is determined by the number of 
states that a device can be in, and by the number of interventions with different 
consequences possible for a given system state. The number of different 
interventions corresponds to the number of potential user decisions given a particular 
state‖ (p.89). Similarly, in decision-making tasks, task complexity is often 
operationalised as the number of alternatives and attributes that must be considered 
in order to make a choice (Olshavsky, 1979; Payne, 1976; Simonson & Tversky, 
1992; Kerstholt, 1992). This essentially reflects the size of the problem space that 
must be considered.   
From the problem space approach has emerged the idea that the size of the 
problem space determines problem difficulty (Kotovsky, Hayes & Simon, 1985), and 
by extension, it has been proposed that the size of the problem space may provide a 
useful proxy for task complexity (Buchner & Funke, 1993; Schoppek, 2002; 
Quesada et al., 2005; Jonassen & Hung, 2008). However, a range of empirical 
evidence suggests that the size of the problem space is not a good indicator task 
difficulty. Firstly, Kotovsky, Hayes & Simon (1985) argue that problems with 
relatively small problem spaces can be extremely difficult to solve. They give the 
example of the Missionaries and Cannibals problem that has a problem space of 16 
nodes and the Tower-of-Hanoi problem that has 27 nodes, and argue that both of 
these problems are quite difficult for problem solvers (see also Quesada, Kintsch & 
Gomez, 2005). Similarly, Buchner and Funke (1993) found that subjects were unable 
to successfully control a dynamic system that had only 9 possible states of the system 
variables. Most strikingly, subjects who controlled this system performed no better 
than subjects who controlled a system that had 46 possible states. These findings 
show that there is not a direct relationship between the size of the problem space and 
task difficulty, and hence that the size of the problem space is not a good indicator of 
task complexity. 
Secondly, the cover story of the problem appears to have a strong effect on task 
difficulty, even though this has no impact on the objective size of the problem space. 
Findings show that problem isomorphs of the Tower-of-Hanoi with different cover 
stories but identical problem spaces have substantially different difficulties.  These 
problem isomorphs can be categorised into two broad classes, according to whether 
the operators that constrain the transitions between states involve moving a variable, 
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or changing a variable. Problems that involve changing a variable take 
approximately twice as long to solve as those that involve moving a variable, 
although they have identical problem spaces (Hayes & Simon, 1974; Kotovsky et al., 
1985). Similarly, as discussed previously, the difficulty of acquiring structural 
knowledge in dynamic systems tasks with different cover stories but identical 
structures, and thus problem spaces, can vary considerably (Hesse, 1982; Beckmann, 
1994; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995; Lazonder, Wilhelm, & Hagemans, 2008; 
Lazonder, Wilhelm & Van Lieburg, 2009). Strong content effects have also been 
observed in numerous studies on decision-making in static tasks (see Goldstein & 
Weber, 1995 for a comprehensive review). This suggests that the content of the 
cover story has an influence on task difficulty, which is not accounted for by the size 
of the problem space.
7
  
Thirdly, findings from a number of different areas of research have shown that 
how the task is visually represented has a strong effect on the difficulty of the task. 
For example, Stock and Watson (1984) found that accountants were more accurate in 
predicting the bond rating of a stock if it was represented schematically, rather than 
numerically. Similarly, in dynamic systems research, graphical presentations of the 
system variables have been shown to result in better control performance than 
numerical presentations (for reviews see Vessey, 1994; Speier, 2006).   Again, these 
manipulations should have no effect on the size of the problem space, yet they result 
in significant effects on problem difficulty.  
Finally, increasing the number of possible decisions open to the problem 
solver, and thus the size of the problem space, does not necessarily hinder 
performance. In decision-making tasks, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between the number of decision alternatives and task difficulty. Numerous 
researchers have found that decision making times increase with the number of 
possible decision alternatives that must be evaluated up until a certain point, after 
which people actually take less time to make a decision (e.g. Naylor, 1968; Payne, 
1976; Hogarth, 1975; Bruce & Johnson, 1996). This suggests that if there is a 
relationship between the size of the problem space and task difficulty, it may not be 
                                                        
7
 Obviously, these objections are also relevant to the computational complexity approach, which 
would also not predict strong content effects. 
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linear. Overall, these results indicate that the size of the problem space does not 
indicate task difficulty, as thus cannot be used to estimate task complexity. 
D.4.3 Campbell‘s (1988) Information Processing Framework 
Campbell (1988) has proposed an Information Processing Framework for 
determining the complexity of cognitive tasks.   Task complexity is conceptualised 
as a function of the information processing demands that the task places on the 
individual, which can be quantified in relation to the information load, information 
diversity and the rate of information change. In the framework, any task 
characteristic that results in an increase in any of these factors implies an increase in 
task complexity.  
Campbell (1988) identifies four task characteristics that result in either a high 
level of information load, diversity or rate of information change, and hence imply 
different levels of task complexity: Multiple paths to a desired goal state, multiple 
desired outcomes, conflicting paths to different desired outcomes and a high level of 
uncertainty between the relationships between inputs and outputs. A typology of 
tasks is proposed that categorises tasks in terms of whether they contain each of these 
characteristics, or combinations of these characteristics. Campbell (1988) argues that 
as tasks contain more of these characteristics, they become more complex. 
This framework is insufficient for the purposes of estimating task complexity 
for a number of reasons, many of which have already been discussed in relation to 
the computational complexity and the problem space approaches. Firstly, the strong 
content effects that are observed in problem solving research cannot be explained 
within this framework. Secondly, the specific limitation of this framework is that it is 
unclear how tasks that are classified as the same within Campbell‘s (1988) typology 
of tasks might be differentiated in terms of their task complexity. For example, all 
items in the Raven‘s Progressive Matrices have only one path to the desired goal 
state, contain one desired goal state, should not have conflicting paths, and contain 
no uncertainty. Clearly, however, the least difficult items are less complex than the 
most difficult items. Thirdly, it could be argued that multiple paths to a desired goal 
state might actually result in a decrease in task difficulty, unless the task-doer is 
required to determine which of the paths is most efficient. Otherwise, it seems 
unlikely that the task-doer will necessarily consider every possible path to the desired 
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goal state. Finally, the emphasis on task characteristics results in a framework that is 
descriptive, rather than explanatory. No explanation is given for why these particular 
task characteristics might result in increases in information processing load. 
D.4.4 Summary of objective measures of task complexity 
Although this is by no means an exhaustive review of objective measures of 
task complexity, it serves to highlight the limitations of this perspective. Firstly, 
objective measures of task complexity may not reflect how the problem solver 
actually approaches the problem. In particular, there is little evidence that problem 
solvers develop mathematically optimal algorithms for solving problems or 
exhaustively search through the problem space for the best solution. Secondly, the 
empirical evidence suggests that task difficulty is dependent on the problem solvers‘ 
internal representation of the task, as strong content effects have been shown on 
problem difficulty. Hence, any measure of task complexity that does not take into 
account how human problem solvers internally represent a task is likely to be 
inadequate. Finally, these approaches do not make any predictions about the limits of 
human performance, as they do not specify when we are likely to encounter a ceiling 
effect on the relationship between complexity and difficulty. Thus, the 
conceptualisation of task complexity as an objective property of the task is likely to 
prove inadequate for the purposes of cognitive research.   
D.5 Complexity as an interaction between psychological and task characteristics 
With these limitations in mind, a number of researchers have attempted to 
conceptualise complexity as an interaction between psychological and task 
characteristics. Although a number of different approaches have been developed, the 
common theme is the description of the task in ―terms of the behaviours and 
cognitive processes that subjects need to perform in order to reach a certain criteria 
of success‖ (Hackman, 1969, p. 103).  
D.5.1 Relational Complexity 
Relational complexity theory (RCT) has been developed by Halford and 
associates (Halford et al., 1998a) in order to account for the limited nature of human 
information processing. In RCT, the task is broken down into a series of sub-tasks, 
which must be completed in order to arrive at the solution. Each sub-task consists of 
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a number of relations and sources of variation that must be integrated in order to 
formulate a solution to the sub-task. A unary relation consists of a single argument 
and one source of variation. A binary relation consists of two arguments and two 
sources of variation and so on. For example, a cat has the property of being a certain 
size (unary relation), as does a dog. If we specify that a cat is smaller than a dog, 
then this constitutes a binary relation. If we further specify that a cat is smaller than a 
dog, under the condition that the breed of the cat and dog is known, then this 
constitutes a tertiary relation. The key claim is that complexity is essentially a 
function of the demand imposed by integrating different sources of information, and 
the relational complexity of a task is defined by the sub-task with the largest number 
of arguments that the problem solver represents in parallel in order to arrive at a 
solution. The relational complexity metric has been applied to a wide range of 
cognitive tasks, and the empirical evidence supports the assumption that increases in 
relational complexity lead to increases in task difficulty (e.g. Halford et al., 1998a; 
Andrews & Halford, 1998; Birney & Halford, 2002; Halford et al., 2005). 
RCT offers a psychological explanation as to why increases in complexity 
should lead to decrements in performance, as the amount of information that can be 
processed in parallel has long been recognised as a critical constraint on human 
performance. Miller (1956) first suggested that human capacity is constrained to 
processing a small number of chunks of information, where a chunk is a unit of 
information of arbitrary size. For instance, the word ―cat‖ can be represented as a 
single chunk or as three chunks if the letters are encoded separately (Halford et al., 
1998a). Initial estimates placed the limit of human information processing at seven 
chunks, plus or minus two (Miller, 1956). However, this estimate has since been 
revised downwards in the light of further empirical evidence (e.g. Broadbent, 1975; 
Fisher, 1984; Halford, Maybery & Bain, 1986; Halford et al., 2005), which suggests 
that human information processing capacity is likely to be constrained to a soft limit 
of processing four relations in parallel (Halford et al., 1998a; Halford et al., 2005). 
Thus, the theory also makes empirically based predictions for the limitations of 
performance in relation to the complexity of tasks.  
In order to overcome these limits on processing, RCT proposes that conceptual 
chunking and segmentation can reduce the number of relations that must be 
processed in parallel. Conceptual chunking occurs when concepts are recoded into 
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fewer dimensions through learning over time (Halford et al., 1998a). For example, 
experienced readers chunk the individual letters of a word together in long-term 
memory, so that they are processed as a single dimension when encountered in text. 
Halford et al., (1998a) argue that the cost of conceptual chunking is that the 
individual dimensions ―…become temporarily inaccessible‖ (p.810). Segmentation 
occurs when relations are broken into steps so that they can be processed serially. 
For example, in multi-digit addition, experienced problem solvers break the process 
down into sub-tasks by grouping like digits and blocking units into groups of 10 so 
they can be handled more easily. As with conceptual chunking, such strategies are 
acquired through experience with the particular problem type. As conceptual 
chunking and segmentation can be used to reduce the relational complexity of a task, 
―…the number of arguments in a relation does not immediately translate into 
effective complexity‖ (Halford et al., 1998a, p.811). Rather, it is dependent on the 
problem solvers‘ internal representations and strategies for solution. These 
mechanisms could potentially explain the strong content effects that have been 
observed in relation to problem solving and decision-making.  
As comprehensive as RCT may be, it does have some general practical 
limitations. Firstly, not all tasks involve processing relations so the theory is limited 
in its application (Halford et al., 1998b). Secondly, the researcher must have a 
comprehensive model of how the task is performed in terms of the sub-tasks that 
must be executed for successful performance. Thirdly, as experienced relational 
complexity is influenced by the problem solvers‘ internal representation and acquired 
strategies, this makes it hard to predict the difficulty of tasks where problem solvers 
have a large amount of domain knowledge and experience (Halford et al., 1998a). 
Fourthly, unless the internal representation of a particular individual is known, then it 
is impossible to determine the complexity of the task as it is experienced by that 
individual (Sweller, 1998).  
D.5.1.1 Complexity frameworks similar to RCT 
D.5.1.1.1 Element interactivity 
In cognitive load theory (CLT), element interactivity has been proposed to 
account for the load on working memory imposed by the demands of instructional 
material (Sweller, 1994; Sweller & Chandler, 1994; Sweller, 2010). In the early 
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stages of its theoretical development (e.g. Sweller, 1994; Sweller & Chandler, 1994), 
element interactivity was used to explain only the intrinsic cognitive load imposed by 
the task, which is the ―…natural complexity of information that must be understood 
and material that must be learned…‖ regardless of the instructional format (Sweller, 
2010, p.124). However, more recently it has been argued that it can be used to 
estimate the cognitive load of the task as a whole (Sweller, 2010).  
Element interactivity is the extent to which information elements in learning 
material interact, and hence must be processed in parallel in order to be learned, 
where ―an element is anything that needs to be or has been learned, such as a concept 
or a procedure‖ (Sweller, 2010, p.124). Thus, in CLT the emphasis is on the 
narrower concept of ―learning‖, in comparison to the broader concept of 
―processing‖ in RCT, which includes learning, but also encompasses other mental 
activities such as reasoning.  
In addition, the concept of an ―element‖ is less clearly defined than a 
―relation‖. However, it could be argued that if an element can consist of a procedure 
to be learned then it is likely to be composed of a number of (possibly interacting) 
relations. Hence, the examination of tasks at the relational level provides a finer 
grained level of analysis than an examination of tasks at the level of elements. 
As in RCT, the level of element interactivity depends, to some extent, on the 
internal schemas of the learner. To return to an example given earlier, Sweller (2010) 
similarly argues that while novice readers may process the letters of a word as 
individual elements, an expert reader will process it as a single element. As in RCT, 
CLT proposes that element interactivity, and thus cognitive load, can be reduced 
through the design of efficient instructional materials, in order to encourage 
chunking or segmentation so that interacting elements can be processed serially, or at 
a lower level of interactivity (Sweller, 2010). A range of empirical evidence supports 
the claim that reductions in element interactivity lead to better learning in 
instructional settings, and hence reductions in task complexity (for a review see 
Sweller, 2010). Considering that the tenants of CLT in relation to element 
interactivity are essentially identical to those proposed by RCT, these empirical 
results add weight to the utility of relational complexity as an effective means of 
estimating task complexity in different domains.  
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D.5.1.1.2 Step complexity 
Park and colleagues (Park, Jung & Ha, 2001; Park, Jung, Kim, Ha & Shin, 
2001; Park, Jung, Kim & Ha, 2003; Park, Jung, Ha & Park, 2002; Park, Jung, Kim & 
Ha, 2003) have proposed a similar metric to RCT for estimating the complexity of 
emergency operating procedures, which they refer to as step complexity. The task to 
be performed is broken down into a series of sub-tasks, each with separate goals, 
which are further decomposed into a series of procedural steps. Procedural steps are 
at an equivalent level of analysis to relations in RCT. The complexity of each sub-
task is then estimated as a function of the amount of information that is needed to 
complete the sub-task, the logical structure of the procedural steps to be performed 
and the number of procedural steps that need to be executed. As in RCT, the 
complexity of the task is equated with the step complexity for the most complex sub-
task. The utility of the measure was demonstrated in a series of studies conducted by 
Park and associates (Park et al., 2001; Park et al., 2002; Park et al., 2003), who found 
that it was a significant predictor of response times in accomplishing the procedural 
steps associated with each sub-task in the emergency operating procedures of a 
nuclear power plant.  
One problem with this measure is that it is difficult to quantify the complexity 
of a procedural step (Park & Jung, 2007). For example, is a step that entails the 
comparison of two values more complex than a step that entails the prediction of a 
value, given a certain state in the system? Park and Jung (2007) suggest a rather 
complex answer to this problem that involves modelling individual procedural steps 
though graph entropy, a method that has traditionally been used to evaluate the 
complexity of software. However, as mentioned previously, as procedural steps are 
at the same level of analysis as a relation in RCT, it would be possible to quantify the 
complexity of procedural steps as a function of the number of relations that must be 
integrated in order to instantiate them. In psychological terms, this has a clear 
advantage over the graph entropy method, as it provides an explanation for the 
complexity of procedural steps with regards to cognitive processes. In comparison, 
the application of the graph entropy procedure is likely to suffer from the same 
problems that were discussed in relation to computational complexity earlier, as the 
assumption that we (human problem solvers) process information in the same way as 
computers is highly questionable.  
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D.5.2 Wood‘s (1986) conceptualisation of task complexity 
Wood (1986) proposes that tasks can be described in terms of their required 
acts, products and information cues. Acts are the mental activities and behaviours 
that are undertaken to produce a given product, where a product is the measurable 
result of an act. Information cues are the knowledge relevant for performance and 
feedback from the task. Overall, task complexity is conceptualised as a function of 
the information processing demands of the task to be performed. 
It is argued that three types of complexity contribute to the overall information 
processing demands of the task: Component complexity, coordinative complexity and 
dynamic complexity. Component complexity is ―…a direct function of the number of 
distinct acts that need to be executed in the performance of the task and the number 
of distinct information cues that must be processes in the performance of these acts‖ 
(Wood, 1986, p.66). It can be reduced if there is a degree of overlap among the acts 
or information cues. For example, if a particular act must be repeated at multiple 
stages of the task. Coordinative complexity is the extent to which acts require precise 
scheduling and timing. For example, coordinative complexity increases if acts must 
be performed in a specific order. Dynamic complexity is the extent to which there is 
uncertainty between the relationships between acts and products. A mathematical 
metric is provided to assess each component of task complexity, although Wood 
(1986) notes that at the current stage of research it is not clear how each type of 
complexity interacts with the other, and it is unlikely that the factors are orthogonal. 
In comparison to RCT, the emphasis here is on the demand imposed on the task-doer 
by the entire task, rather than the demand imposed by the most complex sub-task.  
One essential problem with this approach involves determining what 
constitutes an elementary level of analysis in terms of acts and information cues. 
With regard to the analysis of acts, Wood (1986) notes that an act can be defined at 
varying levels of abstraction, ranging from the very to specific to the more complex. 
For example, ―inference‖ is considered to be one act because it produces a single 
product, although it is likely composed of multiple mental processes. As with the 
step complexity metric discussed earlier, it then becomes difficult to compare the 
complexity of different acts. As the quantification of the complexity of acts is not 
specified, this provokes the question of whether a task that requires many acts that 
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are composed of few processes is more complex than a task that requires a single act 
that is composed of many interacting processes. This issue remains unresolved in 
Wood‘s (1986) task complexity metric. 
With regard to the representation of information cues, Wood (1986) does not 
explicitly address how expertise or domain-relevant knowledge might affect the 
formation of information cues, and thus overall task complexity. However, he does 
acknowledge that domain-relevant knowledge is likely to have a significant impact 
on the number of information cues that are perceived by the task doer. The 
framework also specifies that a comprehensive model of how the task is internally 
represented by the problem solver is required before adequate estimates of task 
complexity can be made using this metric. 
Bonner (1994) argues that Wood‘s (1986) conceptualisation of task complexity 
is insufficient because it does not adequately capture the uncertainty of real world 
tasks. He proposes an alternative approach in which tasks are described in terms of 
their inputs, processes and outputs, which are essentially equivalent to Wood‘s 
(1986) information cues, acts and products, respectively. As in Wood‘s (1986) 
approach, task complexity is described as a function of the number of each of these 
elements. The main extension is that task complexity is also related to the clarity of 
each of these elements. Although Bonner (1994) names a number of distinct factors 
that may influence clarity, it essentially seems to reflect to the extent to which the 
situation is uncertain. For example, the extent to which there are consistent 
relationships between inputs and outputs, and the extent to which cues and goals are 
specified. Thus, although Wood (1986) metric for dynamic complexity captures 
some of these factors, it does not reflect all of them.  
The empirical validity of Wood‘s (1986) metrics is not addressed in the 
original paper. In addition, although a Google Scholar search undertaken on the 25
th
 
June 2010 indicated that Wood‘s (1986) paper is cited in 473 separate papers, few 
researchers have actively applied the framework as it is set out in its original 
formulation. This perhaps reflects the difficulty of meaningfully decomposing a task 
into required acts, products and information cues. It has, however, been used to 
classify tasks on a post hoc basis in a meta-analysis conducted by Wood, Mento & 
Locke (1987) on the effect of goal-setting in cognitive tasks. Across the studies 
 256 
included in the meta-analysis, setting challenging goals led to higher levels of 
performance in simple tasks, but the effect was much smaller in more complex tasks. 
This indicates that task complexity, as defined by Wood (1986), does appear to have 
a psychologically meaningful impact on task performance across a wide range of 
cognitive tasks. 
In a more recent study, Beckmann (2010) has applied Wood‘s (1986) approach 
to quantify the complexity of figural series completion tasks. In these tasks, subjects 
are shown a series of geometric shapes and must describe the next shape in the 
series. The tasks were presented differently in two conditions, ―Standard‖ and 
―Memory Eased‖.  In the former condition, subjects had to describe all the features 
of the next shape in a single answer, while in the latter condition, verbal descriptions 
of the next shape could be made gradually, and as the subject named a feature, such 
as the colour green, it appeared on screen. An information-processing approach was 
used to describe the tasks in both conditions in terms of their component acts, 
products and information cues, and subsequently, Wood‘s (1986) component 
complexity metric was used to determine their level of task complexity. This 
approach was contrasted with a task analysis based on the notion mental load as 
indicated by element interactivity in CLT, which was discussed earlier. Different 
complexity estimates were derived for the tasks presented under different conditions, 
and these estimates lead to the prediction that difficulty would be lower in the 
―Memory Eased‖ than in the ―Standard‖ condition. In contrast, mental load estimates 
did not predict such differences. The results showed that tasks presented in the 
memory eased format did have a lower level of difficulty than in the standard format. 
This suggests that Wood‘s (1986) approach provides an empirically valid means by 
which to provide an a priori estimate of the effect of the task and the situation on 
performance.  
D.5.3 Summary of complexity as a function of psychological and task characteristics 
RCT and Wood‘s (1986) framework converge on the idea that task complexity 
is a function of the information processing demands imposed by the task, which is 
indicated by the number of processes that need to be executed in the performance of 
the task, and the dependency among those processes. This is determined by the 
internal representation of the task-doer and objective requirements of the task. 
 257 
Hence, decrements in performance related to task complexity are explained by 
constraints on the human information processing system.  
In general, the limitations of each these frameworks are similar. Firstly, the 
researcher must have a model of ideal task performance. Secondly, as complexity is 
influenced by the problem solvers‘ internal representation of the task and acquired 
strategies, this makes it hard to predict the difficulty of tasks where problem solvers 
have a large amount of domain knowledge and experience. Thirdly, unless the 
internal representation of a particular task-doer is known, then it is impossible to 
determine the complexity of the task as it is experienced by that task-doer (Sweller, 
1998). In cognitive research, these problems could be overcome through the 
development of comprehensive models of task performance, and utilising tasks that 
are novel for all problem solvers. 
The main difference between the two main frameworks discussed above is in 
terms of their applicability. RCT is limited in application to tasks that involve the 
processing of relations. In comparison, Wood‘s (1986) explicit aim was to develop a 
general theoretical model for the description of tasks that are used to study human 
behaviour. As ―required acts‖ and ―information cues‖ can be specified at varying 
level of abstraction, the framework is flexible enough that it has the potential for 
application to a wide range of cognitive and motor tasks. For example, an ―act‖ may 
involve the processing of a relation, but it could equally be used to describe the 
generation of a strategy, or the retrieval of declarative knowledge. Therefore, 
Wood‘s approach may be applied to a wider range of cognitive tasks than RCT. 
D.5 Conclusions 
At a conceptual level, complexity has been aligned with the intricacy and inter-
connectedness of tasks. In turn, this can be conceptualised as an objective property of 
the task, or as an interaction between psychological and task characteristics. The 
adoption of the first perspective is problematic, as it essentially ignores how the task 
is performed by the task-doer. The second perspective emphasises a process-
orientated account of task complexity. Under this view, complexity is seen as a 
function of the information processing demands of the task to be performed. This 
approach is likely to prove more successful in the prediction of task performance, as 
it takes into account the internal representation of the task-doer and the objective 
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requirements of the task, which are both likely to impact upon the overall difficulty 
of the task to be performed.  
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APPENDIX E 
EQUATIONS FOR THE SYSTEMS USED IN STUDY 3 
V3x3-R-3-C-1: 3 inputs, 3 outputs, 3 relations, connectivity 1  
 
U = Ut-1 + 0.8A 
V = V t-1 + 1.6B 
W = W t-1 – C 
 
V3x3-R-6-C-2: 3 inputs, 3 outputs, 6 relations, connectivity 2 
 
U= U t-1 + 0.8A + 0.8B 
V = 0.8V t-1 + 1.6A 
W = 1.2W t-1 – C 
 
V6x6-R-12-C-2: 6 inputs, 6 outputs, 12 relations, connectivity 2 
 
U = U t-1 + 0.8A + 0.8B 
V = 0.8V t-1 + 1.6A 
W = 1.2W t-1 – C 
X = X t-1 + 0.8D + 0.8E 
Y = 0.8Y t-1 + 1.6D 
Z = 1.2Z t-1 – F 
 
V3x3-R-7-C-3: 3 inputs, 3 outputs, 7 relations, connectivity 3 
 
U = 0.8U t-1 + 0.8A + 0.8B 
V = 0.8V t-1 + 1.6A 
W = 1.2W t-1 – C 
 
 
 
